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Introduction 
 
 
At the moment of writing these lines, many forums are discussing the 
ethical and moral legitimacy of publishing the photograph of Aylan Kurdi, the 
3-year-old Syrian boy whose body was found washed up on a beach in 
Bodrum, Turkey, on September 2, 2015. He had drowned after the boat in 
which he was travelling along with his family and 23 others had overturned. 
They were trying to reach the Greek island of Kos after fleeing war-torn 
Syria. 
 
Over the following days, many national and international newspapers 
dedicated their editorials to the photograph, taken by Nilüfer Demir, with the 
aim of justifying its publication, whether on the front page or inside or on their 
website. With regard to situations like this, most professional codes of ethics 
admit that a greater public interest may justify that the public’s right to be 
informed prevails over the right to privacy of the people affected by the 
events. In theoretical terms, posing the question in these terms does not 
raise many objections. It is, rather, the application to specific cases that can 
be deeply problematical. 
 
For some, this photograph is necessary and the decision to publish it 
could be justified in terms of its extraordinary power to move readers’ 
consciences. More than any other text and more than many other images, 
the shocking impact of the photo of Aylan, lying face down on the beach, has 
the capacity to move people. This is, in fact, the position of the photograph’s 
author herself: “If the picture makes Europe change its attitudes towards 
refugees, then it was right to publish it. I have taken many photographs of the 
refugee drama and none had such an effect on the public consciousness” 
(Küpeli, 2015). According to this position, the goodness of this decision 
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depends on the anticipated benefits that may result from the publication of 
the photograph. 
 
For others, the publication of this photograph is ethically unjustifiable 
and withholding its publication does not compromise the public’s right to be 
informed. Other photos could have been used instead, such as the one 
showing a Turkish paramilitary craddling the body of Aylan in his arms, which 
some newspapers chose to publish on their front pages (El País, The Daily 
Mail, The Sun, The Daily Mirror, The Times, The Guardian, The Washington 
Post, etc.). Whilst also shocking, in this photograph the face of Aylan is not 
visible, which helps to protect his identity. However, is it as effective in raising 
people’s awareness and mobilising political action? 
 
In addition, the idea that news and images could transform, by 
themselves, social and political reality has been challenged by different 
authors. Perlmutter (1998), for instance, has argued that it would be an 
exaggeration to credit iconic photographs with the power to determine 
international political action, and Cohen (2001) has argued that the 
widespread indifference with which citizens relate to social and political 
injustice could be explained by a compassion fatigue effect resulting from the 
overexposure to graphic and violent content, which instead of driving political 
action would generate the opposite reaction. According to this argument, 
there is no need to show the photograph of the body of Aylan to raise 
readers’ awareness of the desperate situation that many Syrian refugees are 
experiencing. Moreover, the publication of shocking images such as this 
would lead readers to become insensitive and would contribute to 
accelerating the horror. 
 
Regardless of the recognition of the value of these theories, which 
denounce the abusive and illegitimate use of images of pain and suffering for 
merely commercial purposes, the question of whether, in the current political 
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context, the publication of the photograph of Aylan Kurdi would not be 
justified in terms of its exceptional nature seems to have no categorical 
answer. Studies on the effects, political or otherwise, that the media is 
capable of unleashing on society would always have enormous difficulties in 
isolating the relative responsibility of a specific media content, whether a 
photograph, a newspaper article or a television report, from the complex flow 
of other media contents and the set of other factors shaping a particular 
historical and cultural context that also influence events (Perse, 2001; 
McQuail, 2010). And studies on the framing and its relation to agenda 
setting, especially when focused on the reception of media contents, are 
faced with the same type of difficulties (Reese, 2001; Borah, 2011). 
 
In Politics as a vocation, Max Weber states that the exercise of politics 
and the press has an undeniably political function cannot be exclusively 
guided by an ethics of conviction that is totally indifferent to the 
consequences of the decisions taken, a position that usually characterises 
the moralist who presumes to live in a perfect world. It cannot, however, be 
completely insensitive to these same convictions, since this would imply a 
cynical behaviour that would not hesitate in justifying any means to reach the 
desired goals. And it is precisely the fact that finding the perfect balance 
between conviction and responsibility does not depend on the application of 
a particular scientific formula that the exercise of politics entails a genuine 
vocation (Weber, 2004: 92). 
 
To further complicate matters, the photograph in question shows the 
death of a child, and our relationship with death, as Sigmund Freud states in 
Thoughts for the Times on War and Death (1915), is a deeply ambivalent 
one (Freud, 1996b). We know that death is life’s natural outcome, but we 
always refer to it as an accident: “We show a patent inclination to do without 
death, to eliminate it from life. We have attempted to silence it.” (Freud, 
1996b: 2110). This emotional ambivalence towards pain and pleasure before 
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the death of the other would be related to, from a phylogenetic point of view, 
the assassination of a leader of a primal horde and from the ontogenetic 
point of view, to the secret desire to kill one’s own father. Death is, therefore, 
the cause of the feeling of guilt and remorse that, according to Freud, are at 
the origin of ethics and religion. Our behaviour before photographs of death 
reveals this same ambivalence. On the one hand, it could be said that photos 
of dead bodies hold a form of fascination for us, mostly morbid, that captures 
our attention. They are shocking photos that increase readership. On the 
other hand, however, we condemn the commercialization of their publication 
as an assault on people’s diginity with the same intensity with which we wish 
to see them, declaring that death should be a private matter. 
 
However, it is not always business and exploitation that drive the long, 
close relationship photography has with death. According to Susan Sontag, 
photography has a greater and uncomparable authority than the written word 
when it comes to “conveying the horror of mass-produced death”. Still 
according to Sontag, the photographs taken in April and the beginning of 
May 1945 in Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald and Dachau demonstrate the 
superiority of photographs over more complex narratives to define and not 
only record the most abominable realities (Sontag, 2003: 24). 
 
The controversy generated over the use of photography in the press is 
as old as photography itself. The suspicion that what is shown may not 
correspond exactly to what actually happened has accompanied 
photojournalism since its inception. Roger Fenton, considered one of the first 
war reporters, was accused of promoting an extremely bloody picture of the 
Crimean war. Technical limitations and mainly editorial restrictions meant 
that the photographs he published in the 1850s in the Illustrated London 
News failed to reflect the full horror of the war. However, staging was not the 
only source of controversy to affect press photography. To it should be 
added, on the one hand, the intrusion into people’s private lives, something 
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that would become a lucrative business from the moment exposure times 
were reduced and pocket cameras were introduced in the 1930s, making 
candid photos popular, and, on the other, the increasing ease with which the 
content of photogrpahs could be altered without leaving a trace of the editing 
process, something that was strengthened by the advent of computers and 
the digitalization of photography in the 1980s, calling into question the 
referential and indexical value of photography that has always formed the 
basis of its credibility. 
 
When we consider written information, there is a set of characteristics 
that we associate more or less consensually with good journalism: good 
news should be truthful, rigorous, objective and should respect people’s 
privacy and dignity. Without these attributes, journalism would lose its 
credibility, which is an indispensable condition to achieve one of its 
fundamental missions: to keep people informed about issues relating to their 
everyday lives. But what happens in the case of photographs? In what sense 
could it be said that a photo is true, or that a photograph is rigorous and 
objective? As images and words refer to reality differently, it is perfectly 
legitimate to ask whether the basic attributes that qualify good news should 
be the same as those that qualify a good press photograph and whether text 
and image should share the same fundamental mission. 
 
From a semiotic point of view, the relationship between words and the 
objects to which they refer is, as a rule, arbitrary. In other words, it is not the 
nature of the objects that motivates or determines the form (signifier) of 
linguistic signs. In this regard, the relation between most words and things is 
purely conventional, i.e. the result of an agreement between the speakers. In 
his Course on General Linguistics, Saussure states that it is the arbitrary 
character of the linguistic sign that makes verbal language the most complex 
and universal symbolic system. It can, then, be considered the paradigmatic 
model of all other symbolic systems (Saussure, 1959, 68). And along the 
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same line, Paul Watzlawick et al. argue, in Pragmatics of Human 
Communication, that (digital) verbal language, by virtue of its arbitrary and 
conventional nature, is the best qualified symbolic system to communicate 
rigorously and precisely (Watzlawick, 2011). Photographs, by contrast, 
represent their objects analogically, by virtue of their similarity to the 
reference. Photographs represent their objects because, under certain 
aspects, they seem like them. In this regard, what photographs represent is 
not established by convention. For Watzlawick et al., what analogue signs 
may lose in determination and rigour, gain in their capacity to move people. 
In this sense, when compared to words, photographs not only relate to 
objects differently, but also relate to people differently. 
 
In terms of these differences, it is legitimate to ask: should the credibility 
of the press photograph be judged according to the same criteria used to 
evaluate a written document? Is it legitimate to expect that images can 
assume the same informative functions demanded of words? What 
relationship should press photography have with artistic photography? What 
attributes should a photograph have so that it may be considered a good 
press photograph? 
 
This study sets out to question the ethos of photojournalism principally 
from the analysis of a set of documents in which the ethical-moral reflection 
on journalism and photojournalism is conceptualized. We will mainly focus on 
the codes of ethics, stylebooks, internal guidelines and academic books 
concerning photojournalism. References to other media accountability 
systems (Bertrand, 2000), also dedicated to reflecting upon what a press 
photograph should be, as well as press associations dictates, opinion 
columns of newspaper ombudsmen, articles published in specialised journals 
and, indirectly, professional forums, will be mentioned, mainly in sections 2.4 
and 2.5., through the investigations of Dona Schwartz (1992, 1999, 2003). 
The aim is to analyse the historical foundations upon which the predominant 
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concept of press photography is grounded and to challenge its theoretical 
legitimacy and practical utility. 
 
This methodological decision does not disregard the distance that exists 
between the (normative) theory of press photography and photojournalism in 
practice. Nor does it ignore the fact that the practice of photojournalism also 
helps forge its professional identity. In other words, the ethos of 
photojournalism is also the result of the understanding reached by all those 
that are more or less directly involved in the activity of taking, selecting and 
editing photgraphs and organising how they are shown and distributed. 
There is no need to carry out any scientific study to confirm that the practice 
of photojournalism is plural and diverse. The question posed is: what relation 
should the much-sought ethos of photojournalism maintain with the various 
ways of understanding and practicing it? This is no insignificant question. In 
fact, and as highlighted by various authors, among them John C. Merrill 
(1974), the ethical reflection on photojournalism should not lose sight of the 
danger of proposing a concept of journalism that threatens its principle and 
fundamental condition: freedom. In this regard, proposing of a set of ethical 
principles aimed at the professional practice should not have as its purpose 
the reduction of various ways of saying or showing reality. Rather, the 
opposite: its diverse and plural expression should be celebrated and 
promoted. For Merrill, this criticism can be extended to the teaching of 
journalism and the imposition of profession entry criteria. Either would help 
legitimise a set of models standardised to look at and understand reality and 
to foster uniformed ways of reporting it. Susan D. Moeller in 2004 
demonstrated that the biased media coverage of the existence of weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq that justified the invasion of the country resulted in 
part from the uncritical application of the inverted pyramid model applied to 
news writing1 (Moeller, 2004). 
 
  16 
The first chapter of this study is dedicated to the relationship between 
general ethics and the ethics applied to journalism and photojournalism. 
Adopting the proposal of Paul Ricoeur (1990), we will attribute to ethics a 
critical and founding function and to morality, a deontological and normative 
function. The question we pose is how a philosophical ethics faced with 
enormous difficulties in legitimating itself is able to help legitimise an applied 
ethics, in this case, to photojournalism, that is capable of responding to the 
crisis in trust being suffered by press and exacerbated by the increasingly 
sophisticated means of digital editing. 
 
While we have excluded the possibility of generating a wide consensus 
surrounding the ultimate grounding of ethics, the route proposed by Paul 
Ricoeur for the question posed is to assign to ethics the task of rethinking the 
convictions and assumptions on which the deontological reflection applied to 
the media are grounded. The ethical reflection assumes at this moment a 
hermeneutical dimension whose aim is to determine whether it is possible to 
reinterpret some of the widely accepted moral principles and apply them to 
the new challenges threatening the accomplishment of the press mission or, 
alternatively, whether it will be necessary to consider reformulating them. 
This strategy will force us to analyse the various documents that bring 
together the ethical reflection on journalism, and from there deduce its 
fundamental ethical principles. The analysis of the codes will allow us to 
conclude that there is a wide consensus on the three fundamental principles 
capable of subsuming all the other deontological rules: freedom, truth and 
the respect for human dignity (Cornu, 1994).  
 
Finally, in the last section of chapter 1, we discuss the question of 
whether the fundamental principles that structure the concept of good news 
can also be applied to photojournalism.  
 
  17 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to questioning the current relationship between 
objectivity and photojournalism. The methodological procedure will be similar 
to that followed in chapter 1. Firstly, we will analyse the central nature that 
the concept of objectivity has assumed throughout the history of journalism, 
in order to then analyse how it was applied to photojournalism. Backed 
mainly by studies carried out by Michael Schudson (1978) and Steven Maras 
(2013), we will identify the various technological, professional, commercial 
and political factors that have contributed to objectivity imposing itself as the 
a central concept in the ethics of journalism. This step will allow us to 
demonstrate that the adoption of the principle of objectivity was made 
historically in response to a set of various needs and that the understanding 
of it changed over time in order to adapt it to these same needs. This 
historical analysis reveals that the concept of objectivity went from being 
considered a characteristic of the subject (the journalist) or the object (the 
news) to being understood as a useful procedure to foster news credibility 
(Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). 
 
In the second section of chapter 2, we analyse how historically the 
concept of objectivity was applied to photojournalism. From reading the 
studies carried out by Barbie Zelizer (1995), Dona Schwartz (1999) and 
Vincent Lavoie (2010), it was also concluded that, in the case of 
photojournalism, the adoption of the principle of objectivity was due to a set 
of technological, professional and commercial needs specific to a particular 
historical moment. This historical analysis allows us to draw two very 
important conclusions for our study: firstly, that the “nearly-natural” relation 
between photography and objectivity (the analogue photograph is the result 
of the direct impression of light projected by objects onto a film) served 
historically as an attempt to regain trust in the media, which had been 
severely questioned for the increasing influence of public relation services, 
political propaganda and commercial interests. Secondly, the analysis of 
photojournalism in different academic journals published in the United States 
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of America demonstrates that the translation of the principle of objectivity to 
photography recommends the application of a set photographic techniques 
designed to hide the intervention of the photographer and minimise the 
material dimension of the image (Schwartz, 1992). The aim is to obtain a 
realistic and natural representation style capable of fulfilling two functions 
simulataneously: to create an identity unique to press photography that 
distinguishes it from artistic photography and to attempt to ground the 
relation of trust in journalism on the object (the news/photograph) and not on 
the subject (the journalist/photograph). 
 
Finally, in the last section of chapter 2, we discuss the theoretical 
legitimacy and the practical utility of this objective and realistic concept of 
press photography. From the analysis of the case of the winning photograph 
of the World Press Photo 2013, by Paul Hansen, which was accused of 
having been manipulated, we will show that insisting on judging the 
legitimacy of a photograph in the digital era from the old paradigm of the 
darkroom and of analogue photography is not only unproductive but, 
moreover, subjects photography to a constant forensic inquisitorial pressure 
that contributes to fostering suspicion and distrust. 
 
The last chapter in this thesis centres on the representation of the other 
and, especially, the suffering of the other. As a general rule, the suffering of 
people should not be news. However, there are exceptions. And, 
unfortunately, in the world in which we live, the suffering of people is often 
caused by evil and injustice, which should be denounced and fought. In this 
regard, the representation of the suffering of the other raises two types of 
questions: on the one hand, it morally obliges journalists to justify that it is 
public interest, and not any other private interest, that determines publication 
and, on the other, it obliges us to raise the question of how to balance 
demands for denouncing evil and injustice with the need to minimise the pain 
and suffering of victims. This second question raises a third, more decisive, 
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one: shouldn’t victims be consulted, whenever possible, with respect to the 
news that concerns them, principally in those cases in which that news 
affects their privacy?  
 
Our reflection on the representation of the suffering of other will be 
initially based on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Although the 
methodological decision must be justified over the course of the 
investigation, there are two fundamental reasons that could be anticipated 
here: the first concerns the centrality that the concept of hospitality occupies 
in his moral philosophy and the second concerns the objections the author 
raises over the possibility of representing the alterity of the other and of 
grounding the relationship with the other in knowledge. For Levinas, the 
encounter with the other is simultaneously a condition of knowledge and the 
revealing of its limitation. The alterity of the other is absolute and, therefore, 
irreductible to the efforts of the subject. In this regard, no representation, 
whatever its nature, could ever encompass what by definition cannot be 
encompassed. The other is the epiphany of the infinite. For this reason, for 
Levinas ethics is fundamentally welcome and care.  
 
Taken together, these two intuitions will help support two important 
theses for this study and will be developed in sections 3.3. and 3.4. 
According to the first, welcoming the other implies giving him/her the 
opportunity to actively participate in the relationship with other members of 
the community. The other needs to be given the opportunity to be seen and 
heard. 
 
To apply the concepts of welcome and hospitality to photography, we 
will resort to the concept of proper distance, proposed by Roger Silverstone 
(2003; 2007). For Silverstone, the representation of the other should be 
thought in terms of a moral distance, understood as the middle between two 
extreme positions, one that errs towards excess (too close or too far) and the 
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other, deficiency (refusal to photograph). In the latest book by Barbie Zelizer 
(2010), we will find other important examples that illustrate that the refusal to 
photograph is not always the right option to fight suffering and injustice.  
 
The second important thesis that the intuitions of Levinas will help to 
support confirms that the traditional concept of press photography, based on 
the canons of naturalism and realism, do not have any privilege when 
representing the reality of the other. This thesis will be important in helping 
us fight the false opposition between politics and aesthetics that threatens to 
paralyse the debate surrounding the image. The works by Susie Linfield 
(2010) and mainly Ariella Azoulay (2008; 2010a), will help demonstrate that 
some of the post-modern criticisms directed against photography by authors 
such as Roland Barthes or Susan Sontag and against what they term the 
aesteticization of suffering, are grounded in a general mistrust in the power of 
representation of the image, also shared by Levinas, and that, paradoxically, 
may serve as an argument for those interested in hiding injustice and 
violence.  
 
Finally, in the last section of chapter 3, we include an empirical study of 
the representation of immigration in four Spanish national daily newspapers 
(El País, El Mundo, ABC and La Razón) between June 2013 and June 2014, 
carried out in collaboration with Dr Ana Beriain Bañares, of the Abat Oliba 
University and Dr Elena Real Rodríguez and Dr María del Mar López 
Talavera of the Complutense University of Madrid.  
 
The study consists of measuring the moral distance with which the 
Spanish newspapers represent immigrants. This evaluation involved 
combining a set of indicators for the analaysis of photographs and for the 
analysis of content. Foremost among the main conclusions is the fact that 
immigrants are not usually the source of the news that concerns them and 
that, as a rule, they are photographed from afar, in groups and without any 
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contact with members of the local community. Although alledegly objective, 
this way of framing and representing immigrants reinforces stereotypes, does 
not help mutual understanding and ends up jeopardizing their social 
integration.  
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1. General Ethics and Photojournalism Ethics 
 
 
As stated in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to challenge some 
of the historical assumptions upon which the moral principles of 
photojournalism have been grounded. Translated into rules and regulations, 
these moral principles represent the consensus regarding best practices 
reached by the community of professional journalists and photojournalists 
throughout time and, in that sense, they help shape their professional identity 
and contribute significantly to building the ethos of photojournalism. 
 
Being of a historical and temporal nature, these moral principles need to 
be updated from time to time, in order for them to provide the best possible 
guidance in the context of a rapidly evolving world. It is our contention that it 
would be important to challenge some of those founding assumptions as they 
profoundly affect our understanding of the structural principles that constitute 
the essence of what we could generally call “good visual information” and 
“good photojournalism”. In order to do so, two preliminary questions need to 
be addressed.  
 
The first concerns the choice of theoretical framework. In the face of the 
multiple (and not always compatible) approaches to ethics, it is important to 
clarify our affiliations and to situate our own thought within a tradition of moral 
philosophy.  
 
The second is related to methodology. Subordinated to the subject of 
our enquiry, the methodology used to study the ethos of photojournalism 
must be explained and justified and its limitations need to be clearly stated. 
The purpose of this first chapter is to address these two preliminary 
questions. 
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1.1. Ethics: the science of ethos 
 
 
The first major difficulty we have in dealing with ethics is to clarify what 
we understand by it. As we shall see further on, different traditions of moral 
thought have elaborated different theories regarding ethics, each of which is 
based on different philosophical and anthropological concepts. In fact, if we 
were to try to find a consensual definition for it, one option would be to say 
that ethics is the branch of philosophy that dedicates itself to the study of our 
ethos. A definition that is not of great help, given that the concept being 
defined is mentioned in the definition. So what does ethos mean? What does 
it refer to? 
 
According to its Greek origin, the word ethos had two slightly different 
meanings. The oldest one referred to “home”, “residence” or “dwelling place”. 
According to José Luis L. Aranguren, the word was first used with this 
meaning in the context of poetry to refer to the place where animals lived and 
gathered and only afterwards did it become common to use it to refer to 
people and to their places of origin (Aranguren, 1994: 21). When interpreted 
metaphorically, ethos alludes to the “place” where we come from, to our 
place in being. In this regard, the ethos gets an ontological meaning. It was 
Heidegger who recently restored this original sense of ethos, promoting the 
identification of ethics and ontology. For the author of the Letter on 
Humanism (Heidegger, 1993), ethics is a philosophical enquiry into the 
meaning of being human, into our particular place of residence in the realm 
of being, into what makes us who we are. Considered through this lens, 
ethos is the “steady ground, the foundation of praxis, the root from which all 
human acts emerge”2 (Aranguren, 1994: 21). 
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The second and most common meaning of ethos is “character” or 
“mode of being”. In contrast to the modern interpretation, “character” is not to 
be understood here in any “biological” sense. It does not refer to any kind of 
given or natural way of behaving, but to a form of living that one “acquires, 
appropriates and incorporates throughout one’s existence” (Aranguren, 1994: 
22). Our character is like a “second nature” (Aristotle) that is shaped by our 
habits. By repeatedly acting according to a particular set of values one gives 
form to what will become one’s character.  
 
From this etymological perspective, still concerned with our habits and 
the morality of our acts, ethics fundamentally began to refer to the meaning 
of our lives and to the modes of being that correspond to our nature. In this 
regard, this ethical theory is linked to an ontological understanding of Man as 
a being that needs to become what he is, whose life is a task that requires a 
lifelong commitment3.  
 
To understand why the second meaning of ethos became prevalent, 
and why the focus of ethics moved towards habits, custom and moral acts, 
we must take into consideration its Latin translation. Although it is widely 
accepted that mos/moris have the same etymological origin as the Greek 
ethos, of which they are a mere translation (see, for instance, Ricoeur, 1990; 
Russ, 1995), Aranguren argues that the use of mos/moris has historically 
evolved towards the second meaning, thus reinforcing the semantic 
connection between mos/moris and habits and custom (Aranguren: 1994: 
23). To provide some evidence of this semantic shift, the author mentions the 
fact that moris translates into the plural a reality that is fundamentally singular 
(ethos as character, a form of living). 
 
This is probably the reason why authors who consider it useful to 
distinguish ethics from morality place the latter in the realm of duty and 
obligation, ascribing a normative and prescriptive function to morality, and 
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reserve the former to the more critical task of reflecting on those fundamental 
questions that challenge and ground obligation, duty and obedience (see, for 
instance, Ricoeur, 1990 or Russ, 1995).  
 
This distinction is also perceptible when we compare the two definitions 
of “ethics” and “morality” given in André Lalande’s Vocabulaire technique et 
critique de la philosophie. In spite of its different uses (as an adjective or as a 
noun), the concept of “morality” (moral/morale) refers to “what concerns 
morals, that is, the norms of behaviour in use in an particular period and in a 
particular society”4 (Lalande: 1947, 636). By contrast, a look at the definition 
of “ethics” (Éthique) reveals that the emphasis is not placed so much on the 
norms of behaviour, but on its reflective and philosophical nature: “A science 
that takes as its immediate object the judgments of appreciation regarding 
the acts qualified as good or bad”5 (Lalande: 1947, 295).  
 
To sum up, according to its etymological origin, ethics is the branch of 
philosophy that studies our mode of being, our character, our habits and the 
norms and rules that we believe should govern our actions (the ones that 
depend on our free will). But ethics is also the branch of philosophy that 
enquires into our ethos, our profound nature, the place where we can be 
ourselves. In this sense, while considering “whom we should turn ourselves 
into” (our character), and “how should we act in order to become who we are 
to become” (our habits), we should take into account, as a reference point, 
as a criterion, our ethos, our place in being. 
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1.2. Ethics and moral consciousness 
 
 
Going through various textbooks dedicated to ethics or moral 
philosophy, we immediately acknowledge that throughout history different 
and sometimes incompatible moral theories have been elaborated, based on 
different philosophical systems and anthropological concepts.  
 
In his highly systematic book, Le Fondement de la Morale, André 
Léonard (Léonard, 1997) proposes classifying some of the most significant 
moral theories according to what he considers to be the core of all moral life: 
freedom. His purpose is to show how, by focusing on different dimensions of 
freedom, these moral theories end up providing distinct interpretations of 
moral consciousness and how the connection they establish between 
freedom and moral consciousness affects their capacity to ground the two 
main features of moral value: absoluteness and obligatoriness6. Moral values 
are absolute because they affect the core of our being, our freedom. They 
should be complied to no matter what we do, regardless of the object of our 
action. Other types of values are not absolute, as their relevance depends on 
the particular end we wish to achieve. Regarding obligation, and following 
Kant, Léonard contends that obligation must be rooted in autonomy. Moral 
values oblige us not because they are dictated by an external authority, but 
because they are posited by each one of us as rational beings. 
 
For Léonard, there are three main interpretations of moral 
consciousness: 
 
1) an archaeological interpretation of moral consciousness;  
2) an interpretation of moral consciousness as absolute autonomy, and  
3) a teleological interpretation of moral consciousness. 
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1) The archaeological interpretation of consciousness considers 
freedom mainly from a biological and psychological perspective, focusing on 
the internal constrains that affect our free will. Our freedom is limited by our 
corporeal nature, by the fact that we live within a body that has its own 
needs, that will inexorably perish and that is subjected to the same laws of 
nature that govern all other beings and things. But our freedom is also 
constrained by the unconscious activity of our psychological life. We are not 
completely transparent to ourselves. Among the “reasons” and “motives” that 
lead us to act, we must consider those of which we are not aware. All these 
forces must be taken into account, as they affect our moral life from within. 
The question here is to know whether these biological and socio-
psychological constraints determine or not our behaviours; whether, 
regardless of their force, we are capable of acting according to our free will; 
in brief, if freedom is possible. 
 
Among the moral theories classified within the archaeological 
interpretation of consciousness, André Léonard includes the following: a) 
“hedonism”, b) “eudemonism”, c) “utilitarianism”, d) “moral sociologism”, e) 
“moral biologism/evolutionism” and, finally, f) “moral psychologism”. All these 
different moral theories underline a particular aspect of our freedom and, in 
so doing, they contribute decisively to providing a comprehensive 
understanding of the structure of our moral consciousness. In fact, any given 
moral theory would rightly be accused of being simplistic and even artificial if 
it did not to take into consideration the importance for us to seek pleasure 
(hedonism) and happiness (eudemonism), to consider the social relevance of 
our acts (utilitarianism) and if it did not recognize the influence of the 
biological and psychological factors on our decision making processes (moral 
biologism and moral psychologism). Regardless of their interest and 
importance, these moral theories fail to provide a solid foundation for moral 
value. Not wishing to be exhaustive, let us briefly phrase, following closely 
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André Léonard, the three main reasons why any attempt to ground morality 
in an archaeological concept of freedom ends up being unfruitful7:  
 
i) These moral theories may try to explain the empirical genesis of 
moral obligation, describing the different factors (internal and external) 
that constrain Man’s free will. However, by focusing on those different 
factors that constrain his behaviour, they end up weakening the 
importance of freedom in moral decision-making processes. Man would 
not act according to certain values because they are good, but because 
of other reasons (because they please him, make him happy, etc.). 
Technically, these moral theories cannot fully account for the 
absoluteness of moral values. 
 
ii) These moral theories also fail when trying to explain how is it 
possible for Man to overcome intrinsic impulses or extrinsic social 
forces in order to act according to superior rational aims. 
 
iii) These moral theories tend to be self-contradictory, for they 
deny the presuppositions upon which, at the end of the day, they also 
rest. Two examples: hedonistic and eudemonistic moral theories that 
overcome a simplistic and reductive concept of pleasure and 
happiness, and that plead to their rational nature, end up placing reason 
at the origin of morality. In this regard, it would still be a rational motive 
that would lead people to act, and not a biological or socio-
psychological drive. Another good example is provided by utilitarianism, 
which is a moral theory that sustains that good actions are the ones that 
produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In this 
case, contradiction results from the fact that although denying all 
metaphysical legitimation for their moral theory, supporters of 
utilitarianism cannot avoid, whether they want to or not, basing their 
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notions of “greatest good for the greatest number of people” on 
particular anthropological, political and metaphysical theories. 
 
2) The idea of an absolute autonomy of our moral consciousness is 
based on a formalistic concept of freedom that is somehow closed within it. 
According to Léonard, there are two major approaches to this kind of moral 
theory: 2.1) freedom as one’s personal freedom, and 2.2) freedom as a 
universal openness of reason. 
 
2.1) To discuss the first, Léonard chooses to focus on Jean-Paul Sartre. 
Freedom is considered here from an existentialist perspective: one’s 
freedom. Autonomous and experienced in the first person, freedom becomes 
the only necessary and sufficient condition of morality. As a consequence, 
the criterion to assess the goodness of our acts turns out to be their 
authenticity, that is, their intimate conformity to our inner self. There is no 
place to claim objective or universal values other than freedom itself. As an 
expression of one’s inner being, one’s freedom is, most of all, the capacity to 
resist nature, to resist the powers of one’s body, of one’s deep psychological 
impulses, and to take decisions regardless of social pressure. It is up to each 
one of us to create our own values. 
 
Although able to ground the absoluteness of moral values, this theory 
fails to ground obedience. Complying with a set of objective or universal 
moral values would actually offend the main moral principal of this theory: 
authenticity. 
 
The issue with this moral theory, which is inspired by existentialist 
philosophies, is to consider that the only absolute value is freedom itself and 
that the morality of our acts would be determined exclusively by the 
authenticity of our intention. It would not matter so much the content of our 
acts, but their formal aspect, their accordance to one’s authentic self. For this 
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reason, André Léonard believes that the existentialist moral theory, grounded 
as it is in authenticity, tends to become ambiguous and, at the same time, 
reveals itself to be unable to provide useful guidance beyond judgments 
formulated for particular situations. 
 
2.2) When it comes to considering freedom as a universal openness of 
reason, André Léonard chooses to centre his attention on Immanuel Kant. In 
the case of the philosopher of Königsberg, the emphasis is on the rational 
dimension of freedom. Reason gives us the possibility of transcending our 
inner self and relating to the world through knowledge, will and desire. In this 
sense, reason is both the source of our freedom and a fundamental object of 
our moral commitment. Being a necessary condition for all morality, freedom 
must be desired and protected. 
 
Although centring his moral philosophy on autonomy, Kant does not 
ground moral values on authenticity, but on duty. In fact, Kant is known to be 
the most relevant representative of deontological moral theories, which place 
duty at the core of their system. 
 
According to Kant, we must act from duty in order to protect our 
autonomy and respect the autonomy of all others8. Acting from duty is more 
than just acting according to duty. In fact, it is possible to comply with duty for 
other reasons than pure respect for the moral principle. If this were the case, 
our will would have been moved by egoistic tendencies, and only accidentally 
would the outcome of our action seem good. In a word, in order to be 
autonomous one must act from duty. All other motivations emerge from 
factors that constrain and corrupt our will. In this sense, a good will must be a 
rational will.  
 
So what specifies rational will? In short, its universal orientation. The 
decisive criterion here is the “proof” of universality. If I want the maxim that 
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guides my action to become a universal one, I can prevent myself from 
acting according to my subjective desires. Willing a universal good is, for 
Man, a duty and an imperative because of his subjective imperfection. From 
there Kant draws the first formulation of his categorical imperative: “Act only 
according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law” (Kant: 2011, 71). It is categorical because “it 
concerns not the matter of the action or what is to result from it, but the form 
and the principle from which it does itself follow” (Kant: 2011, 61). To 
understand the connection between duty and autonomy we must introduce 
the concept of “self-determination”, according to which Man is capable of 
giving rational ends to his will. In this sense, acting from duty is the ultimate 
expression of autonomy. The universal law that determines my action does 
not impose itself from the outside, but results from my understanding and 
self-determination. This is the source of human dignity. In Kant’s words: 
“Autonomy is thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational 
nature” (Kant, 2011: 101). 
 
A common critique to these two moral theories concerns the fact that 
they both, although for different reasons, leave aside all consideration 
regarding both the archaeological ground and the teleological orientation of 
freedom. In this sense, both are “acosmic”, that is, not referred to the world: 
“(...) no moral inspiration is to be found in the nature of things nor in the 
objective elements of our human condition”9 (Léonard: 1997, 165). They can 
also be accused of being “formalistic”, as their systems are grounded in a 
formal conception of freedom and their principles are, most of all, without 
reference to concrete contents10. 
 
3) The third interpretation of our moral consciousness is termed 
teleological, making reference to the Greek word telos, which means goal or 
end. The focus of this theory is the relationship between reason and being, 
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centring its attention not on freedom as self-determination or pure autonomy, 
but on its openness to all there is.  
 
The explicit purpose of this moral theory, which Léonard assumes to be 
his, is to provide an ontological and metaphysical foundation for morality. 
According to this thesis, although necessarily mediated by reason, moral 
values would be founded in being. In this sense, they could be said to be 
“objective”, being, at the same time, created and found, invented and 
discovered. Being itself grounded in being and open to it, our reason would 
be in a position to take into consideration, and even receive inspiration from, 
the structure of reality while considering what is right and what is wrong. 
Seemingly paradoxical, this thesis states that moral consciousness is, at the 
same time, the origin of moral values, as they are established by it, and the 
medium to discover them, for they are already implied or suggested by the 
“natural order of things”. 
 
Yet recognizing the importance of Immanuel Kant, who has had the 
merit of demonstrating that it is reason that grounds both the “transcendence 
of moral obligation as it compels me (...) and its immanent character as it is 
imposed to me from within, that is to say, from conscience”11, Léonard 
argues that reason must not be taken as the absolute origin of morality 
(1997: 172). According to him, only assuming the fundamental orientation of 
reason towards otherness, it is possible to overcome the excessive 
formalism of Kant’s theory and, thus, propose concrete moral ends to a moral 
consciousness no longer enclosed in itself. Natural law would be the 
expression of those concrete moral principles, established and discovered by 
reason by contemplating the essences of things and of Man in the first place. 
God, as the creator of all there is, would be, according to this argument, the 
ultimate rule of morality. Leonard’s purpose is to declare, little by little and 
going through different levels of mediation, God as the “supreme objective 
rule” of morality and natural law as its “mediated objective rule” (Léonard, 
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1997: 215). In this sense, and in order to remain loyal to what he calls Kant’s 
“fundamental” and “definitive” finding, according to which “the essence of 
moral value and, as a consequence, the rule of moral consciousness, must 
be founded on the conformity of human action with reason”12 (1997: 172), 
Léonard is forced to distinguish between “subjective” and “objective” rules of 
morality. Moral consciousness is, according to this thesis, and which Léonard 
revives from Thomas Aquinas, the “subjective rule of morality”. At the end of 
the day, ethical decisions are taken within our personal moral consciousness. 
It is up to each one of us to decide how to act. Nonetheless, and due to its 
openness to transcendence and capacity to conceptualize and thus to 
understand beings not only in their singularity, but also in their universality, 
reason would also be able to establish and understand concrete moral 
principles which aspire to be universally and objectively good. This is what 
the author means when he states that reason, now called “right reason”, is 
the “proximate objective rule of morality”. Although still immanent and 
proximate, right reason is also in close relation with the “natural order of 
things”. In this sense, reason would function as the necessary mediation 
between the subjective and the objective orders of morality. 
 
In contrast to Kant’s pure practical reason, which is a priori obliged to 
respect the categorical imperative, right reason is engaged with concrete 
moral principles implicitly inscribed in the nature of things. Taken as a whole, 
these moral principles form the natural law, considered the “objective and 
mediated rule of morality”: “objective” because it would comprehend a set of 
universal moral principles; and “mediated” because those moral principles 
are not explicitly available among natural things, but are seized and 
established by right reason.  
 
Accepting that universal moral principles could be deduced by 
contemplating the essence of things and of Man in the first place, we could 
then ask the question, as Léonard does: “what or who is the origin of these 
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essences and of their intrinsic ends?” (1997: 222). Léonard’s answer is worth 
quoting in its entirety: “If we admit that metaphysics pursues the question of 
being until achieving God, then the answer will be that the dynamism of the 
essences proceeds from the Creator’s intelligence and will”13 (Léonard, 
1997: 222-223). This is what it means for God to be the “objective and 
supreme rule of morality”.  
 
It is the figure of otherness, lived and experienced firstly in the 
encounter with others, secondly with being and thirdly with God that helps 
the author establishing his thesis. This “dependency” on otherness led 
Léonard to argue that universal friendship is the concrete imperative of this 
teleological moral theory: “Friendship, which seeks the good and the 
promotion of the other, is the fundamental moral value resulting from the 
openness of human reason to the structure of freedom and to the mystery of 
being”14 (Léonard, 1997: 202). 
 
Regardless of the difficulties associated with trying to ground ethics in 
ontology and, furthermore, in metaphysics, difficulties that will be mentioned 
below, André Léonard’s thesis has, nevertheless, the merit of placing our 
relationship with the other at the core of moral life. As we shall see further on, 
this anthropological and ontological purpose, which Léonard assumes is 
close to the work of contemporary authors such as Martin Buber and 
Emmanuel Levinas, will be of great help and inspiration in developing our 
own approach to media ethics and, in particular, to establish the basis of an 
ethical framework capable of providing us with an insightful ethical guidance 
for the visual representation of the other (chapter 3). 
 
At the end of this résumé of Léonard’s views on ethics, it becomes clear 
that ethics or moral philosophy depend largely on preliminary concepts of 
Man and reality. As we have just seen, at the core of the divergence between 
different moral theories, the understanding of freedom and reason play a 
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crucial role. Since it is not possible to demonstrate theoretically freedom, nor 
even to find a minimum scientific consensus on it, we find ourselves in the 
situation of having to bet on its possibility and to seize it by looking at its 
concrete manifestations. It would be nonsense and contradictory to consider 
ethics and moral philosophy whilst not presupposing at the same time that 
Man is a rational being capable of acting according to his free and rational 
will. This should not prevent us, though, from acknowledging the fragile 
nature of our human freedom, constrained as it is by so many different 
internal and external factors, as we have just seen. Our freedom, as 
Léonard, following Ricoeur put it, is motivated, embodied and contingent 
(Léonard, 1997, 78). The big question is to know how to conceive freedom 
and reason. Léonard’s classificatory scheme helps make it clear how 
different traditions of thought, each of which is based on different ontological 
and epistemological concepts, end up elaborating divergent, if not 
irreconcilable, anthropological and moral theories. 
 
Although this is not a study on moral philosophy and general ethics, it is 
important for our purposes to underline the connection between ethics, 
philosophical anthropology and ontology, for it makes clear that any ethical 
discussion must go through a previous enquiry into our faculties and 
capabilities and also into the fundamental orientation of our freedom. In the 
case of photojournalism ethics, mutatis mutandis, the same requirements are 
present, as it would be impossible to understand and eventually challenge 
professional moral principles without at the same time assessing the 
conditions of practice and discussing what aims and ends are to be 
considered good15. We will come back to this point later. Before doing so, 
there are two related questions that need to be addressed: the first relates to 
the difficulties implied in finding a solid ontological ground for morality, and 
the second concerns the relationship between general and applied ethics. 
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1.3. General Ethics and Journalism Ethics 
 
 
As Jacqueline Russ (1955) stated, ethical thinking faces the paradoxical 
situation of being considered the answer to many of our contemporary social 
issues and not having answers for its own lack of legitimacy: “It is within an 
absolute emptiness that contemporary ethics is created, in a place where the 
traditional ontological, metaphysical, religious bases of pure ethics and 
applied ethics have been erased” (Russ, 1995: 7). The foundations of ethics 
and morals have disappeared. Among the reasons for this “ethical 
emptiness”, Russ identifies the following: 1) the rise of nihilism, associated 
with the death of God as the supreme and transcendent support of morality 
(Nietzsche), 2) the crisis of legitimation affecting ideologies and the grand 
narratives, characteristic of our “postmodern condition” (Lyotard), 3) the rise 
of a new form of individualism, where narcissism and hedonism take the 
place of autonomy and freedom and, finally, 4) the relentless development of 
new technologies that increase significantly Man’s power to determine the 
outcome of his actions (Russ, 1995). 
 
It is within this context of “ethical emptiness”, characterized by the 
enormous difficulty in establishing an ontological or metaphysical foundation 
for morality that the connections between general and applied ethics are to 
be sought. Two important questions arise here: 1) Does this lack of ultimate 
legitimacy undermine the attempt to establish a well-grounded professional 
applied ethics? If not, 2) What sort of help and orientation should we expect 
from general ethics in order to establish a coherent and legitimate journalism 
ethics? 
 
A possible answer to the first question can be found in the work of Paul 
Ricoeur. In the Postface au Temps de la Responsabilité (Ricoeur, 1991), 
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Ricoeur argues that it would be “too damaging” to consider that the lack of an 
objective and transcendent reference for morality should jeopardize or 
sacrifice all enquiry into the content of moral precepts: “It is always, I believe, 
with reference to preliminary convictions that we pose the question of the 
foundation”16 (Ricoeur, 1991: 256). Although recognizing that this lack of 
justification ends up leaving all moral questioning pending, Ricoeur is 
convinced that this “provisional regime” is sufficient for guiding individual and 
collective behaviours. Having been invited to write the postface of a collective 
book  (Lenoir, 1991) dedicated to exploring the distinct ethical challenges 
posed by our increasing capacity to transform reality, particularly sensitive in 
the case of environmental ethics and bioethics and also significant in the 
case of business ethics and media ethics, Ricoeur observes two trends that 
seem to confirm his thesis:  
 
1) Regardless of the irreconcilable disagreement existing between 
Christians and agnostics and between supporters of an ethics of dialogue 
and an ethics of individual alterity/otherness, there is a significant consensus 
on the main moral principles ruling the distinct fields of praxis. Moreover, the 
existing disagreements regarding professional principles do not overlap with 
the ones concerning foundations. 
 
2) While focusing on the various contributions to this collective book, 
Ricoeur identifies two main attitudes: one that claims that the possible 
answers to these new ethical challenges must be sought within a set of 
common and enduring convictions, and another that argues that we need to 
formulate new convictions or to reformulate the old ones. 
 
In this sense, and in line with Ricoeur’s thesis, we will also argue that 
the lack of an ultimate ontological justification for morality should not 
undermine the attempt to establish well-grounded professional ethics. So the 
question now is: what sort of help and orientation should we expect from 
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general ethics in order to establish coherent and legitimate journalism ethics? 
To answer this question it is useful to recall the distinction between ethics (or 
moral philosophy) and morality and to highlight the different and 
complementary roles played by each one of them. As we mentioned 
previously (section 1.1), ethos and mos/moris have the same etymological 
origin: the Latin mos/moris is a mere translation of the Greek ethos. 
Nevertheless, some influential authors, such as Paul Ricoeur himself, 
consider it useful to distinguish the two concepts and to assign to each one a 
different and complementary role: “It is, therefore, by convention that I 
reserve the term “ethics” for the aim of an accomplished life and the term 
“morality” for the articulation of this aim in norms characterized at once by the 
claim to universality and by an effect of constraint” (Ricoeur, 1992: 170). Still 
according to Ricoeur, it is possible to recognize in these two different 
orientations the opposition between two heritages: the Aristotelian one, 
centred on the “aim at a good life” and thus characterized by its teleological 
perspective, and the Kantian one, focused on duty and on the obligation to 
respect the norm, and thus characterized by its deontological approach.  
 
For the author of Oneself as Another, there is no reason to consider 
these two approaches incompatible, for “they belong to two different 
dimensions of practical philosophy” (Ricoeur, 1996: 691). According to his 
famous thesis, the relationship between ethics and morality should be 
considered as follows: “1) the primacy of ethics over morality; 2) the 
necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm; 3) the 
legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to 
impasses in practice” (Ricoeur: 1992, 170).  
 
It is within the horizon drawn by this ethical theory that we are going to 
look for an answer to the question we asked above: what sort of help and 
orientation should we expect from general ethics in order to establish 
coherent and legitimate journalism ethics?  
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By stating the primacy of ethics over morality, Ricoeur is, at the same 
time, subordinating a deontological approach to morality to a teleological 
approach to ethics. This means that, according to this thesis, the ultimate 
justification for moral principles must be sought within the scope of a wider 
enquiry into goals and aims. An interesting link to professional and applied 
ethics could be established here, for this thesis makes it clear that if we are 
to assess or establish guiding principles for journalism and photojournalism 
(the question of knowing to what extent should they be taken together will be 
discussed further on in the next section), we must previously discuss what 
journalism is for. Only afterwards would it make sense to establish concrete 
rules for action. This sort of approach to media ethics may be found in the 
different works of authors such as Boris Libois (1994), Daniel Cornu (1994; 
1997) and Benoît Grevisse (2000). Other authors, although not claiming the 
heritage of Paul Ricoeur, such as for instance Bill Kovach and Tom 
Rosenstiel (2001; 2011), develop, nevertheless, their theories in accordance 
with this philosophic theory. It should also become clear that the debate 
regarding the functions and purposes of journalism entails taking a position 
on its multiple political, ethical, social and cultural roles in society. In this 
sense, all journalism ethical theories rely, in one way or another, more or less 
explicitly, wishing it or not, on a previous philosophical conception of Man 
and society. In this sense, and in spite of the issues surrounding its own 
legitimacy, ethics can still play a fundamental role in enquiring about the 
ultimate purpose of journalism and in submitting rules and regulations to a 
critical analysis. As Paul Ricoeur declared in his speech delivered in 
Barcelona in 2001, when the University Ramon Llull awarded him the degree 
Doctor Honoris Causa, the work of an ethical enquiry is “(...) to seek a more 
solid grounded basis for moral obligation than that of a simple “you must”17 
(Ricoeur, 2001, 32). 
 
An insightful reflection on the sources of obligation, later applied to 
journalism ethics by Daniel Cornu (1994), can be found in Otfried Höffe’s 
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Political Justice: foundations for a critical philosophy of law and the state 
(Höffe, 199518). According to Höffe, it is possible to distinguish three different 
levels of obligation, hierarchically ranked, each of which correspond to a 
different meaning of the word “good”:  
 
- The first is merely technical and instrumental and concerns 
procedures. No reference is made here to objectives or to ultimate ends. 
“Good” here means “good for something” (Höffe, 1995: 29); there is no 
intrinsic value within it. At this level, obligation is taken in its weakest sense. 
It compels for technical and strategic reasons. 
 
- The second meaning is referred to as pragmatic. In this case, “good” 
means “good for someone”. Actions are good if they are useful and 
advantageous. Their value results from the consequences they produce in 
particular situations. The logic here is utilitarian. It is the welfare of all 
affected parties that constitutes the source of obligation.  
 
- Finally, the third level is called ethical. It is at this level and at this level 
only that “good” is referred explicitly to ultimate ends and obligation gets its 
strongest meaning. What is “good” obliges us not because of any extrinsic 
reason, but because it imposes itself from within. It is from this ethical level of 
obligation that the two other subordinated levels, the technical and the 
pragmatic, receive their ultimate legitimacy. 
 
Applying the thesis of Otfried Höffe to journalism, Cornu argues that it 
pertains to ethics to enquire into the ultimate goals and ends of journalism 
and to define, accordingly, the main ethical attributes of what we could call 
“good information” (Cornu, 1994: 133-136). This is a crucial point, for the 
possibility of assessing the propriety of professional moral precepts and 
eventually challenge their ability to answer to some of the new ethical 
challenges that arise in the new media landscape, relies on this previous 
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critical enquiry. Moreover, it is this concept of ethics, which we have been 
drawing with the help of Paul Ricoeur, Otfried Höffe and Daniel Cornu, that 
supports our own research project. 
 
As we mentioned in the introduction, the main purpose of this study is to 
enquire into some of the long-standing assumptions upon which 
photojournalism ethics has been grounded. It is our contention that 
photojournalism’s credibility should no longer rest on the old paradigm of 
analogical photography and that a reformulation of some of its basic 
assumptions is paramount if photojournalism is to maintain its social function 
and thus be faithful to its ethos. It is, therefore, in the face of 
photojournalism’s ultimate ends and goals that professional moral principles 
and the convictions upon which they rest should be assessed. In this regard, 
the critical dimension of this concept of ethical thinking is intrinsically linked 
to its teleological orientation. 
 
Before proceeding to the next section, which is dedicated to critically 
discussing journalism’s basic principles, it is worth underlining yet another 
important contribution of this ethical theory to journalism ethics. Our attention 
will now be focused on those situations where norms lead to impasses in 
practice, that is, when it is not clear what norms should be applied in 
particular situations. 
 
As we have seen above, according to Paul Ricoeur, although highly 
important for their “claim to universality” and “effect of constraint”, norms can 
still lead to impasses. How should we act in those situations in which 
different courses of action seem to be legitimated by different and competing 
norms? According to Paul Ricoeur, knowing what to do in those 
circumstances may require the “recourse by the norm to the aim”. In this 
sense, acknowledging that there are different levels of journalistic obligation, 
and that among them it is possible and even desirable to establish a ranking 
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of importance, can be extremely useful. As we have seen with the help of 
Otfried Höffe, some rules compel more than others.  
 
More dramatic situations occur when the norms in competition belong to 
the same level. The obligation to inform the public, on the one hand, and to 
respect the privacy of those affected by the news, on the other, constitutes a 
typical example of this sort of journalistic ethical dilemma. In these cases, the 
recourse to the aim requires from each one a sort of practical wisdom 
capable of deliberating on, for a particular situation, what counts as the 
“specification best suited to the ultimate ends pursued” (Ricoeur, 1992: 175). 
Hans-Georg Gadamer also comments on the concept of practical wisdom, 
which he also takes from the Aristotelian phronesis, while discussing in Truth 
and Method “the hermeneutical relevance of Aristotle”. Gadamer’s 
observations on the topic are of enormous interest, for they concern the 
question of knowing how to apply general laws to particular situations. While 
discussing the nature of practical reason, in the context of legal 
hermeneutics, Gadamer introduces the Aristotelian notion of epieikeia 
(equity), which he defines as “the correction of the law” (Gadamer, 2004: 
316). The law is always in a “necessary tension with concrete action”, not 
because of any intrinsic deficiency, but because it does not fully match with 
our “imperfect” human reality (Ibidem). In this sense, applying the law entails 
a particular kind of knowledge that is not merely technical. In some 
circumstances, the one to apply the law may “have to refrain from applying 
the full rigor of the law (...) not because he has no alternative, but because to 
do otherwise would not be right” (Ibidem). In the case of a craftsman, whose 
work also involves applying rules (though technical ones), fulfilling a 
particular request may oblige him to readapt the usual procedures, but not to 
challenge the technique itself. In the case of moral deliberation, “restraining 
the law” may in some circumstances be synonymous with “finding the better 
law” (Ibidem). What is at stake with moral knowledge is the ability to 
understand “what the concrete situation asks” of each one of us (Gadamer, 
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2004: 311). And there are no methods, special techniques or magic formulas 
available. Choosing the right means to achieve the pursued ends depends 
on us. As Gadamer put it, moral knowledge implies “deliberating with 
oneself” (Gadamer, 2004: 318).  
 
Before continuing, let us briefly summarise the main conclusions 
reached in this section: 
 
1) The difficulty in finding a consensual source of legitimacy for moral 
philosophy should not jeopardize the attempt to establish a well-grounded 
professional applied ethics. 
 
2) Despite this crisis of legitimacy, there is a broad consensus on the 
main moral principles ruling the different fields of praxis, including, as we 
shall see further on, journalism ethics. 
 
3) In order to face the ethical challenges that arise in the new media 
landscape, it is important to challenge the enduring convictions that support 
journalism ethics. 
 
4) The ethical enquiry into those enduring convictions must take into 
account not only the ultimate ends of journalism, but also its conditions of 
practice. 
 
5) The main characteristic of moral knowledge or practical wisdom is 
the ability to understand what is right in a given situation. 
 
It is on the basis of this concept of ethics, which we have been drawing 
little by little, that we now go on to look at journalism’s ethical moral 
principles. 
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1.4. Journalism: essential moral principles 
 
 
The purpose of this study, as has already been stated, is to critically 
examine some of the enduring assumptions upon which photojournalism 
ethics has been grounded. It is our contention that some of those long-
standing convictions can no longer help in dealing with the major challenges 
that news outlets face in the current media landscape. This question is 
particularly relevant in the case of the visual representation of reality.  
 
The impressive level of sophistication reached by the various 
technologies of the image has contributed to generating a simultaneous 
effect of fascination and suspicion. Never before have our daily lives been 
overwhelmed by pictures and videos. Pictures are everywhere. Nonetheless, 
and regardless of their “omnipresence”, our faith in their truth-value may 
have never been so threatened. At least with regards to journalism, pictures 
are accused of depicting staged events (or pseudo-events), of being 
doctored, of distorting reality through framing techniques and even of 
representing different things from those mentioned in their captions. 
Verification, in the context of visual journalism, has become increasingly 
demanding, as technology has reached higher and more sophisticated 
levels. 
 
In spite of all the criticism, we strongly believe that a “good” press 
requires “good” pictures. Now, what do we mean by “good” pictures? What is 
proper of a “good” press photograph? What are the essential moral values 
that help configure a “good” press photograph? Briefly, what defines the 
ethos of photojournalism? And what should be the best method to seize it? Is 
it reasonable to expect photojournalism to share the same ends and goals as 
journalism tout court? 
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In order to answer these questions, some considerations have to be 
made. The first concerns the fact that the mission of the press will be 
analysed here from a Western perspective, within the inheritance of the 
liberal political thought of John Milton, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson and 
John Stuart Mill. It is not the purpose of this study though to go through the 
history of political thought or to elaborate on the roots of freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press. Our purpose here is significantly humbler. We wish 
to identify the main political and social functions of the press within the 
Western tradition and accordingly examine its basic moral principles. This 
does not mean, however, that we are willing to accept uncritically the 
heritage of a pure liberal theory of the press. On the contrary: history has 
shown us that a free press must be protected from other influences than just 
the political one and that the mission of the press must go beyond the role of 
watchdog. Insightful considerations on the issue can be found, among 
others, in works by Daniel Cornu (1994), Boris Libois (1994) and Carlos Ruiz 
(2010). While it would be naive and ultimately deceiving not to declare the 
historical and cultural background that informs our own theories, this 
recognition raises two interrelated questions that need to be addressed: 1) 
Are we condemned to ethnocentrism? and, 2) Is it possible to reconcile this 
affiliation with universalism? 
 
These two questions lead us to a second consideration concerning the 
debate between universalism and communitarianism, which made its entry in 
media literature in the 1990s, due mainly to its importance for public 
journalism theories (Black, 1997). On the basis of these theories lays the 
idea that the aim of journalism is to strengthen communitarian bonds. For the 
supporters of these journalism theories, sometimes also called civic or 
communitarian theories, citizens and members of local communities should 
be able to take part in important editorial decisions and should be given the 
opportunity to have a say in what journalists are to investigate and what 
questions are to be addressed. In this sense, the definition of “good” 
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journalism should be thought by and for the members of each local 
community. Regardless of their evident interest, these theories need to deal 
with an important threat: relativism, and how to overcome it. According to 
Christians (1997a), it is possible to reconcile communitarianism and 
universalism. The touchstone is the concept of “common good”, that is, 
goods that are valued by real communities. According to Christians, 
universalism and communitarianism should enrich each other mutually. On 
the one hand, “universal values provide a framework for bringing our 
community conventions under judgment as necessary” (Christians, 1997a: 
22) and, on the other, by rooting universal moral principals in “common 
goods”, it is possible to prevent universalism from becoming excessively 
“formal” and “static”. The important thing is to make sure that “(...) appeals to 
universals must be done without presuming traditional versions of 
foundationalism”, considered context-insensitive and excessively objectivistic 
(Christians, 1997a: 23). The argument used to overcome a purely formal 
legitimacy is to establish an intrinsic link between values' universal claim and 
the existing worldwide consensus on them. This does not mean though that 
their universality could be deduced directly from consensus: “common 
goods” are ultimately grounded in our human oneness, that is to say, in an 
ontological understanding of our nature. The role of this communitarian 
consensus is to strengthen their legitimacy. In other words, the function of 
this intersubjective agreement is to help ratify the universal nature of those 
values. Nevertheless, and regardless of this argumentative effort, the 
ultimate source of legitimacy remains in dispute, as there is no necessary 
reason for this worldwide consensus on universal values to exist. 
 
Taken together, these two preliminary considerations allow us to state 
the following conclusions: 
 
1) It is possible to explore the ultimate ends of journalism and 
photojournalism within a particular tradition of thought without renouncing to 
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the ambition of stating their universal value, thus avoiding accusations of 
ethnocentrism and relativism.  
 
2) The idea of a wide consensus on particular “common goods” may 
provide a powerful argument for establishing the mission of the press and 
journalism’s basic moral principles. 
 
As we have seen, according to Paul Ricoeur (1991), regardless of the 
difficulties in ultimately justifying morality, there is wide consensus within 
distinct fields of activity regarding their professional moral principles. In the 
case of journalism, studies carried out by different authors corroborate this 
thesis. With the purpose of enquiring into the mission of the press and 
journalism’s most fundamental moral values, we must now review some of 
those studies.  
 
Our strategy will be the following: firstly, and inspired by the work of 
Otfried Höffe (1995) and Daniel Cornu (1994), we will argue that the three 
main moral principles of journalism are: freedom, truth and respect for human 
dignity. Secondly, and in order to reinforce this thesis, we will compare it with 
two other studies focused on journalism’s universal shared values (Elliot, 
1988; 2009) and journalism’s main elements (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001; 
2011). Finally, and throughout the next section, we will discuss the question 
of knowing to what extent journalism’s moral principles should be applied to 
photojournalism. 
 
Applying the distinction between the three levels of obligation 
established by Otfried Höffe to journalism’s codes of ethics, Daniel Cornu 
(1994) concludes that it is possible to organize their contents according to 
four main categories: mission of the press, freedom, truth and respect for 
human dignity. The first establishes the purpose and aim of journalism, while 
the other three stand for the ultimate moral values that subsume all technical 
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and pragmatic aspects of information. This does not necessarily mean, 
however, that all these documents explicitly organize their contents around 
these four main categories. Some deliver them rather randomly. In some 
cases, it is even possible that no explicit reference is made to any one of 
them. The case of “truth” is paradigmatic. Some codes of ethics omit explicit 
references to this fundamental moral value, opting for alternatives such as 
accuracy, precision or exactness, which could all be taken as its pragmatic 
correlatives, that is, as different and complementary means to achieve it. 
 
References to the mission of the press are generally included in the 
headings and preambles of journalistic codes of ethics. In spite of the 
plurality of their formulations, most of these references highlight the key role 
played by journalism in democratic societies, providing citizens with 
information required for them to take decisions regarding their individual and 
collective future, serving as a counter-power by playing the role of watchdog, 
denouncing violations to the social contract and to citizen rights, or helping to 
generate a forum for public debate. While stressing the political and social 
function of the press, these documents also justify their own legitimacy and 
importance. As Claude-Jean Bertrand stated, if it was not for its impact on 
and importance for society, there would be no need for any sort of journalism 
ethics. 
 
Freedom of the press plays a particular role within journalism ethics, for 
it is at the same time a condition of its possibility and one of its most 
important values. It would be nonsense to suggest how journalists and news 
media should carry out their work if they were not free19. Authors such as 
Benoît Grevisse (2000) hold that it is contradictory to claim a more 
responsible press while at the same time blaming external factors for the 
faults of journalism (technological determinism; lack of time; pressure of 
public relations organisations, etc.). Freedom of the press is not only a 
necessary condition of journalism ethics, but more broadly of journalism 
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itself. In this sense, it is a moral duty for journalists to protect their freedom 
and to disclose all attempts to control it. 
 
While there is an important role played by the political power in 
developing a legal framework that guarantees and protects freedom of the 
press, and provides journalists with the legal rights required to carry out their 
work, there is also an important role played by journalists themselves in order 
to safeguard the independence of their work.  
 
Among the different rules that can be found in journalistic codes of 
ethics that set out to promote and protect freedom of the press, it is possible 
to identify four main groups: 1) disinterest; 2) refuse political and commercial 
propaganda; 3) resist all attempts of manipulation and pressure; 4) the rights 
of journalists.  
 
Regarding disinterest, codes of ethics recommend that journalists do 
not accept gifts and rewards from their sources or from those they cover, for 
it could raise public criticism regarding their independence. As the saying 
goes: Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion. For the same reason, 
journalists are recommended not to accept having their travel expenses paid 
by those who invite them to cover international affairs. Finally, journalists 
should avoid working on stories linked to their personal interests. 
 
A second set of rules concerns the refusal of commercial propaganda. 
The major threat identified here is the influence of advertising over editorial 
content. The more news media depend on advertisers to fund their projects, 
the more their editorial independence is threatened (McQuail, 2010). 
Environmental journalism is, among others, particularly sensitive to this kind 
of influence. The 2007 United Nations’ report on media coverage of climate 
change has concluded that news media’s room for manoeuvre to report on 
climate change is limited by the fact that the majority of polluting companies 
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are also important advertisers (Baykoff and Roberts: 2007). More information 
on the subject can be found in Allan et al. (2000). 
 
A third set of rules concerning freedom of the press focuses on political 
and economic manipulation. Journalists are encouraged to resist all attempts 
to influence their work. This is probably one of the major topics concerning 
press freedom. Together with commercial propaganda, economic and 
political pressure expose the limits of an ethics centred exclusively on 
journalists and their individual responsibilities (Cornu, 1997). Resisting 
political and economic pressure is something journalists will not be able to do 
without the support of their organizations. Refusing to be manipulated by 
political and economic powers is also a moral duty for news organizations 
themselves. 
 
Finally, the fourth set of rules related to the freedom of the press 
focuses on journalists’ rights to refuse to act against their own moral 
consciousness and against the editorial principles of their company. 
 
Truth is, at the same time, journalism’s most important and most 
controversial moral principle. As mentioned before, there are even some 
codes of ethics that simply omit explicit references to it, opting instead for 
“soft” versions or pragmatic correlatives (accuracy, exactness, rigour). Since 
discussing truth always involves taking a position with regard to 
metaphysically, ontologically and epistemologically complicated questions, 
no theoretical approach to it is without criticism. The multiple versions in use, 
which range from “real truth”, “religious truth”, “scientific truth”, “objective 
truth”, “journalistic truth”, etc., are symptomatic of the pluralistic 
understanding of truth. Regarding journalism, the discussion is generally 
centred on the relationship between truth and objectivity, which is another 
highly controversial concept. Chapter 2 is dedicated to exploring the 
historical roots of objectivity in journalism and its application to the ethics of 
  54 
photojournalism. It is our contention that it was the need for photographers to 
be accepted within the circle of professional journalists that forced them to 
commit themselves to the ethical guidelines of written journalism, regardless 
of the fundamental differences existing between words and pictures. Given 
that the means through which the former and the latter represent reality are 
intrinsically different, the means to provide a thorough and truthful account of 
reality must also be different. Before going through the technical and 
pragmatic dimensions of truth in photojournalism, however, we must 
demonstrate that truth is actually one of the founding moral principles of 
journalism. 
 
Despite the numerous issues surrounding the concept of truth, 
journalistic codes of ethics provide a set of rules aimed at promoting it. 
According to Daniel Cornu (1994), it is possible to group them in the following 
categories: the relationship with the sources of information; the refusal of 
disloyal methods of gathering information; the obligation to rectify incorrect 
information; the protection of sources. 
 
Regarding sources of information, there are two main kinds of 
concerns: on the one hand, journalists are required to take into account the 
ideas and opinions of all those involved in a story. Not doing so would 
jeopardize the possibility of a thorough and comprehensive report. Subtle 
forms of discrimination take place when certain groups, especially minorities, 
are deprived of actively participating in the public discussion. And it is worth 
mentioning here, as Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001: truth...), among others, 
do, that it is a mistake to insist on the idea that there are only two sides to a 
story. Some authors argue that this dualistic understanding of reality could be 
the result of applying the polarized structure of American politics, dominated 
by the opposition between Republicans and Democrats, to journalistic 
narratives (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). On the other hand, codes of ethics 
recommend journalists to identify their sources of information, for the 
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credibility of their work relies on it. Political journalism is particularly sensitive 
to this question. In fact, the use of confidential sources in political matters is 
not always justified and when not used carefully it can lead to manipulative 
control of the press.  
 
A second set of rules related to the promotion of a truthful report of 
reality concerns the methods of gathering information. Journalists should 
strive to use only moral and legal methods to document their stories. This set 
of rules has a particular relevance for photojournalism: the use of hidden 
cameras, telephoto lenses or images available on social media provides 
some examples of debatable questions. The use of dishonest or even illegal 
means to seek information is only justified if there is no other way left to get it 
and if this information is considered of public interest. 
 
The obligation to rectify incorrect information is also present in most 
international journalistic codes of ethics. Regarding this point, Cornu 
underlines that complying with this moral obligation is sometimes the result of 
not having conducted a thorough investigation beforehand. These situations 
reveal that it is possible to comply with the letter of the law while violating, at 
the same time, its spirit. 
 
Protecting confidential sources of information is the fourth set of rules 
aimed at seeking truth in journalism. Besides being a moral obligation, the 
protection of sources is also a right protected by national constitutions in 
many countries. The disclosure of sensitive inside information is often risky 
for sources, as they may not dare to share it with journalists if their identities 
were not properly protected. Breaking this agreement would only be justified 
if journalists could demonstrate that they had been intentionally manipulated 
by their sources. In practice, news media prefer to deal with accusations of 
delivering false information than to disclose their confidential sources and 
publicly charge them for wrongdoing. The recent disclosure of classified 
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information from the National Security Agency by Edward Snowden to The 
Guardian and other news media (starting 2013) revealed what is probably 
the current biggest threat posed to journalism, for it seriously compromises 
the possibility for journalists to protect their confidential sources. 
 
Still regarding truth seeking, there is one important category not 
mentioned by Daniel Cornu: image manipulation. The inclusion of rules in 
journalistic codes of ethics proscribing post-processing techniques that 
mislead readers by affecting the integrity of news images became common in 
the mid 1990s. That is probably the reason why there is no mention of it in 
Cornu’s book. The digitization of photography and the numerous challenges 
it poses to journalism ethics will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
The respect for human dignity is the third fundamental journalism moral 
principle and, according to the insightful expression of Daniel Cornu, it “sets 
limits to the public’s right to know” (Cornu, 1994). Going through the various 
journalism codes of ethics, it is possible to identify distinct recommendations 
that specify what respect for human dignity consists of: protection of honour, 
reputation and privacy; protection of the identities of those involved in legal 
research and presumption of innocence; respect for the public’s sensitivity 
and for minorities. 
 
The first set of rules is centred on the protection of personal rights. 
Journalists must take extreme care not to offend people’s honour and 
reputation. Accusations without proof must be considered unacceptable in 
any circumstance. Slightly different is the situation concerning the protection 
of people’s privacy, for most codes of ethics admit exceptions to this general 
rule whenever there is an indisputable public interest. The difficulty here is 
defining what constitutes public interest. The code of editors of the former 
Press Complaints Commission, now the Independent Press Standards 
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Organisation (IPSO), is one of the few that tried to define it, although more or 
less loosely: “Public interest includes, but is not confined to:  
 
i) Detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety;  
ii) Protecting public health and safety;  
iii) Preventing the public from being misled by an action or statement of 
an individual or organisation”20.  
 
While abusive interpretations of public interest are being used to 
“justify” unacceptable intrusions into people’s privacy, restrictive 
interpretations are also preventing people from accessing important 
information. The major implications of this situation for photojournalism will 
be discussed in chapter 3. 
 
A second set of rules meant to promote the respect for human dignity 
include those that refer to the protection of the identities of those involved in 
legal research, especially if they are underage, and the presumption of 
innocence. Some codes of ethics also mention the need for journalists not to 
publish images or information that could identify children involved in crimes, 
especially if they are violent or of a sexual nature. The presumption of 
innocence is another form of respect for human dignity. When reporting on 
cases being investigated, journalists should be extremely careful not to 
incriminate anyone or suggest people’s guilt before a final judgment is 
pronounced. 
 
Finally, a third set of rules concerns the respect for public sensitivity and 
for minorities. Both of them have important implications for photojournalism. 
The first refers to questions of taste and public morality. Journalists should 
be scrupulous when publishing graphic content photographs. What is at 
stake here is not so much the integrity of the photograph, but its 
inappropriateness (considered too violent, obscene, etc.). As happened with 
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the concept of “public interest”, “public sensitiveness” can also be used as an 
argument for withholding important (visual) information. We will come back to 
this point in the next section. 
 
Regarding minorities, codes of ethics prohibit all sorts of discrimination 
based on sex, race, nationality, language, religion, ideology, culture, class, 
sexual orientation and disability. The representation of the other is another 
major topic within journalism and photojournalism ethics. Given that the other 
is generally depicted differently from the same, it could arguably be said that 
media ethics is also about geography. It is about physical and symbolic 
distances, for both determine the way people are portrayed and the 
opportunities they are given to express themselves and thus to actively 
participate in the public sphere. We will come back to this point in chapter 3. 
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1.5. Challenging Daniel Cornu’s theory 
 
 
Following our strategy, we will now challenge Daniel Cornu’s thesis, 
according to which journalism’s fundamental moral principles are freedom, 
truth and respect for human dignity, by referring to the theses of Deni Elliott 
(1988; 2009), Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel (2001; 2010). 
 
In a very concise text published in 1988, titled All is not relative: 
essential shared values and the press, Deni Elliott sustains that journalists 
share a set of essential moral values that, “though rarely articulated”, define 
journalism’s identity and provide the standards for deciding what behaviour is 
acceptable and what is unacceptable (1988: 29).  
 
Recognising that these shared values could not be proven by surveys 
or any other “nose-counting techniques”, and that empirical evidence could 
only provide an approximate description of them, Elliot contends that these 
essential values can be considered “universal, normative and definitional” 
(1988: 30). To test their essentiality, the author suggests a negative 
procedure: “The way to check out whether or not some value is essential to a 
field is to see what would happen if that essence were removed” (Elliott, 
1988: 30). Although basing her theory on the American reality, Elliot 
contends that these shared moral values have a universal dimension, being 
perfectly appropriated for guiding 21st century journalism: “This author 
identified three shared values that are sustained across culture and time, and 
paradigm shifts as well” (Elliot, 2009: 36). As we shall see further on, besides 
Deni Elliott, Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel are also convinced that the 
basic journalism moral values are as legitimate and appropriate now as they 
were in the past, regardless of the important transformations journalism is 
undergoing. 
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For Deni Elliott, there are three essential moral values in journalism. 
According to the first, journalists should strive to publish “balanced, accurate, 
relevant and complete” information. According to the second, journalists 
should strive to publish balanced, accurate, relevant and complete 
information “without causing harm that could be prevented”. Finally, 
according to the third, “journalists should strive to give citizens information 
that they need for self-governance” (2009; 36-37). Considered the “defining 
principle of the practice of journalism”, the third moral principle is also the 
one that justifies that, in particular circumstances, when information is of 
public interest and there is no alternative, harm could be done to people. 
 
Despite the similarities, Deni Elliot and Daniel Cornu’s theories do not 
completely coincide. Three important differences can be observed.  
 
The first concerns the fact that for Elliott “giving citizens the information 
they need for self-governance” is a moral value, while for Cornu it is the 
mission of the press. It is unquestionable that the mission of the press has a 
moral nature and that it is good for journalists to comply with their mission. 
But technically it is worth maintaining the difference between what constitutes 
the purpose of journalism and the moral values governing information. The 
former establishes the criteria for assessing the appropriateness of the latter. 
If the mission of the press were different, the moral values governing 
information would have to be reconsidered. 
 
The second main difference is the lack of reference to freedom in 
Elliott’s theory. For Cornu, freedom is not only a condition sine qua non for 
the practice of journalism, but is also one of its fundamental moral principles. 
The legal recognition of the right of freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press does not guarantee a free and independent press. For journalists, it is 
a duty to protect and promote them. 
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Finally, the third major difference is conceptual. Bearing in mind Otfried 
Höffe’s theory of obligation, it could be said that Elliott’s enquiry is confined to 
a pragmatic level, not a moral one. Balance, accuracy, relevance and 
completeness are means to promote a truthful report of reality and avoiding 
harm, an expression of the respect for human dignity. In this sense, the 
values proposed by Deni Elliott are not as essential as those proposed by 
Daniel Cornu, for the former could be subsumed in the latter without 
completely reducing their meaning. 
 
Among other possible strategies to establish the mission of the press 
and accordingly define journalism’s moral values, the one adopted by the 
Committee of Concerned Journalists in 1997 (at the time led by Bill Kovach 
and Tom Rosenstiel), which resulted in the publication of Elements of 
Journalism: What news people should know and the public should expect 
(Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2001), is a very interesting one. One of the main 
focuses of interest relates to the fact that the authors decided to involve not 
only professionals in the discussion about the press’s mission, but also 
academics and citizens. 
 
In the introduction of their book, the authors say that the idea of carrying 
out a comprehensive study on the fundamental elements of journalism came 
up as a result of an important meeting that gathered some of the top 
American newspaper editors, influential names in television and radio, top 
journalism educators and prominent authors at the Harvard Faculty Club, in 
June 1997, to discuss the lack of credibility affecting journalism. The fact that 
many among them conceded that the public had good reasons not to trust 
news media organizations led them to take action. A plan was undertaken to 
engage journalists and the public to examine what journalism was supposed 
to be. For two years the Committee of Concerned Journalists carried out “the 
most sustained, systematic, and comprehensive examination ever conducted 
by journalists of news gathering and its responsibilities” (2001: 4).  
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This huge project included 21 public forums, which were attended by 
3,000 people and allowed more than 300 journalists to share their views on 
the subject; it also involved a team of academic researchers who 1) 
conducted more than a hundred interviews with journalists about their values; 
2) produced surveys about journalists’ principles; 3) organized academic 
meetings with journalism scholars about the First Amendment and, 4) in 
collaboration with the Project Excellence in Journalism, carried out different 
studies on news reporting.  
 
The outcome of such a comprehensive examination was a “description 
of the theory and culture of journalism” that citizens expect journalists to 
apply and that could be summarized in the following ten core principles: 
 
1. Journalism’s first obligation is to the truth. 
2. Its first loyalty is to citizens. 
3. Its essence is a discipline of verification.  
4. Its practitioners must maintain an independence from those they cover.  
5. It must serve as an independent monitor of power.  
6. It must provide a forum for public criticism and compromise.  
7. It must strive to make the significant interesting and relevant. 
8. It must keep the news comprehensive and proportional.  
9. Its practitioners must be allowed to exercise their personal conscience.  
10. Citizens, too, have rights and responsibilities when it comes to the news21.  
 
(Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001: 5-6) 
 
In order to challenge Daniel Cornu’s theory, we could now ask: do these 
elements of journalism include any new fundamental moral principles to 
journalism ethics? Or is it possible to subsume all their content under the 
three essential moral values already identified (freedom, truth and respect for 
human dignity)?  
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Following the same methodological procedure already used when 
challenging Cornu’s theory with Elliot’s essential shared values in journalism, 
it is possible to argue that among the ten elements of journalism, three are 
related to the mission of the press, four to freedom, three to truth and one not 
strictly related to journalism practice. 
 
Among the elements referring to the mission of the press, clause five 
claims that journalism “must serve as an independent monitor of power”; 
clause six states that journalism “must provide a forum for public criticism 
and compromise” and clause seven holds that journalists “must strive to 
make the significant interesting and relevant”. These three principles 
complement the “primary purpose of journalism”, which, according to Kovach 
and Rosenstiel, is to “provide citizens with the information they need to be 
free and self-governing” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001: 12). As we have seen 
with the help of Daniel Cornu, most of these principles are commonly 
mentioned in journalistic codes of ethics. In their headings and introductions, 
these documents stress the political function of the press, not only 
underlining its role as a watchdog, but also the important mission of providing 
an equitable access to the public sphere. In this context, the most original 
remark is the one that stresses the importance of abandoning conventional 
journalistic formulas in order to make “the significant interesting and 
relevant”. The inverted pyramid writing technique is one of those 
paradigmatic formulas the two authors believe should be challenged (Kovach 
& Rosenstiel, 2001: 189). There is no fundamental reason why storytelling 
should be limited by this long-standing technical convention. Long before 
Kovach and Rosenstiel, John C. Merrill advocated for broadening journalist’s 
room for manoeuvre (Merrill, 1974). In his Imperative of freedom, the 
Emeritus Professor at the University of Missouri also contends that 
journalistic techniques learnt in schools of journalism end up promoting a 
standardized depiction of reality, impoverishing diversity and plurality, which, 
according to the liberal theory of the press, are two fundamental instruments 
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for favouring the disclosure of sensitive information. For Merrill, the use of 
plural and original reporting techniques is paramount in order to provide a 
comprehensive and thus truthful account of reality. It would be interesting to 
consider whether this productive argument could also be applied to the visual 
representation of reality. We will come back to this interesting hermeneutical 
question further on in chapter 3. 
 
Regarding the elements of journalism that could be subsumed under 
the category of “freedom”, clause two states that journalists’ “first loyalty is to 
citizens”, clause four claims that journalists “must maintain an independence 
from those they cover”, clause five contends that journalists must “serve as 
an independent monitor of power” (our italics) and clause nine states that 
they “must be allowed to exercise their personal conscience”. When 
comparing these different elements with the rules identified by Daniel Cornu, 
we come to the conclusion that most of them are quite similar. The first one 
concerns journalists’ loyalties. By stating that journalists’ first loyalty is to 
citizens, the authors emphasize the social responsibility of the press and its 
political function. Moreover, journalists would not be free if they had to 
account for their actions mainly to their chiefs, to their peers or to the medium 
itself. Their first moral obligation is to society and to citizens. They work in the 
public interest. 
 
Concerning the most “controversial moral value”, the first principle is 
straight and clear: “Journalism’s first obligation is to the truth”. All other 
elements of journalism can be subsumed under this first one, that is, they 
can be taken as a means to promote a thorough and truthful account of 
reality: clause number three declares that journalism’s “essence is a 
discipline of verification” and clause number eight states that journalists must 
“keep the news comprehensive and proportional”. 
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Among the ten constitutive elements of journalism there is not a single 
one explicitly dedicated to the respect for human dignity. It is as if the ethical 
concern about how journalists should address the representation of other 
human beings was not essential for providing a  “description of the theory 
and culture of journalism” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001: 6). Even when 
authors refer to minorities, for instance, they do so to underline the need for 
newsrooms to be ethnically diverse in order to provide a plural depiction of 
reality. In other words, minorities are referred to within the debate on 
journalism and truth, not in the context of a wider discussion about the 
respect for human dignity. It is worth noting that at the start of this 
comprehensive study that resulted in the publication of The Elements of 
Journalism there was widespread concern about the lack of public trust in 
news media. In this sense, it is understandable that the focus of the research 
was on freedom and truth and on the means available to promote them. 
 
Finally, there is one constitutive element of journalism that could not be 
subsumed under any of its three fundamental moral principles identified by 
Daniel Cornu: the one related to citizens’ responsibilities regarding news. It is 
worth recalling that this tenth principle was not originally included in the first 
edition of Elements of Journalism: What newspeople should know and the 
public should expect (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001), but added later on in the 
second edition (2007).  
 
The idea of involving the public in media ethics is not new. Among 
others, Claude-Jean Bertrand (1997, 2000) was one of its most committed 
advocates. According to Bertrand, the development of a responsible press 
relies upon the existence of a demanding public. Professionals committed to 
moral values are “too few and too vulnerable to confront economic and 
political forces alone. They need the support of the masses of media users 
with their great voting and purchasing power” (Bertrand, 2000: 210). This is 
why it is so important to establish a pedagogical relationship with the public, 
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and to explain how news media operates, what people should expect from it 
and what its limitations are. Besides contributing to enforcing media ethical 
standards without compromising the freedom of the press, Media 
Accountability Systems (M*A*S*), which Bertrand defines as “any non-State 
means of making media responsible towards the public” (Bertrand, 2000: 
205), should also assume this pedagogical function. 
 
Regardless of the importance of involving the public in journalism 
ethics, it is doubtful whether we could properly included it among journalism’s 
core moral principles. In a strict sense, the three journalism moral principles 
(freedom, truth and respect for human dignity) refer to journalists —or to 
journalism practitioners— and to their work, not to the public or to citizens. 
The contested question of knowing who should be considered a journalist will 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
In 2010 Kovach and Rosenstiel published a book titled “Blur: how to 
know what is true in the age of information overload” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 
2010). In this second book, the authors challenge the ability of the 
established elements of journalism to grasp the essence of an activity that is 
going through important changes, as it is now characterized by an increasing 
participation of the public. Journalism, the authors declare, “is no longer a 
lecture. It is more of a dialogue -and potentially richer than ever before” 
(Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2010: 172). And they continue: 
 
As the press changes, however, we believe certain standards and 
values of the traditional vision of journalism remain. If anything, indeed, they 
become more urgent, since those values are the primary way that consumers 
can distinguish reliable information from the other kinds of media vying for 
their time.  
(Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2010: 172)  
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Besides confirming that the classic elements of journalism are as 
fundamental for the new journalism as they were for the old, they add eight 
functions especially linked to this new dialogical concept of journalism: 
 
1. Authenticator: in the current overwhelmed media environment, where 
everyone can be a media outlet (Shirky: 2008), journalists can function as 
authenticators, helping people distinguish which contents are true and 
reliable. This function is especially relevant in the context of photojournalism. 
For different reasons, which will be discussed later on, trust in images 
depends more on their author than in the image itself.  
 
2. Sense maker: significantly deprived of their traditional role as 
gatekeepers, journalists are now called to work as sense makers, providing a 
broader context to their stories and including links for additional information 
and further reading. 
 
3. Investigator: journalists are expected to keep holding power into 
account and to “expose what is being kept secret” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 
2010: 177). The traditional watchdog role played by the press is as 
fundamental now as it was in the past. 
 
4. Witness Bearer: to bear witness and to monitor events, people and 
places considered important for maintaining a “basic civic integrity” is another 
crucial mission of the press (Idem, 2010: 178). 
 
5. Empowerer: the possibility of providing people more information than 
that actually made available in news articles and to share with them the 
means to access multiple sources of information empowers citizens. For the 
same reason, inviting people to participate in the process of newsmaking 
also empowers journalists. It is a mutual empowerment (Idem, 2010: 178) 
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6. Smart Aggregator: journalists are also called to function as smart 
aggregators, helping people find reliable information. There are good 
reasons not to trust computer algorithms and generic news aggregator 
websites. 
 
7. Forum Organizer: Creating forums of debate on topics of public 
interest is another important function of journalists in this new era. This 
function is especially relevant at local levels. 
 
8. Role Model: Given that everyone is potentially a media outlet (Shirky, 
2008), journalists must acknowledge that they can function as role models for 
citizen journalists. 
 
While most of these eight functions are linked to the mission of the 
press in the new dialogic news media environment (investigator, witness 
bearer, empowerer, smart aggregator, forum organizer and role model), 
there are two clearly connected to truth seeking: authenticator and sense 
maker.  
 
To sum up this point, and after having gone through the constitutive 
elements of journalism and the eight added functions of the press in the 
twenty-first century proposed by Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, it is 
possible to conclude that they could all be considered either specifications of 
the mission of the press or subsumed under one of the three fundamental 
journalism moral principles identified by Daniel Cornu: freedom, truth and 
respect for human dignity. The only exception is the tenth element, which 
concerns the responsibility of the public, which, strictly speaking, should not 
be considered within the boundaries of an ethics for journalism practitioners. 
In this sense, we could state, although provisionally, following Daniel Cornu 
(1994), that good information must be at the same time free, truthful and 
respectful towards people.  
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The question of knowing to which extent these essential moral 
principles should apply to photojournalism will be discussed in the next 
section.  
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1.6. Journalism ethics and photojournalism ethics 
 
 
After having identified the fundamental moral principles that should 
govern the practice of journalism, we must now ask if those essential shared 
values are also the appropriate ones to guide the practice of photojournalism. 
Some may say that this question has an obvious answer, for photojournalism 
is a form of journalism and, therefore, should abide by the same ethical 
standards. In spite of the legitimacy of this rationale, we firmly believe that 
this thesis should be demonstrated little by little. As the saying goes, the devil 
is in the details.  
 
Our purpose is to highlight that although sharing the same essential 
moral values, journalism and photojournalism do not share exactly the same 
technical and pragmatic obligations. And this is a crucial point. Given that the 
means by which verbal language and visual language that refer to the world 
are different, their means to promote a truthful and respectful account of 
reality must also be different.  
 
Throughout chapters 2 and 3 we will try to provide sufficient arguments 
to demonstrate that, besides what we could call historical motives, there are 
no strong reasons to sustain that news photos should limit their means of 
expression exclusively to the aesthetic norms of realism and naturalism. The 
idea that photographs represent things as they are, mirroring reality, has 
been subjected to criticism almost since the invention of photography in the 
late nineteenth century. Notwithstanding, it is possible to find in some 
photojournalism practices and in various documents related to press 
photography (codes of ethics, internal guidelines and text books) the traces 
of this reductive conception of visual truth. But before elaborating on the 
differences between journalism’s and photojournalism’s technical and 
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pragmatic levels of obligation we must first briefly demonstrate that both 
share the same fundamental ethical principles. 
 
Following the same strategy that we have already used to establish 
journalism’s fundamental moral principles, we will have to enquire into the 
telos of photojournalism. According to the moral theory that we have 
adopted, there is an intrinsic connection between the mission of the press 
and journalism’s essential values. This does not mean though that freedom, 
truth and respect for human dignity are valuable just because they favour the 
accomplishment of the mission of the press. They are good in their own right. 
In the words of Clifford Christians (1997a), these moral values are rooted in 
our “human oneness”. But we have also seen that the justification of morality 
is a contested terrain. The development of diverse metaphysical, ontological 
and scientific concepts of freedom and of moral consciousness gave birth to 
different and sometimes irreconcilable moral theories. Recognizing that it 
would be ultimately impossible not to take sides in this complex debate, and 
after having set the horizon of our own moral thinking within the moral theory 
of Paul Ricoeur, we have decided to follow the path drawn by Deni Elliot 
(1988, 2009), Daniel Cornu (1994), Clifford Christians (1997a), and Bill 
Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel (2001, 2010) and to enquire into the mission of 
the press and journalism’s essential moral principles within some of the 
expressions that reveal the shared and enduring convictions about the ethos 
of journalism. 
 
In order to demonstrate that journalism and photojournalism share the 
same mission and essential moral values, we will proceed according to the 
following strategy: firstly, we will briefly show that general journalism codes of 
ethics are also aimed at photojournalists. Secondly, we will analyse the 
National Press Photographers Association’s (NPPA) code of ethics, which is 
one of the first codes specific to visual journalism (1946) and one of the most 
influential (Lavoie, 2010). The purpose here is to prove that its rules can also 
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be subsumed under the three essential journalism moral principles. Finally, 
we will consider the current debate surrounding the definition of journalist and 
journalism to determine whether they are sufficiently comprehensive to 
include the practice of visual journalism. 
 
With regards to the question of knowing whether general codes of 
ethics are also aimed at people involved in capturing, editing and 
disseminating news photos, and thus whether the three essential journalism 
moral values also encourage photojournalists, the answer is yes. On the one 
hand, in their preambles and headings, these codes of ethics do not 
discriminate between journalists and photojournalists. On the other hand, 
however, they generally include, even if only en passant, rules regarding 
pictures. In this sense, and taken together, these two features support the 
idea that general journalism codes of ethics also encourage photojournalists 
and that, at the end of the day, they consider them journalists tout court. 
 
Still with reference to the first point, we have shown elsewhere that 
despite also being aimed at photojournalists, general codes of ethics do not 
provide useful guidance with regard to certain important challenges currently 
affecting visual journalism (Santos Silva, 2011). Most journalism codes of 
ethics include rules proscribing the manipulation of news photos, the 
unjustified invasion of privacy, the intrusion into grief and suffering and some 
recommend best practices regarding the depiction of children. But they 
generally fail to provide guidance regarding, for instance, the use of violent 
and graphic pictures (Keith, Schwalbe & Silcock, 2006), the use of post-
processing editing tools, or the use of user-generated content. 
 
After having seen that general journalism codes of conduct also 
encourage photojournalists, it is now time to take a look at the situation 
regarding the specific codes of ethics of visual journalism. It is worth noting 
here that in many European countries such as Portugal, Spain, France, 
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Norway and the United Kingdom, there are no specific codes of ethics for 
visual journalism, even though in some of them there are professional 
photojournalists’ associations, such as the Asociación Nacional de 
Informadores Gráficos de Prensa y Televisión, in Spain, Union des 
Photographes Professionnels, in France, the Foto Journalisten in Norway, 
and the British Press Photographers Association, in the United Kingdom.  
 
In order to establish the thesis according to which the essential moral 
principles of photojournalism are freedom, truth and respect for human 
dignity, we will now analyse the National Press Photographers Association 
(NPPA) code of ethics. 
 
Regarding the mission of “visual journalism’, the NPPA code of ethics is 
in line with the majority of journalism codes of ethics. In its preamble, the 
NPPA states that visual journalists’ “primary role is to report visually on the 
significant events and varied viewpoints in our common world” and to 
"expose wrongdoing and neglect, inspire hope and understanding and 
connect people around the globe through the language of visual 
understanding” (NPPA, 2004).  
 
Going through the nine clauses of the NPPA code of ethics, we are 
forced to conclude that they can all be subsumed under one of the three 
essential journalism moral principles identified by Daniel Cornu (1994).  
 
Among the rules that express means to protect and promote freedom, 
clause eight forbids visual journalists from “accept(ing) gifts, favors, or 
compensation from those who might seek to influence coverage”, and clause 
nine reminds journalists not to “intentionally sabotage the efforts of other 
journalists”. In the first case it is journalists’ independence that is at stake, 
while in the second, it is the freedom of others to work that must be 
guaranteed. 
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Regarding truth seeking, the NPPA code is quite complete. Clause one 
declares that visual journalists must “be accurate and comprehensive in the 
representation of subjects”. Clause two states that journalists must “resist 
being manipulated by staged photo opportunities”, and clause three asks 
them to “be complete and provide context when photographing or recording 
subjects” and to “recognize and work to avoid presenting one’s own biases in 
the work”. Clause five encourages journalists not to intentionally contribute 
to, "alter, or seek to alter or influence events”. Regarding post-processing 
techniques, clause six states that “editing should maintain the integrity of the 
photographic images’ content and context”, specifying that it is forbidden to 
“manipulate images or add or alter sound in a way that can mislead viewers 
or misrepresent subjects”. Regarding the means of gathering (visual) 
information, the code proscribes “pay(ing) sources or subjects or reward 
them materially for information or participation”. 
 
Finally, concerning the respect for human dignity, clause three states 
that visual journalists should “avoid stereotyping individuals and groups”, 
whilst clause four asks journalists to “treat all subjects with respect and 
dignity”, and to “give special consideration to vulnerable subjects and 
compassion to victims of crime or tragedy”. Furthermore, it reminds them to 
“intrude on private moments of grief only when the public has an overriding 
and justifiable need to see”. 
 
The code then adds seven more recommendations that visual 
journalists should “ideally” follow. Although more general, this second set of 
rules could still be subsumed under one of the three fundamental principles 
of journalism. Among them, the first adds specifics to the mission of 
journalists, saying that they should “strive to ensure that the public’s business 
is conducted in public”. To make it possible (freedom is a condition sine qua 
non for the practice of journalism), the code adds that visual journalists 
should “defend the rights of access for all journalists” and underlines that 
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journalists should “strive for total and unrestricted access to subjects” (rule 
number three). Still regarding journalists’ freedom, the code states (rule 
number 4) that journalists should “avoid political, civic and business 
involvements or other employment that compromise or give the appearance 
of compromising one’s own journalistic independence”.  
 
When it comes to the promotion of truth, besides asking journalists to 
“respect the integrity of the photographic moment” (rule number 6), the code 
includes two other interesting recommendations. The first asks visual 
journalists to “think proactively, as a student of psychology, sociology, politics 
and art to develop a unique vision and presentation” and to “work with a 
voracious appetite for current events and contemporary visual media” (rule 
number 2). The second asks them to “recommend alternatives to shallow or 
rushed opportunities, seek a diversity of viewpoints, and work to show 
unpopular or unnoticed points of view” (rule number 3). These two 
recommendations, which taken together constitute an appeal to the use of 
creative and original reporting strategies and points of view capable of 
favouring a pluralistic and diverse depiction of reality, are in line with one of 
the constitutive elements of journalism established by Kovach and 
Rosenstiel, according to which journalists should abandon conventional 
journalistic formulas in order to make “the significant interesting and 
relevant”. We will come back to this interesting hermeneutical question in 
chapter 2. 
 
Finally, with regard to the due respect for human dignity, the code 
states that, ideally, visual journalists should “strive to be unobtrusive and 
humble in dealing with subjects” (rule number 5). 
 
Given the importance and influence of the NPPA on the community of 
photojournalists, the fact that all its rules and recommendations could be 
subsumed under one of the three essential journalism principles constitutes 
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an important argument for our thesis: journalism and photojournalism share 
the same essential moral principles. 
 
Finally, the question of knowing who is a journalist is a contested one, 
as it always has been. And it has become increasingly complicated, now that 
virtually everyone can be a media outlet (Shirky: 2008).  
 
Whilst this is not the place to elaborate on the subject, it is nevertheless 
possible to briefly mention the main arguments in contention: on the one 
hand, authors such as Peters and Tandoc claim that it is crucial to establish a 
definition of journalist. Their main argument is linked to the need to grant 
journalists legal protection. According to the authors, legislators need to 
define who is to be considered a journalist in order to decide who should be 
given the right not to disclose confidential information (including pictures and 
videos) or sources of information in legal proceedings (Peters & Tandoc, 
2013). Willing to provide a descriptive definition, Peters and Tandoc have 
analysed and identified the common elements used to conceptualize a 
journalist by a variety of different sources from academic, legal and industrial 
domains. Their goal was to reflect how journalists are commonly defined. 
This is what they established:  
 
A journalist is someone employed to regularly engage in gathering, 
processing, and disseminating (activities) news and information (output) to 
serve the public interest (social role).  
(Peters & Tandoc, 2013). 
 
The main problem with this definition, the authors recognize, is that 
while used to decide who may be granted with legal protection, this definition 
leaves unprotected “a large number of actors in the journalism ecosystem in 
the position of fulfilling community needs for news”, which is particularly 
worrying “when their work provokes backlash” (Peters & Tandoc, 2013). But 
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this definition is also “unwise” because it might “de-incentivize innovation in 
news production and distribution by limiting shield protections to traditional 
outlets and journalists” (Ibidem). 
 
On the other hand, authors such as Josh Stearns argue that it is time to 
“stop defining who is a journalist, and protect all acts of journalism” (Stearns, 
2013a). Not providing protection to those who practice journalism, regardless 
of the venue or their professional status, would significantly limit the 
development of new forms of journalism performed by unpaid bloggers, 
activists, hobbyists and citizen journalists and thus diminish the diversity and 
plurality of news coverage. According to Stearns, there is growing consensus 
on the need to abandon traditional definitions of journalist. The fact that at its 
2013 annual meeting the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) debated a 
proposal to change its name to Society for Professional Journalism is 
considered a sign of this changing attitude. Not having reached the 
necessary backing to pass the proposal, the organization decided 
nevertheless to vote in support of a resolution that “rejects any attempts to 
define a journalist in any way other than someone who commits acts of 
journalism” (SPJ, 2013, quoted from Stearns, 2013a). Restricting who counts 
as a journalist, the SPJ contends, is “an affront to journalism and to First 
Amendment rights of a free press” (Ibidem).   
 
Given the difficulty in providing a clear and consensual definition of 
“acts of journalism”, Stearns proposes establishing the debate around three 
complementary dimensions: ethics, behaviour and service. No matter who 
performs them, acts of journalism should comply with the highest ethical 
standards, generally listed in codes of ethics, and should be considered a 
service to the community, that is, it should be “driven by audience needs” 
rather than by a business logic.  
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Although not proposing any definition of “acts of journalism” of his own, 
Stearns finds “very functional” and comprehensive the definition included in 
the Free Flow Information Act of 2013, put forward by the House of 
Representatives, according to which: 
 
(...) ‘journalism’ means the gathering, preparing, collecting, 
photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of news or 
information that concerns local, national, or international events or other 
matters of public interest for dissemination to the public. 
(The Free Flow Information Act of 2013, quoted by Stearns, 2013a) 
 
Both the “descriptive” definition of journalist provided by Peters and 
Tandoc (2013) and the definition of journalism included in the Free Flow 
Information Act of 2013 seem sufficiently comprehensive to include the 
activities performed by photojournalists. But the most interesting thing about 
this debate is the move from a traditional notion of journalist towards an 
ethical conception of the acts of journalism. Jane Singer and Cecilia Friend 
(2007) also share this approach to the phenomenon. For them, the 
categories of professionalism and process are no longer appropriate to 
distinguish journalists from non-journalists: 
 
We would suggest instead that journalists in our current media 
environment are best defined not by who they are or even what they do, but 
by how and why they do it. What is definitive from our perspective is the 
journalist’s ethics or norms, as well as the principles that underline those 
norms.  
(Singer & Friend, 2007: 47) 
 
A journalist is someone who does journalism. And what distinguishes 
journalism from other activities related to gathering, editing and disseminating 
information to the public is its ethos. In this sense, the ethics of journalism 
and photojournalism is an enquiry into the nature of each of these activities, 
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an enquiry into what is proper to each one of them. In the words of Vincent 
Lavoie, “the ethics of photojournalism is, after all, ontology, for it is still the 
essence of this activity that is at stake”22 (Lavoie, 2010b: §18). But this 
essence, or nature, is not to be understood as something fixed and static, 
something that could be established once and for all. The ethos of journalism 
and the ethos of photojournalism are dynamic, for their mission and the 
means by which they are called to accomplish them are constantly evolving.  
 
Photojournalism, Lavoie contends, is a “fundamentally unstable 
category that is constantly reconfigured by [historical] discourses” (Lavoie, 
2010b: §18). In his Photojournalismes: revoir les canons de l'image de 
presse, Lavoie shows how different histories of photography and 
photojournalism have contributed to configuring diverse understandings of 
what photojournalism is, highlighting, at the same time, the decisive role that 
ethical considerations play in shaping those diverse understandings (Lavoie, 
2010a). 
 
It may now become clear why we have been avoiding providing a 
definition of photojournalism: we wanted to highlight that photojournalism is a 
constitutive form of journalism and that it is their ethos that ultimately defines 
them and distinguishes them from other similar activities. This is why it has 
been important to establish the essential moral principles of photojournalism 
before proposing a definition. Throughout this first chapter we have tried to 
demonstrate that although dynamic, their mission and essential moral values 
are well grounded. Regarding the mission of the press, the most essential 
and at the same time comprehensive definition is probably that proposed by 
Kovach and Rosenstiel, according to which journalism should “provide 
people with the nformation they need to be free and self-governing” (Kovach 
& Rosenstiel, 2001: 12). And regarding ethical standards, the most fecund 
account is that provided by Daniel Cornu, according to which the essential 
moral principles of journalism (and photojournalism) are: freedom, truth and 
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respect for human dignity. In this sense, any tentative definition of 
photojournalism should at the same time incorporate this comprehensive 
understanding of its mission and its essential moral principles. And there is 
yet another important characteristic that should not be underestimated: “The 
basic unit of photojournalism is one picture with words” (Hicks, 1973: 5). 
Words are needed to help people understand what pictures show. Each one 
of them has its own mode of referring to reality, with its advantages and 
disadvantages, and it would be an error to ask them to function as something 
they are not. We will come back to this question further on. 
 
To conclude this first chapter, we could propose the following tentative 
definition of photojournalism:  
 
Photojournalism is the activity involved in providing people with 
information of public interest through a combination of words and pictures in 
a free, truthful and respectful way.  
 
It must be clear that this tentative definition has no normative ambition. 
Its purpose is to underline that photojournalism’s basic unit is the 
combination of words and pictures, and that to serve the public interest 
photojournalism practitioners must be free, truthful and respect people’s 
dignity. 
 
The next chapter is dedicated to the history of the ethics of 
photojournalism. We focus on objectivity and how different photojournalism 
textbooks and codes of ethics have incorporated it among their rules and 
recommendations. Our purpose, as has been stated, is to demonstrate that, 
besides certain conjectural motives, there are no fundamental reasons not to 
challenge the narrow understanding of visual truth that is related to the 
historical interpretation of photographic objectivity. 
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2. Objectivity and photojournalism ethics 
 
 
The aim of this second chapter is to question the concept of objectivity 
that, since the end of the 19th Century, has been shaping our understanding 
of what a good press photograph should be. It is our conviction that the 
profound revolution photojournalism underwent after the invention of digital 
photography in the 1980s has forced us to revise the bases on which the 
credibility of press photography was founded and to rethink the comparison 
between journalistic and artistic photography.  
 
With the aim of looking into the historical roots of the predominant 
concept of press photography, we will begin by analysing the development of 
the concept of objectivity in American journalism since the 1830s, bringing to 
light the different technological, professional, commercial and political factors 
that have driven its development. 
 
We will then analyse the development of ethical reflection in 
photojournalism, which will allow us to understand why and how the concept 
of objectivity was applied to press photography.  
 
Finally, and starting from the analysis of a specific case  Paul 
Hansen’s award-winning World Press Photo 2012, we will attempt to 
demonstrate that the promotion of photojournalistic credibility within the 
framework of the old paradigm of the darkroom is not justifiable either from 
the theoretical or practical point of view. It is not from the theoretical point of 
view because it is not possible to demonstrate the epistemological privilege 
of realistic photography. And it is not justifiable from the practical point of 
view because basing trust on press photography on a control system and 
forensic monitoring will end up fostering generalised suspition. 
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2.1. The rise of objectivity in journalism 
 
 
Perhaps no question is as central to an understanding of objectivity in 
journalism than that of its origin. 
(Maras, 2013: 22) 
 
Although being a highly contested concept, objectivity has played a 
central role in the development of modern journalism. As David T. Z. Mindich 
put it in his Just the facts: how objectivity came to define American 
journalism: “If American journalism were a religion, as it has been called from 
time to time, its supreme deity would be ‘objectivity’” (Mindich: 1998: 1). 
 
Going through the literature available on the subject, it becomes clear 
that the lack of consensus surrounding the concept of objectivity mirrors an 
analogous dispute on why and when newspapers started developing new 
procedures meant to make their reports more credible. Some authors 
attribute this change to technological factors, such as the invention of the 
telegraph, others to the shift from a partisan to a more commercial press in 
the wake of the 20th Century and others to the increasing claims of 
professionalization by journalists themselves.  
 
It is not our intention in this study to take a position regarding the 
relative importance of each of the different factors or to dispute with 
historians the exact moment in time when the new journalistic routines were 
implemented. Our purpose is rather different: we want to understand the 
extent to which the rise of objectivity in journalism may have helped shape 
the ethos of photojournalism since its early days. In order to do that we need 
to be able to provide a guiding definition of what objectivity means in 
journalism and also to understand the reasons behind this cultural movement 
by going through the factors that have brought it about.  
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The fact that most of the literature on the subject is centred on 
American journalism raises two important methodological questions: the first 
concerns the extent to which objectivity can be considered a cross-cultural 
ethical principle and the second concerns the possibility of considering the 
American case paradigmatic.  
 
Regarding the first question, it is important to distinguish a normative 
from a descriptive approach: the first deals with the question of knowing 
whether objectivity should be considered a universal moral value and the 
second with the question of knowing whether objectivity has effectively 
become a core moral value in different journalistic cultures besides the 
United States. 
 
With regard to the legitimacy of considering objectivity as a universal 
moral value, authors have different opinions, reflecting their different 
understandings of what objectivity really means. Supporters of public or civic 
journalism, like Jay Rosen, for instance, consider that one of the most 
important missions of the press is to strengthen communitarian bonds 
between citizens and help them take decisions regarding their polis, and that 
objectivity, understood as a form of detachment, does not help accomplish 
that fundamental mission (Traquina & Mesquita, 2003). Others advocate for 
the need to clarify the concept, which in their opinion has been misinterpreted 
(Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001) or to redefine it according to our current 
epistemological theories (Ward, 2004). In all these different approaches, 
authors subordinate objectivity to the mission of the press. This was also the 
point we made in the previous chapter. Following the theory of Otfried Höffe, 
we suggested that objectivity should be considered a pragmatic value in 
journalism, that is, a means to promote a truthful and credible account of 
reality. 
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Regarding the question of knowing to which extent objectivity has 
influenced other journalistic cultures besides the American one, Stuart Allan 
contends that, although with regional differences, the ideal of objectivity has 
a wide reach. Still according to Allan, besides the economical, technological 
and political factors, it was the call for professionalism and the response to 
criticism regarding the bias that followed the coverage of the First World War 
that brought about this shift in many different countries (Allan, 2010). 
 
The question of knowing whether the American model of objectivity 
should be considered paradigmatic, Steven Maras contends that existing 
studies that focus on the subject in Canada, Australia, France and the UK 
support the idea that, in the context of journalism, objectivity is an Anglo-
American invention (Maras, 2013: 6).  
 
Things get even more complicated when it comes to defining objectivity 
and identifying the main historical factors that contributed to its development. 
To guide us in this complex subject we will follow closely Steven Maras’ 
book, Objectivity in Journalism (2013), which provides a critical overview of 
the literature on the subject. 
 
Acknowledging that the concept of objectivity is “polysemic” and that it 
has been interpreted differently among different countries and cultures, often 
being associated with various concepts such as impartiality, neutrality, 
balance, accuracy, honesty and fairness, Maras proposes considering 
objectivity as an ideal that involves three related aspects: values, process 
and language.  
 
Regarding values, and following Everette E. Dennis, Maras suggests 
that being objective implies: “1) Separating facts from opinion; 2) Presenting 
emotionally detached views of the news; 3) Striving for fairness and balance” 
(Dennis & Merrill, 1984: 111, cited by Maras, 2013: 8). These three duties are 
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meant to minimize the role played by the subject in shaping news. Journalists 
should stick to what is objective, that is, literally, to what is external regarding 
them. Their own prejudices, preconceptions and preferences should not 
influence their report.  
 
With respect to processes, the author contends that objectivity requires 
“providing a contrasting, balancing or alternative viewpoint, using supporting 
evidence, ensuring close attribution through quoting, and finally organizing 
the story into a familiar news format” (Maras, 2013; 9). These processes link 
objectivity and verification and consider them means to seek the truth. It is 
interesting to note, as Maras does, that in practice values and procedures are 
not necessarily linked to one another and that journalists may eventually 
contest the value of objectivity while, at the same time, recognize that these 
procedures are part of their working routines. 
 
Regarding language, which Maras believes is the least understood 
aspect of objectivity, authors underline its rhetorical capacity to “give the 
impression of authority and trust, especially in core descriptions and 
information such as who, what, when, etc.” (Maras, 2013: 9-10). The use of 
the inverted pyramid style of writing is a good example of these linguistic 
devices that are meant to distinguish a journalist-fact approach to reality from 
other non-journalistic genres. But it is not the only one. In features, for 
instance, where journalists are allowed more flexible writing techniques, 
conventions on the use of language focus on other rhetorical devices centred 
on authenticity.  
 
Citing Schiller, Maras remarks that language functions as an “‘invisible 
frame’ through which the story comes into existence on its own, 
independently of the reporter” (Maras, 2013: 10). This rhetorical device is 
useful when it comes to creating the idea that journalists “report” instead of 
produce the news. As we shall see further on, these rhetorical devices play a 
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crucial role in translating into the language of visual journalism the ideal of 
objectivity. 
 
These are basically the main traits that draw the ideal of objectivity as it 
has been understood and applied although with regional variations in 
Western countries. Together with the concept of truth, which it is closely 
related to, the concept of objectivity in journalism has been subjected to 
intense criticism, having been accused of being grounded in naïve 
ontological and epistemological theories. As a result, in some countries (the 
UK, the U.S, Portugal, Spain, France, etc.) references to objectivity have 
been excluded from codes of ethics or replaced by other concepts such as 
accuracy, impartiality or professional integrity. We will come back to this point 
further on. For the moment it is enough to remark that objectivity has played 
an important role in shaping the ethos of journalism. 
 
Regarding the reasons that contributed to the development of objectivity 
in journalism, Maras, building on the studies of Michael Schudson (1978) and 
Stuart Allan (2010), identifies four related factors: a) professionalization, b) 
technology, c) commercialization and d) politics (Maras, 2013: 23).  
 
a) The professionalization argument. According to this argument, the 
rise of objectivity can be understood as a result of the process of 
professionalization that journalism underwent between the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. In a context of rapid industrialization, 
newspapers were forced to reconfigure themselves in order to serve 
politically heterogeneous audiences and to respond to an increasing lack of 
public confidence. In response to these two trends, journalists were 
encouraged to stick to the facts, covering all sides of the story and allowing 
readers to judge for themselves and form their own opinions. 
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Schudson (1978) also remarks that through education journalists were 
introduced into a scientific concept of the world that, by then, was profoundly 
empiricist and positivist. By the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century it was the model of natural sciences, based on methodologies that 
favour the use of mathematics to describe reality and manipulate facts that 
served as the dominant epistemological paradigm in social sciences. The 
emergence of journalism schools in this academic context helps explain the 
place given to objectivity in journalistic practice. As Maras puts it: “(...) 
objectivity was fast-tracked as a way to characterize the profession, as well 
as indicating a point of mutual interest for practitioners and educationalists” 
(Maras, 2013: 25).  
 
Despite being the most common explanation for the rise of objectivity in 
journalism, professionalization was not the only factor that contributed to its 
emergence. Other interrelated factors must be taken into account if we want 
to rise above the superficial explanation of it.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
b) The technological argument. According to this argument, the rise of 
objectivity in journalism is mainly linked to the invention of the telegraph and 
to the series of constraints this technology imposed on language: “The wire 
services seemed to have imposed a lean, unadorned “objective” style: a form 
of writing stripped of locality, regional touches and colloquialisms” (Maras, 
2013, 28). Besides being expensive, the use of wire services was constantly 
threatened by technical problems, leading its users to be brief and to place 
the factual and novel information at the beginning of their messages. In this 
sense, the telegraph may have been at the origin of the creation of the 
inverted pyramid writing style. In the words of James Carey, “the origins of 
objectivity may be sought, therefore, in the necessity of stretching language 
in space over the long lines of Western Union” (Carey, 2009: 162, cited by 
Maras, 2013: 29). Moreover, for Carey, the telegraph not only reconfigured 
the use of language in journalism but it also reconfigured our sense of 
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awareness by establishing a strong link between the facts that people should 
know and a specific and standardized linguistic mode of addressing them.  
 
Although acknowledging the enormous influence that technology has on 
journalism, scholars warn of the danger of falling into a technological 
determinism that would prevent us from recognizing the impact of other 
factors in shaping journalism practice. News agencies, for instance, are 
among the most influential factors with respect to the adoption of an objective 
and factual language in journalism. It is also interesting to note that the rise of 
objectivity in journalism is also linked to “medium-specific issues”, such as 
radio and television. The “immediacy” of the former and the “eye-witnessing 
account” of the latter reinforced a trend towards objective reporting.  
 
c) The commercialization argument. The general thesis of this argument 
is that objective and politically neutral information serves the wishes of 
advertisers in reaching large heterogeneous audiences. According to this 
argument, objectivity does not only respond to claims of professionalism or 
technological determinisms, but also concerns business logic: instead of 
focusing on specific niche targets, news media should produce and deliver 
news for the masses. This concern with pleasing advertisers led news editors 
to favour what could be called a “stick-to-the-facts” approach to news, and to 
avoid the risks involved in providing interpretations that might not please all 
their readers. But there is another factor that links objectivity and business 
logic: productivity. Sticking to the facts and to the version provided by news 
sources and not having to engage in deep research reduces costs, besides 
allowing reporters to swap between sections, liberating them from acquiring 
specialized knowledge. To sum up, procedures associated with objectivity 
may have been historically adopted for their ability to generate efficiencies 
and to attract audiences.  
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d) The political argument. According to the political argument, no 
comprehensive account of the rise of objectivity in journalism can neglect its 
political dimension. Against a widespread belief, according to which the 
penny press supressed the partisan press, favouring the rise of objectivity in 
journalism, Michael Schudson argues that it was the need for news agencies 
such as Associated Press to deliver contents to a wide range of newspapers 
each with their own political affiliations that helped develop a more 
neutral and impartial approach to news. It is not true then that, due to its 
business logic, the penny press prompted the death of the partisan press.  
 
Other interpretations of the importance of the political factor in the 
development of objectivity in journalism claim that commercial newspapers 
developed their editorial strategy by assuming the central political function of 
surveilling the public good. Holding the powerful to account and providing 
citizens with objective and reliable information was one of the missions of the 
press in the context of American liberal thought. 
 
Alternative accounts of the relationship between politics and the rise of 
objectivity in journalism suggest that the reason why the nineteenth century 
press moved from being partisan and politically committed to more central 
and detached could be related to a progressive detachment from politics that 
occurred in the US, especially from the 1850s onwards (Maras, 2013: 34-35).   
 
Equally complicated in determining which of these factors was more 
influential in the development of objectivity in journalism is knowing exactly 
when this development started. This question is particularly knotty not only 
because there is no consensus on the meaning of objectivity among 
historians of journalism but also because the understanding of the concept 
has evolved over time.  
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To cope with these difficulties, Maras proposes discussing the issue in 
terms of a general “‘orientation’ towards objectivity”, that is, “an approach to 
news production disposed towards the fact” and placing its origin in the 
1830s (Maras, 2013: 42).  
 
Following Stephen Ward (2004) and Michael Schudson (1978), Maras 
calls the period between 1830 and 1880 as the “proto-objective era of news 
as commodity”, characterized by the “triumph of ‘news’ over the editorial and 
‘facts’ over opinion” (Schudson, 1978: 14, cited by Maras, 2013: 42-43) and 
by an increasing concern for factuality, independence and impartiality 
(Maras, 2013: 42). It must be stressed that these values were not contrary to 
the kind of journalism practiced by the penny press, which was mainly 
focused on crime, the activities of the local police, the courts of law and with 
all sorts of faits divers and city life. Targeted at an increasing urban 
population, the penny press delivered news in a simpler and entertaining 
way, using a kind of language that everyone could read and understand. As 
we have already seen, the possibility of reaching a massive audience 
required political detachment, which does not mean that the commercial 
press did not assume a political function, mirroring the interests and 
aspirations of the working class and challenging traditional aristocratic values 
(Schudson, 1978; Mindich, 1988; Maras, 2013). Certain important 
procedures associated with objectivity became common in this period, such 
as the use of the “lead” sentence, fostered by the increasing use of the 
telegraph in the 1840s. Regardless of all these new trends, Schudson 
considers that it would be risky to place the birth of objectivity in journalism in 
this period, for “American journalism had not yet become an occupational 
group or an industry” (Schudson, 1978: 60, cited in Maras, 2013: 46).  
 
The rise of the figure of the reporter during the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century represents the second important step in the orientation of 
journalism towards objectivity. With the telegraph, the reporter displaced the 
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editor as the prototype of the journalist and favoured the division of 
journalistic labour. Reporters gained autonomy and control over their work 
and editors became responsible for policing accuracy and separation of facts 
and opinions. 
 
According to Schudson, it was probably the organization of the daily 
work and the need to establish new routines in news production that fostered 
an attachment to the facts. But the end of the century was also the era of the 
yellow sensationalist press of Joseph Pulitzer and his New York Word, and of 
William Randolph Hearst and his New York Journal. Besides following the 
penny press with regard to news subjects, which mainly focused on crime, 
faits divers and city life, newspapers of the end of the century developed 
what Schudson calls “self-advertising”: a set of stylistic techniques meant to 
draw readers attention to the newspaper itself, including the use of 
illustrations, colourful and appealing headlines, etc. (Schudson, 1987: 94). 
The circulation of newspapers in major cities like New York increased 
enormously and with it, their influence. As Schudson remarks, newspapers of 
the end of the century extended the revolutionary changes introduced by the 
penny press in the late 1830s, reinforcing their independence and 
detachment regarding politics, promoting the separation between facts and 
opinions, while at the same time using a simpler language, including 
illustrations and focusing on the needs and interests of a growing urban 
population. 
 
The third major contribution to the rise of objectivity in journalism is 
associated with a new informational ethical model represented, among 
others, by the editorial project of the New York Times, especially following its 
acquisition by Adolph S. Ochs in 1896. According to Maras, when compared 
to the yellow press, the New York Times represented an alternative approach 
to news, grounded in a clear distinction between entertainment and 
information, setting a new paradigm to analyse objectivity in journalism, 
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which until then was mainly conceived in terms of political detachment and of 
separation of news from opinion. According to Ochs himself, the Times’ aim 
was to give “all the news in concise and attractive form”, to give it “impartially, 
without fear of favor, regardless of any party, sect, or interest involved” (Ochs 
1896, cited by Maras, 2013: 50). The purpose of newspapers like the Times 
is not to sell stories, though reliable as they may be, but to provide citizens 
with important information to help them take decisions regarding their 
community. Within this new informational ethical model, objectivity became 
an ethical claim in itself. Regardless of the fact that this new informational 
model of objectivity has monopolized our contemporary concept of quality 
press, it would be a mistake to underestimate the role of the sensationalist 
and popular press in promoting and dignifying everyday life and thus in 
extending the boundaries of the concept of public good (Schudson, 1978; 
Conboy, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, according to Schudson it was only between the 1920s 
and 1930s, partly in response to the criticism directed towards the press in 
the aftermath of the World War I, that the ideal of objectivity in journalism 
became fully articulated. Concerns with the propagandistic use of the media 
and with the increasing influence of public relations generated a sentiment of 
suspicion among journalists regarding the informative value of the “sticking-
to-the-facts” principle and among the public in general regarding the media 
itself. However, the ideal of objectivity in journalism is also the result of the 
reaction to a complex, multi-faceted cultural moment marked, on the one 
hand, by developments in theoretical physics that questioned the existence 
of a stable, uniform reality, by the works of Freud that questioned the 
transparency of the conscience to itself, by an artistic avant-garde that 
questioned the power of representation and, on the other, by the influence of 
neopositivism in many academic and scientific circles. Therefore, instead of 
becoming the culmination of a process based on the belief that facts speak 
for themselves, objectivity in journalism reached its full articulation mainly as 
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“a method designed for a world in which even facts could not be trusted” 
(Schudson, 1978: 122). According to Maras, more than an “expression of 
professional excellence”, objectivity became “an expression of professional 
anxiety” (Maras, 2013, 52-53).  
 
As a result, calls for professionalization have intensified, the recourse to 
specialized journalists has increased and a new genre of interpretative 
reporting has developed. The understanding of objectivity in terms of the 
inverted pyramid, non-partisanship, detachment, balance and verification 
gradually started to take shape in codes of ethics and academic textbooks.  
 
In short, alongside the concept of objectivity based on naïve empiricism, 
an alternative vision developed that conceived objectivity as a method 
designed to minimise the distortion and bias that inevitably affect news 
production. For Walter Lippmann, who, according to Schudson, “was the 
most wise and forceful spokesman for the ideal of objectivity” (1978: 151), in 
order to reverse the subjectivist tendency in journalism and protect citizens 
from manipulated journalistic coverage, journalists should receive 
professional training, acquire expert knowledge and adopt a more scientific 
approach to reality. It should come as no surprise that in this context, the use 
of photography was generally seen as a positive contribution to the 
promotion of news credibility. The belief in the objectivity of photography, 
which was grounded in the idea that photographs were the result of a 
chemical process performed by a machine, was pretty much in line with the 
widespread enthusiasm for all sorts of scientific and technological 
developments. 
 
Since the 1950s and 1960s onwards, two parallel concepts of objectivity 
have coexisted side-by-side: one that considers objectivity as a biased 
doctrine and another that considers it a doctrine of credibility. According to 
the first, the set of procedures meant to foster an objective depiction of reality 
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end up serving the interests of those in power, favouring the Establishment 
and the status quo. Neutrality and balance are good examples of procedures 
traditionally associated with objectivity that undermine the watchdog role of 
the press, for they recommend treating equally what ultimately is not equal. 
For instance, minority voices that deny, against worldwide scientific evidence, 
human responsibilities in global warming and climate change should not be 
given the same prominence in the media as those who do (Kovach & 
Rosenstiel, 2001). Other critical remarks on objectivity, formulated by 
supporters of public journalism, claim that it fosters political detachment and 
discourages civic engagement.  
 
When it comes to considering objectivity as a doctrine of credibility, 
authors such as Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel (2001) and Stephen Ward 
(2004) highlight the fact that, regardless of all criticism directed at certain 
naïve epistemological understandings of knowledge, the concept of 
objectivity may still play an important role in journalism. For them, it is 
precisely because people cannot rid themselves of their preconceptions that 
makes it important for journalists to adopt a set of procedures and techniques 
meant to promote an (as much as possible) credible and free-from-bias 
account of reality. This alternative understanding of objectivity is based on 
the idea that the political function of the press only makes sense if journalists 
are able to provide citizens with objective, impartial and politically detached 
information. 
 
In summary, following Schudson (1978), Maras (2013) believes it is 
possible to demonstrate that the orientation towards objectivity, which started 
to develop in the 1830s with the adoption of strategies that promote the 
separation of facts from opinions and the dissociation of the journalistic 
discourse from its politically biased ties, would reach its full articulation in 
journalism in an era (the 1920s) in which few no longer believed in the 
possibility of news free from bias and would end up becoming, in our time, 
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the object of a doubly antagonistic attitude: on the one hand, there are those 
who consider it a form of mystifying the authority and legitimacy of a debate 
inevitably mixed up in personal interests and, on the other, there are those 
who consider that objectivity should be understood as a way of fostering the 
credibility of news through various mechanisms that allow readers to 
participate in the news process (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2010; Ward, 2010). 
 
The next section of our study focuses on the ethics of photojournalism. 
Through a brief historical analysis, we aim to demonstrate that the orientation 
towards objectivity, which started to develop in journalism in the 1830s, will 
be reflected in the debates that attempt to legitimise the use of press 
photography as an instrument of news dissemination and not just an 
illustrative and decorative news feature. Moreover, the history of 
photojournalistic ethics provides enough evidence to support the idea that the 
media industry has promoted an understanding of photography as a mirror of 
reality, favouring its denotative and referential functions over its connotative 
and expressive ones and thus basing trust and credibility in news photos on 
the photographs themselves, that is, on their own integrity, rather than on the 
relationship between publishers, journalists and readers. 
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2.2. The origins of photojournalism ethics 
 
 
After having reviewed the rise of objectivity in journalism we will now 
turn our attention to the origins of photojournalism ethics. Our purpose is to 
highlight the historical development of two common assumptions regarding 
the ethos of photojournalism: 1) news photographs should embrace the ideal 
of objectivity and thus favour their referential function; 2) news photographs 
should avoid similarities with artistic photographs.  
 
By revealing the historical roots of these two rhetorical assumptions, we 
aim to denaturalize them and challenge their ambition to continue 
determining our current concept of what photojournalism is and should be. It 
is our contention that these basic suppositions continue to shape debates 
surrounding two of the most important aspects of photojournalism ethics: the 
credibility of images and the representation of people’s suffering (Lavoie, 
2010: 127-129). 
 
Throughout this chapter we will argue that these two longstanding 
assumptions are no longer appropriate for promoting credibility in news 
photos. The increasing difficulty of detecting digital manipulation and, 
moreover, of establishing a clear and consensual criterion to determine what 
is legitimate and what is not suggests that we need to find a new ground in 
which to anchor the credibility of photojournalism. 
 
In next chapter we will attempt to demonstrate that, by centring the 
debate on the representation of suffering with regard to its aestheticization, 
these two longstanding assumptions have excluded from this debate its 
intrinsic moral and political dimension, shifting the centre of discussions from 
the people who suffer to the form and style of photographs. 
  100 
In order to challenge these two suppositions, we first need to go 
through the history of photojournalism ethics to understand how they came to 
define its ethos, which raises the complicated question of the starting point: 
where exactly should we place the origin of photojournalism? Addressing this 
question, Vincent Lavoie has recently shown that there are two main 
tendencies in the historiography of photojournalism: the first, supported by 
most historians of photojournalism, considers that photojournalism has its 
roots in the history of photography itself, being a “natural” development of it; 
the second, popular mainly among professionals and practitioners, refuses to 
associate photojournalism with the history of photography and places its 
origin between the two World Wars (Lavoie, 2010: 12-13).  
 
This finding is interesting, for it shows how history can be used to give 
rhetorical support to different interpretations of what photojournalism should 
be. For press photographers, breaking with former uses of photography that 
were mainly associated with arts was important in order to create a strong 
new professional identity (Lavoie, 2010: 13). According to them, photography 
should be considered revolutionary for having introduced a set of new 
features in journalism that none of the previous forms of visual representation 
was ever capable of: speed; mass market appeal, reproducibility and 
promptness (Lavoie, 2010: 12).  
 
Nevertheless, and regardless of the accuracy of this claim, there are 
good reasons to believe that the origins of photojournalism ethics should be 
sought in the illustrated weeklies of the 1830s, whose successful editorial 
strategies inspired the next generation of illustrated newspapers. According 
to Dona Schwartz (1999), the Penny Magazine, a British newspaper that 
appeared in May 1832 and was sponsored by an organization devoted to 
social reform called Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, deserves 
special mention for its pioneering role in the use of images. 
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Building on Patricia Anderson’s The printed image and the 
transformation of popular culture, 1790-1860 (1991), Schwartz remarks that 
the Penny Magazine “was the earliest inexpensive serial publication to 
realize the commercial possibilities of mass-reproduced imagery” (Schwartz, 
1999: 163). According to its publisher, Charles Knight, the Penny Magazine’s 
goal was to assume an important social mission by providing the working 
class with less radical and dissident views than the ones offered by the 
partisan press. Through “high quality, wood-engraved images” used mainly to 
reproduce fine art works, the Penny Magazine made available for all the most 
“valuable accessories of knowledge [and] instruments of education” 
(Anderson, 1991:70 cited by Schwartz, 1999: 163). The combination of 
political detachment with an educational use of images proved to be a huge 
editorial success, allowing the Penny Magazine to achieve unprecedented 
circulation, which quickly reached one million readers. 
 
The Illustrated London News, considered to be the first newspaper to 
reproduce a news photo (Sousa, 2011; Schwartz, 1999) which at the time 
was still a drawing based on the original daguerreotype taken by Carl 
Friedrich Stelzener in 1842, depicting the consequences of a fire in the city of 
Hamburg23, followed a similar editorial strategy to the Penny Magazine, 
attributing an educational role to images. In line with the Penny Magazine, 
The Illustrated London News refused to dedicate itself to the kind of stories 
typical of the popular press, which mainly focused on crimes, scandals and 
the like: “The Illustrated London News claimed the moral high ground, 
positioning itself as a periodical suitable for the drawing-room table” 
(Schwartz, 1999: 164). Besides these similarities, the Illustrated London 
diverged from the Penny Magazine with regard to its concept of “art”: while 
for the Penny Magazine the wood-engraved images were considered 
vehicles for reproducing the real artistic values present in painting, sculpture 
and architecture, for the Illustrated London News the engravings were 
considered artistic themselves. This new concept favoured a more “light 
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entertainment” approach to the educational mission of the periodical. Instead 
of focusing on the reproduction of works of art, the Illustrated London 
promoted moral values through a variety of different genres such as 
illustrated literary fiction, fashion news, recipes and articles on art, science 
and current events. 
 
The use of images of an educational purpose was grounded in the 
nineteenth-century belief that visual arts were universally comprehensible 
and that they could contribute to the common good by exposing people to 
transcendent and universal moral values. And it is worth noting that faith in 
the universality of visual images was intrinsically linked to their capacity to 
objectively represent events. The following public statement by the Illustrated 
London News regarding its wood-engravings is paradigmatic of this linkage 
between art and factuality: “The public will have henceforth under their 
glance and within their grasp, the very form and presence of events as they 
transpire, in all their substantial reality, and with evidence visible as well as 
circumstantial” (Fox, 1988: 12, cited by Schwartz, 1999: 164).  
 
It is interesting to note that for publishers of the 1830s and 1840s the 
artistic dimension of illustrations did not compromise their objectivity or 
factuality. Moreover, together with political detachment and a proper sense of 
decorum, the combination of objectivity, factuality and art allowed these 
illustrative periodicals to become appealing to both elites and the working 
class and thus to reach a mass readership. The pictures that Roger Fenton 
took in the Crimea Wars for the Illustrated London News in the 1850s, for 
instance, were still published with the help of the wood-engraving process. 
And regardless of the technological limitations that made it impossible to 
capture motion and action, and regardless of the editorial censorship that 
prevented Fenton photographing the horrors of war, these pictures are often 
considered to be at the origin of what would later be called photojournalism 
(Sousa, 2011: 41). The link between war and photography would be 
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increasingly strengthen in the 1860s during the American Civil War, with 
photographers such as Mathew Brady, Alexander Gardner and Timothy 
O’Sullivan contributing to transforming war photography into one of the most 
emblematic genres of photojournalism (Lavoie, 2010: 20). 
 
The association between news images, art and factuality would not last 
forever in the history of photojournalism and over time the credibility of sketch 
artists to reproduce faithfully photographic events started to erode. 
Nevertheless, the replacement of wood engravings by photographic images 
would only be completed by the 1920s. At first, photographs were not able to 
capture action and motion, as they required long exposure times. 
Furthermore, until the 1870s there were no means of printing photographs 
directly with type, which made it very difficult for mass-circulation newspapers 
to run photographs regularly. Their use was soley limited to serving as 
models for sketch artists, who were entrusted to copy them so that they could 
be reproduced on wood engravings. It was only in the 1880s that halftone 
technology facilitated the process of mass reproduction of photographs in the 
press. Alongside these technological developments, the rise of artistic avant-
garde movements that challenged the canons of artistic representation also 
contributed to displacing the claims of objectivity and factuality from hand-
made images towards camera-generated photographs. As Schwartz points 
out, “The universality and factuality of art were the cornerstones upon which 
the illustrated press had built its claim to a mass audience, and photography 
appeared the logical heir to wood engraving” (Schwartz, 1999: 167). 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the sensationalist newspapers of the 
late nineteenth-century, of which the World of Joseph Pulitzer was one of the 
most successful, followed a similar strategy to its British predecessors, 
mixing information and entertainment and using pictures to attract readers. It 
should come as no surprise that in an increasingly competitive market, 
grabbing readers’ attention required using increasingly sensational pictures. 
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It was in this context that discussions regarding the invasion of privacy 
resulting from the use of hand cameras made their entry in specialized 
publications (Lavoie, 2010b). Among the first expressions of this new ethical 
attitude, Lavoie points to two articles voicing concerns about the invasion of 
privacy and the use of candid photos. The first, titled “The ethics of hand 
cameras”, was published in 1890 in the Photographic Times by Henry 
Harrison Suplee, and the second, titled “The Casuistry of Photographic 
Ethics”, was published in 1899 in the American Journal of Photography 
(Lavoie 2010b). 
 
The need to protect privacy and intimacy became even more relevant in 
photojournalism ethics throughout the 1930s, in a time when the competition 
for audiences between illustrated magazines led to both an increase in 
photographic activity and to some undesirable excesses. According to 
Lavoie, the most important books on press photography of that time included 
if not a whole chapter, then at least a substantial part dedicated to the 
representation of otherness. A remarkable expression of this ethical concern 
can be found in a book published in 1939 by Duane Featherstonhaugh titled 
“Press Photography with the Miniature Camera” (see Lavoie, 2010b). 
Building on the existence of an “unwritten code of ethics”, the author urges 
photographers to act with tact and sensitivity when depicting events such as 
accidents, fires or natural disasters. Recognizing the right for pictures in 
public places to be taken, and foreseeing a short career for those 
photographers who resist taking sensationalist snapshots, Featherstonhaugh 
places the discussion on photojournalism ethics within the classic dialectic 
tension between market forces and moral obligation.  
 
In the absence of a code of ethics specific to photojournalism, which 
would only appear in 1946, press photographers were invited to commit 
themselves to the same ethical standards that ruled the printed press. James 
C. Kinkaid, for instance, included the whole code of ethics of the American 
  105 
Society of News Editors of 1922 in his book Press Photography, published in 
1936, stating that is was imperative for photojournalism to replicate the same 
moral guidelines established for the press. For Lavoie, the fact that 
photojournalists were willing to adopt the same sort of regulating systems 
that already existed in the domain of the printing press is symptomatic of two 
ambitions: the first, to increase the legitimacy of photojournalism by 
committing it to the same ethical standards of the printed press; and the 
second, to subordinate photography to a regulating system that was already 
institutionalized. 
 
For the authors of Pictorial Journalism, published in 1939, ethics was no 
longer efficient when it came to protecting people’s fundamental rights 
against certain abuses perpetrated by the press. Legal protection was 
required:  
 
The passing of laws is made difficult by the determination of the press to 
guard its freedom, guaranteed by the Constitution, yet if publication is deemed 
injurious to citizens and prejudicial to justice, it can and should be restricted. 
(Vitray et al., 1939: 386) 
 
Among the topics under examination, authors include “photos that 
cartoon or misrepresent the subject”, “newsphotos that horrify”, “rights of 
privacy” and “pictures that are faked”. Regarding the last, two interesting 
observations are worth mentioning: the first concerns the fact that authors 
accuse critics of not being as hard with “reputable” newspapers as they are 
with the more sensationalist ones: “When the fake is accompanied by a 
certain amount of sensationalism, then everybody is up in arms” (Vitray et al., 
1939: 391). This observation is interesting for it reveals the existence of a 
long-standing tendency to use double standards when it comes to judging 
newspapers. But their observations on fake photographs are interesting for 
yet another reason. According to the authors, fake photographs were 
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becoming rare: “The truth is that real photography has driven the fakes out of 
the field so completely that current examples would be difficult to find” (Vitray 
et al., 1939: 391). The exaggerated tone of this statement reveals the 
enthusiasm generated by the new technological innovations and the faith 
people had in the power of the photographic camera to record reality. Among 
the types of faked photos that nevertheless could deceive readers, the 
authors identify three: 1) photos developed from something that was not a 
photograph, which at the time were mainly drawings; 2) photos posed by 
models to represent actual news events, a kind of practice sometimes used 
to illustrate electrocution to which the cameraman had no access; 3) photos 
made up of parts of several photographs, known as “composographs”, which 
differed from photomontages because they were intended to mislead readers 
by pretending they were real photographs. 
 
It is remarkable that the major ethical concerns regarding news photos 
from the 1890s until the 1940s were mainly focused on the protection of 
people’s dignity. Trust in photography was not yet in question. In fact, as 
Schwartz (1999) and Zelizer (1995) point out, the credibility of photographs 
served as an important rhetorical device for editors and publishers from the 
1920s onwards in reversing the extended suspicion regarding the work of 
journalists, accused of buckling under the pressure of governments and 
public relations. At a time when it was commonplace to say “you can’t believe 
all you read in the newspapers” (Schwartz, 1999: 168), photographs proved 
to be very useful both for boosting public trust in journalism and for engaging 
with readers and increasing circulation. 
 
The technological improvements of the 1930s, including the 
development of smaller cameras, better lenses, faster film, and better means 
for transmitting photos, with the popularization of the Associated Press’ 
Wirephoto services (1935), which allowed the transmission of photos over 
distance, contributed definitively to converting news pictures into accepted 
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and common means of conveying information. According to some 
interpretations of the history of photojournalism, especially popular among 
professionals, the new methods for gathering and disseminating news photos 
constituted a complete novelty when compared to the previous uses of news 
images, making it possible to say that the 1930s represented 
photojournalism’s ground zero (Lavoie, 2010). For Gisèle Freund (1980), for 
instance, the history of photojournalism begins when, for the first time in the 
history of journalism, it is the image itself that tells the story. This 
subordination of words to pictures was an essential feature of the new 
photojournalistic genre called photographic essay that news magazines 
such as the French Vu (1928-1940) and American Life (1936-1972) made 
popular in the 1930s.  
 
As a consequence of the increasing popularity of news photos between 
the 1930s and 1940s, print journalists started to feel that their authority, 
legitimacy and power were being threatened and decided to react. According 
to Barbie Zelizer (1995), two different rhetorical strategies were used to 
deflate the authority of photography as a journalistic tool: 1) to limit 
photography to its recording function and 2) to disembody the figure of the 
photographer, suggesting that their role in the process of taking pictures was 
almost irrelevant. Both strategies were grounded in the idea that 
“photography needed print journalism in order to make sense” (Zelizer, 1995: 
146).  
 
Regarding the first strategy, and building on Roland Barthes and Stuart 
Hall’s theory according to which photographs fulfil both a denotative 
(referential) and a connotative (interpretative) function, Zelizer contends that 
the idea of limiting photography to its referential function was a way to 
bypass its “potentially threatening connotative role” and thus reduce the 
possibilities of having photography assume an alternative and possibly a 
primary role in journalism (1995: 146). By claiming that the mission of news 
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photographs was simply to record events, print journalists tried to 
domesticate photography and to subordinate its influence and authority to the 
power of words. Photographs could work next to words and complement their 
mission, but by no means could they replace them: “In short, the running 
comparison with words generally worked against a recognition of what 
photographs could do that was different from what could be accomplished 
with other tools of documentation” (Zelizer, 1995: 146). 
 
The second strategy consisted of disembodying the photographer, 
suggesting that the camera could eventually get by without human 
intervention. According to Zelizer, most discussions on news photography 
between the 1930s and 1940s ignored the role played by photographers, 
centring the attention on the camera itself and its ability to record and mirror 
reality. This strategy allowed print journalists to claim their own presence in 
discussions on photography and to deflate the authority of photographers. 
This is also the opinion of Dona Schwartz, for whom “photographers have 
been conceptualized as camera operators rather than artists or authors, 
technicians who initially received no credit or byline for the work they 
produced” (Schwartz, 1999: 173). 
 
For Zelizer, the situation of photojournalism changed with the entry of 
the United States into World War II, as photographers were called to 
“document the inadequacies of print journalism” (Zelizer, 1999: 152). 
According to the general view, photographs were more capable than words 
of showing events as they really happened and documenting the events of 
“‘real’ life” (Ibidem). Moreover, photography’s participation in war was not 
limited to the work done by professional photographers, many of who were 
attached to military divisions. Advanced amateurs with some training and 
even complete amateurs with no previous training, operating with their own 
private cameras, also participated in the massive photographic 
documentation of World War II.  
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For Zelizer, the “victory of news photography was tied up with the 
photographer’s ability to record, reference, and report reality, rather than 
interpret it” (Zelizer, 1999: 153). Photography’s denotative function ended up 
imposing itself over its connotative function, which may have had negative 
consequences, as news organizations dedicated little attention to clarifying 
the rules governing the relationship between words and pictures, including 
captions, credit lines, etc. It is as if news photos spoke for themselves and 
were able to mirror reality. Still according to Zelizer, this assumption became 
harder to challenge from the moment images were co-opted as part of the 
war effort: “In playing down the photographer’s role as interpreter in order to 
stress that of the documenter, the photograph and the photographer were 
thus codified somewhat propagandistically in a way that would help secure 
military victory” (Zelizer, 1999: 153). Hiding the fact that photographs involve 
interpreting events serves the interests of those who want to hide the fact 
that photographs can also be used to manipulate. Moreover, insisting on the 
idea that photographs document reality, rather than interpret it, mirrors 
another dangerous idea according to which history is a scientific and rigorous 
account of the past.  
 
By the end of the war, the role of news photos in journalism was no 
longer in question. The increasing social recognition of the importance of 
visual journalism was accompanied by calls for professionalization and 
schools of journalism around the United States started to include in their 
academic offer courses on news photography. In 1942, the dean of the 
School of Journalism at the University of Missouri, Frank Mott, used for the 
first time the expression “photojournalism” to label the programme of 
academic training offered in his school and in 1946 the National Press 
Photographers Association (NPPA) was born, with the explicit purpose of 
defending the rights of press photographers and of improving public trust by 
promoting the highest standards in visual journalism. The heading of its first 
code of ethics, included in the founding documents of the association, 
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declared: “The National Press Photographers Association, a professional 
society dedicated to the advancement of photojournalism, acknowledges 
concern and respect for public’s natural - law right to freedom in searching for 
the truth and the right to be informed truthfully and completely about public 
events and the world in which we live” (Lester, 1990).  
 
It is remarkable that the code included no explicit references to the 
setting up of pictures, the manipulation of images and most of all, to the 
invasion of privacy. After having gone through the history of photojournalism 
ethics, one gets the feeling that the explanations of these absences provided 
by John Ahllauser in the NPPA Special Report on Photojournalism Ethics, 
published in 1990, are all but convincing: “Given the technology of the times, 
some of what we consider wrong today, was tolerated by newspapers or 
even required as good practice when bulky 4x5 cameras, slow lenses and 
film, flashbulbs and tripods and time exposures were routine on any 
assignment” (Ahllauser, 1990).  
 
The absence of a clear reference to the protection of people’s privacy is 
especially surprising taking into account that the genesis of photojournalism 
ethics is intrinsically linked to it. Regarding setting up pictures and altering of 
images, although not explicitly addressed, the code nevertheless states that 
“It is the individual responsibility of every photojournalist at all times to strive 
for pictures that report truthfully, honestly and objectively” (Lester, 1990: 98).  
 
The difficulty in reaching a broad consensus among journalists, editors 
and publishers, which was absolutely necessary if codes of ethics were to be 
efficient tools of self-regulation, was probably one of the reasons why this 
first code was general and loose. Nevertheless, the work done by the NPPA 
since the first years of its inception has been important in reinforcing and 
institutionalizing the role photographs play in the news process, in assuring 
  111 
the right of press photographers and in intensifying the debate on 
photojournalism ethics. 
 
The late 1980s witnessed the introduction of revolutionary technologic 
transformations in the field of photography that deeply challenged the 
credibility and future of photojournalism. “We are under attack”, proclaimed 
the president of the NPPA, John Long, on the occasion of the presentation of 
the new “Digital Manipulation Code of Ethics” that the association adopted in 
1991 (Lavoie, 2010b). It is ironic, Schwartz remarks, that “the technological 
nature of photography, which once seemed to assure its truthfulness, now 
raises suspicion” (Schwartz, 1999: 174). According to Schwartz, the current 
scrutiny of press photos is similar to the “disrepute” that sketch artists faced 
by the end of the nineteenth-century. The ease with which photographs can 
be doctored has undermined the public’s confidence in the power of 
photography to truthfully represent reality, forcing the industry to take 
measures. Newspapers have restated their commitment to photographic 
integrity, adopted internal guidelines ruling the use of digital editing software 
and increased self-scrutiny and reassessment. Nevertheless, as Lavoie 
(2010b) and Schwartz (1999) remark, the response from the industry to the 
new challenges was basically guided by the old paradigm of the darkroom: 
the use of digital editing tools should be limited to those that were commonly 
accepted in the darkroom for editing analogue photographs: tonal and colour 
corrections, dust spot elimination, cropping, burning and dodging. The use of 
other tools remained controversial, if not prohibited, for they could possibly 
compromise photographic integrity. This means that while framing and even 
cropping techniques may be legitimately employed to exclude an object from 
appearing in a photograph, other computer editing techniques remain 
unacceptable.  
 
The strategy adopted to preserve photography’s credibility was based 
on the idea that what the camera recorded should not be manipulated 
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afterwards. In this sense, the general response to the new threats posed by 
digital-imaging technology of the late 1980s and 1990s echoes the rhetorical 
stances that have been shaping photojournalism’s ethos since the end of the 
nineteenth century, favouring the referential and denotative functions of 
photography over the expressive and connotative ones and undermining the 
active role the photographer plays in determining how subjects and events 
are represented. 
 
After this brief historical overview, it is now time to take a look at the 
current situation in photojournalism ethics. Throughout the next section we 
will compare eight European and American codes of ethics that apply to 
photojournalism, even if they are not all specific to visual journalism. In fact, 
in most European countries, there are no specific codes for photojournalism 
and photographers are recommended to abide by the general ones.  
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2.3. Photojournalism and Codes of Ethics 
 
 
With the aim of analysing the situation of the ethics of modern 
photojournalism, we decided to compare seven codes of ethics prevailing in 
Portugal, Spain, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. The selection of these codes follows a doubly relevant criterion: 
national context and specific subject. For each country, whenever possible, 
we chose two codes: one general and one specific to photojournalists. The 
aim is 1) to verify if the updates introduced in some of the codes signals an 
increasing awareness of the importance and specificity of visual news in the 
current context of integration and convergence fostered by the Internet; 2) to 
reflect on the ways to improve general codes with contributions from specific 
photojournalism codes; 3) to confront some of the intrinsic difficulties 
affecting news regulation. 
 
From Portugal, we will only analyse the code approved by the Sindicato 
dos Jornalistas Portugueses (SJP, 1993), as there is no representative 
photojournalists’ association. In the case of Spain, we will analyse the code 
of the Federación de Asociaciones de Prensa de España (FAPE, 1993) and 
the former code of the Asociación Nacional de Informadores Gráficos de 
Prensa y Televisión (ANIGP-TV, 2007), respectively. Although ANIGP-TV 
decided to abandon its code, the fact that in most European countries there 
is no specific code for photojournalists justifies our inclusion of the Spanish 
code in our study. In France, the Syndicat National des Journalistes (SNJ) is 
the most representative association of journalists. Its code of ethics was 
updated in 2011. Moreover, it is important to note that the Association 
Professionnelle des Photojournalistes (Freelens) merged with the Union des 
Photographes Créateurs (UPC) in 2010 to create the Union des 
Photographes Professionnels (UPP). As a result of this paradoxical merger, 
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the code of ethics of this new association no longer regulates 
photojournalistic activity. It therefore does not form part of our study. From 
the UK, we analyse the code of conduct of the recently created Independent 
Press Standards Organisation, which in 2014 substituted the Press 
Complaints Comission (IPSO, 2011), having adopted its Editor's Code of 
Practice. The UK also lacks a code of ethics dedicated exclusively to 
photojournalists. From the USA we analyse the ethics code of the Society of 
Professional Journalists (SPJ, 2014) and the National Press Photographers 
Association (NPPA, 2004). 
 
2.3.1. Methodological Considerations 
 
Regarding the specificity of this study, which aims to carry out a 
reflection on the self-regulation affecting photojournalists’ activity, it is 
necessary to take a position on an important methodological consideration: 
should we favour a broad or limited interpretation of the ethical norms? In 
other words, should we consider, for comparative effects, the rules that, 
despite not mentioning images or photojournalistic activity, are, nonetheless, 
applied to them? 
 
This decision is neither innocuous nor without consequences. In fact, 
the risk of favouring a literal interpretation is to promote a reductive 
interpretation that strengthens the idea that codes of ethics are more centred 
on acts than on agents. Taken to the extreme, this idea would lead us to 
defend the notion that all action not set out in the letter of the law would be 
permitted. The codes of ethics would contain thousands of pages and would 
still not exhaust the infinite possibilities of human action. Leonardo Rodríguez 
Duplá, in the article “Ética Clásica y Ética Periodística” [Classical and 
Journalistic Ethics] notes that Plato, in his Republic (Rep. 426e), compared 
the project of an exhaustive legislation encompassing all possible cases (...) 
with the attempt to decapitate a hydra, the mythical monster whose heads 
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multiplied when cut (Rodríguez Duplá, 1995: 72). And Daniel Cornu, in 
Journalisme et Vérité, warns of the risk of formalism that this type of literal 
interpretation entails. Respecting the letter of the law is not always 
synonymous with respecting its spirit (Cornu, 1994). A classic example? 
Correcting inaccurate news that has not been confirmed by independent 
sources or that simply served to strengthen the impact of a news item. 
 
Warned of the risks of a too literal interpretation, we have chosen an 
intermediate path: we will admit that in some cases (to be identified) the rules 
should be broadly interpreted and should also be binding photojournalists. In 
controversial cases, whenever a rule refers explicitly to images or 
photojournalistic activity, we will consider it separately. 
 
Following the proposal of Daniel Cornu (1994), we will divide the 
analysis of the codes of ethics into four basic principles: 1) the mission of 
news media; 2) freedom as a condition; 3) truth as a fundamental duty; 4) the 
respect for the dignity of people as a boundary. The various norms set out in 
the codes will be considered specifications of these general principles. 
 
1) For the purposes of this study, we will not go into the proposals 
specifying the media’s mission that generally head the preface of these 
documents. Belonging to a cultural tradition explains why most codes of 
ethics analysed defend a responsible free press capable of balancing the 
rights of citizens with news of public interest. 
 
2) Freedom is a fundamental principle of good journalism. Codes of 
ethics usually specify this general principle in rules relating to disinterest and 
independence, the rejection of political or commercial propaganda and 
resistance to pressure. Codes of an “educational” vocation, such as the 
Munich Declaration (1971) or the FAPE code (1993), also include in their 
articles a set of rights guaranteeing conditions for good professional practice, 
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amongst which freedom takes precedence. By its very nature, the defence of 
freedom includes all journalists, and is also, therefore, not included in our 
comparative study. It is important to remember that we are still referring to 
the declaration of principles. On reviewing the complaints and petitions of 
professional associations we can confirm that in practice not all are equal 
before the law: photojournalists still face great difficulties when it comes to 
exercising their profession freely.  
 
3) Despite its importance, truth continues to be controversial within 
journalistic ethics. Considered unattainable, subordinated to the domain of 
subjectivity, prisioner of the point of view, it makes its appearance in certain 
documents “timidly” under terms such as “rigour” and “exactitude” (SJP) or 
“accuracy” (IPSO). We will avoid from the outset the disputed as well as, until 
now, fruitless debate, taken to extremes in the case of photography, if we 
initially limit ourselves to analysing the rules specifying truth as related to 
news. 
 
4) The respect for the dignity of people as a limit to the right to inform is 
the fourth fundamental principle that constitutes good news. A great part of 
the ethical debate on journalism and photojournalism in particular is centred 
on human dignity. Exceptions are allowed in the name of greater public 
interest. The big question is knowing how to determine it. 
 
2.3.2. Analysis of the codes of ethics 
2.3.2.1. Rules specifying the ethical commitment to the truth 
2.3.2.1.1. Banning the use of unfair methods.  
 
All the codes of ethics analysed include rules that prohibit the use of 
unfair methods of news gathering and that, for the most part, make specific 
reference to the taking of pictures. Of all the codes, the IPSO code most 
comprehensively sets out the methods that cannot be used: hidden cameras 
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or microphones and the hacking of private telephones, messages or e-mails. 
Neither does it consider acceptable the obtaining and publication of 
documents or photographs taken without authorisation (“removal”) or 
obtained through accessing private information available on digital media 
without consent. No other code includes this last rule. The prohibition of the 
use of these methods is only excepted under two conditions: that there is no 
other way of accessing information and that it is of public interest. 
 
At a time when the media is increasingly using material provided by the 
public, especially on their online versions, reference to the rule, found in the 
preface to the IPSO code, that obliges British editors to respect the rules 
enshrined in the code even when the material to be published has not been 
obtained by their team of journalists, takes on special importance. This rule 
has a particular impact in promoting truthful, good-quality visual information. 
Furthermore, its compliance represents an ethical challenge the media 
cannot neglect.  
 
The fall in resources affecting the press, which is clearly harming 
original journalistic production, especially in the international arena (see, for 
example, Moore, 2010), will oblige traditional media to increasingly refer to 
news providers of the countries of interest. Not to do so would be to 
jeopardise news pluralism even further. This situation gives rise to a new set 
of ethical questions for journalists and the media and should foster, following 
the proposal of Jeff Jarvis, the adoption of a new Golden Rule of Links in 
journalism: link unto others’ good stuff as you would have them link unto your 
good stuff” (Jarvis, 2010). 
 
Finally, and in addition to harassment (FCC), persecuation and 
intimidation (ANIFGP-TV) there is another means of obtaining images that 
photojournalists should avoid (the degree of disapproval varies from code to 
code) (ANIFGP-TV, SPJ and NPPA): paying for news and participation. The 
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specificity of this method and the importance for the ethics of photojournalism 
justifies it being considered separately.  
 
2.3.2.1.2. Avoiding staging.  
 
Among the codes analysed, apart from the two specifically regulating 
photojournalism (ANIGP-TV and NPPA), only the SPJ code refers to this 
practice. However, none of the three rejects it outright. The SPJ code states 
“(...) if a representation is needed to tell a story, it should be mentioned”. The 
NPPA code is more exhaustive: “resist being manipulated by staged 
photographic opportunities.” And it adds: “do not pay for (...) participation”. 
The ANIGP-TV code states that the photographer should avoid paying or 
receiving money in exchange for illustrations or stagings that offer news of 
public interest that do not correspond with reality. Of the three codes of 
ethics, that of the NPPA most clearly draws attention to the fact that staging 
can be the result of a premeditated act by the subject of the photograph. The 
professionalization of communication that has invaded many sectors of the 
public sphere requires us to avoid rushing into making judgements on the 
authenticity of what we call reality. In Regarding the pain of others, Sontag 
draws our attention to the fact that, despite the fact that the photo taken by 
Eddie Adams of February 1968 in which the head of the South Vietnamese 
national police, Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, executes a suspected 
Vietcong in the streets of Saigon was not questioned, it is clear that this 
photo was staged. Sontag states that General Loan “would not have carried 
out the summary execution there had they not been available to witness it. 
Positioned beside his prisoner so that his profile and the prisoner’s face were 
visible to the cameras behind him, Loan aimed point-blank” (Sontag, 2003: 
60-61).
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2.3.2.1.3. Influencing events 
 
With regard to staging, the influence of the reporter on the progress of 
events can be formally considered the subject of a separate rule. The NPPA 
code, the only to take a position on this subject, though of a fairly generic 
formulation, maintains the distinction. Its article states that press photography 
should not intentionally alter, attempt to alter or influence events. 
 
2.3.2.1.4. The prohibition of manipulation and the limits of editing 
 
Although the history of photography confirms the idea that image 
manipulation is not exclusive to the digital era, the truth is that, among the 
codes analysed, only those that have been ratified or updated after the 
second half of the 1990s include rules that reject this practice. The 
international impact of certain cases such as the one to affect Time 
magazine, which was accused of deliberately darkening a photograph of O. 
J. Simpson, which was published on the cover on the June 27 1994, would 
have contributed to this situation. This case is paradigmatic because it 
reveals that the boundaries between legitimate editing and manipulation can 
be extremely tenuous. Among the rules analysed, the ANIGP-TV rule is the 
most comprehensive. It recommends that the photographer defend the image 
as it was taken, demanding that at no moment should it be manipulated if this 
leads to the total or partial obscuring of reality. Reading between the lines, 
the possibility of legitimate editing is accepted, although it does not provide a 
rule to regulate this. The same could be said of the NPPA code, which 
imposes as a condition the maintainance of the integrity of the content and 
context of photographic images. Considered a secondary act with respect to 
the original act of photography, limited editing distances itself from 
manipulation by not attacking “visual information” or the “original image” 
taken by the camera. 
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Many other editorial decisions raise questions for which there are 
probably no definitive answers. Many of these cases are related to 
photographs that testify to evil and human suffering and that are usually 
decided on the basis of “taste”, that is, appealing to a personal sensitivity that 
is often determined by cultural context and not based on a universal rule. We 
will come back to this point further on. 
 
2.3.2.1.5.  Providing contextual information that improves coordination 
between text and image.  
 
Apart from the two codes specific to photojournalists, in none of the 
general codes can references to the need to provide contextual information 
that improves the coordination between text and image be found, which 
reinforces the idea that visual information is still relatively subordinate to 
written information.  The decision to encourage proper coordination and fair 
combination between text and image does not depend on the photographer 
but the media outlet. The ANIGP-TV code poses the question thus, 
emphasising that without this commitment there is no such thing as good 
information. The NPPA code, which in this regard is less educational, limits 
itself to recommending that photojournalists be thorough in their news 
coverage and that they supply contextual information. The difficulties posed 
by questions of the semiotics and the rhetoric of the image do not justify the 
silence of most codes in this regard. Providing information on who is in the 
photograph, where it was taken, when it was taken, what it shows and in 
what circumstances is very important in order to help readers make sense of 
what they see. In some cases, silence can be an accomplice in the 
manipulation.
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2.3.2.1.6. The duty to present a variety of shots and angles of the 
events.  
 
To encourage good editing, and aware of the subjectivity this can entail, 
the ANIGP-TV code, in an explanation of its motives, urges the photographer 
to provide a photo taken not just from one vantage point, but a range of 
shots. Once again, only those codes aimed at photojournalists include this 
rule. The NPPA code recommends the photojournalist be thorough in the 
representation of the events. It is impossible to see the six sides of a cube at 
the same time. 
 
2.3.2.1.7. Safeguarding the media’s photographic archive.  
 
The introduction of this rule in the ANIGP-TV code should be 
understood as “pedagogical”, as its compliance does not only depend on the 
will of the photographer. No other code refers to the need to document and 
guarantee the conditions of good preservation of archive images. In the 
digital context, access to photographic databases can be, and in some cases 
is, an income source for the media and, at the same time, a service for 
historic awareness.  
 
2.3.2.1.8. Fostering the correction of errors.  
 
All the general codes analysed oblige journalists to correct false 
information. With the exception of cases of manipulation, errors affecting the 
press photograph have their origin, above all, in the betrayal of the word. In 
this case, the ANIGP-TV code recommends that the photographer demands 
that their employers correct it. The NPPA says nothing in this respect, which 
seems to indicate that it does not blame the photojournalist for these types of 
errors. 
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2.3.3. Rules specifying the duty to respect the dignity of people. 
2.3.3.1. The respect for privacy and image rights.  
 
Determining the boundaries to the right to inform is a concern that has 
accompanied journalistic ethics from very near its inception. In effect, the 
right to inform involves, at the same time, a duty to respect the dignity of 
people, something fundamental to journalistic ethics. Indepedently of the fact 
that personality rights, including honour, privacy and image, are enshrined in 
law and that the right is best qualified to assure its effective protection, all the 
codes of ethics analysed include rules that oblige journalists to respect them. 
 
With regard to the activity of photojournalists, the analysis of the codes 
of ethics allows the identification of three types of questions relating to the 
protection of privacy and image rights: 1) the protection of minors and 
vulnerable people; 2) circumstances and methods by which photographs can 
be taken; 3) the respect for situations of pain and suffering.  
With the exception of the SNJ code, all the others include 
recommendations that endorse the protection of the privacy of minors. In this 
case, the IPSO code is fairly restrictive, prohibiting the interviewing or 
photographing of under-16-year-olds without the consent of their parents or 
guardians and in schools without the consent of the authorities. To this 
specific concern with minors, the FAPE and IPSO codes add 
recommendations that urge extra care in the case of sick people or people in 
hospital or similar institutions.  
The second type of questions related to privacy is concerned with the 
circumstances and methods by which photographs can be taken. In this 
regard, the IPSO code is the most original and also the most restrictive, 
prohibiting the taking of photographs of people in private spaces without their 
consent, defining private spaces as public or private properties where there is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. This definition has the advantage of not 
limiting private space to private property, making it clear that even in public 
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spaces citizens have the right to privacy. To reinforce the meaning of this 
rule, the code adds another that specifies that journalists cannot continue 
photographing people when asked to stop, without specifying whether people 
are in public or private places. 
All these rules allow exceptions when there is a case for greater “public 
interest”. Once again, the IPSO code is the only one to attempt to clarify what 
“public interest” might be. In addition to the freedom of expression itself, 
information of public interest is that which aims to: 
 
• detect or report crimes or serious irregularities;  
• protect public health and security;  
• prevent the public being deceived by the actions or claims of an 
individual or organisation. 
 
Although still in agreement with the IPSO code, only exceptional public 
interest could justify the application of this clause in cases involving under-
16-year-olds. 
We could introduce the third type of question related to the protection of 
privacy and image rights with the following question: What purpose could 
justify the taking and publishing of inappropriate images or images showing 
severe pain and suffering?  
Most of the codes analysed recommend that journalists are especially 
sensitive in cases of pain and suffering, with the aim of avoiding unjustified 
intrusion that does not provide relevant information to the understanding of 
events. However, whilst it is true that on many occasions the difference 
between morbid voyeuristic exploitation and informative need is easy to 
establish, since the confusion of the two is the result of the imposing of 
economic values over moral ones, in others it is more complicated. 
The ANIGP-TV code takes a position on this question by introducing a 
distinction between images that record the consequences of a terrorist 
attack, conflicts etc., in which professional photographers should avoid 
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unjustified intrusion into feelings, and photographs that should serve to raise 
the public’s awareness to situations of injustice related to suffering, misery or 
famine. 
We ask: What criterion could help us decide whether and how to 
publish the award-winning photograph taken by Pablo Torres Guerrero of the 
series of attacks that took place on 11 March 2004 and published on the front 
page of El País and other international newspapers, including the Daily 
Telegraph or The Guardian? In an article with the suggestive title Beyond 
Taste: Editing Truth, published on the Poynter Institute’s website, Kenneth 
Irby (2004) suggests that questions such as these require considering, on the 
one hand, the public sensibility and, on the other, the duty of truth. When 
they consider that a particular photograph is overly inappropriate and violent 
and liable to harm the public’s feelings, newspaper editors should choose 
another photograph. However, what if, as Clemente Bernad claims, Torres 
Guerrero’s photograph was an essential image? (Bernad, 2009). What 
argument could justify the manipulation to which many newspapers subjected 
photographs by deleting or hiding the visible remains of human bodies? 
Shouldn’t we admit, as Pepe Baeza does that the duty to respect the privacy 
of people is being used for other purposes than fostering journalistsic ethics 
and morals? (Baeza, 2001). This appears to be the opinion of Susan Keith et 
al., who, in a study titled Images in Ethics Codes in an Era of Violence and 
Tragedy, recommend that codes make it clearer that the commitment to the 
truth can clash, at least temporarily, with the media’s interest in keeping their 
readers satisfied (Keith et al., 2009). 
It is important to recount that, in addition to the ANIGP-TV code, in none 
of the other codes we have analysed can journalists find a rule that helps 
them decide whether to publish or not inappropriate or overly graphic 
photographs. The study carried out by Susan Keith et al. (2009), which 
analyses more than forty American ethics codes, reaches similar 
conclusions. In this regard, the ANIGP-TV code, despite the fact that its 
formulation could be improved, is important as it confirms the importance of 
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showing photographs whose aim is to raise people’s awareness and 
safeguard their fundamental rights. 
 
2.3.3.2. Prohibition of the identification of victims of sexual crimes and 
minors involved in criminal acts.  
 
The analysis of the codes reveals, with respect to this rule, a difference 
of position between English-language countries, which are more permissive 
with regard to identifying minors who may have committed crimes, and 
continental European countries. The IPSO code only prohibits the 
identification of under-16-year-olds who have been victims or witnesses of 
sexual crimes. In the case of adults, it allows identification when justifiable 
and when the law does not prohibit it. The SPJ code, which is even less 
restrictive, only recommends precaution when identifying minors suspected 
of, or victims of, sexual crimes. Among the European codes analysed, with 
the exception of the SNJ code, which does not include this rule, the 
prohibition of identification is extended to all victims of sexual crimes and 
minors involved in criminal activities. The difference in positions is maintained 
when we analyse the codes specifically aimed at photojournalism: the 
ANIGP-TV code does not allow the taking of images of minors when they are 
involved in criminal activities, while the NPPA code makes no mention of it. 
 
2.3.3.3. Rejecting discrimination of minorities and the use of 
stereotypes. 
 
With the exception of the SNJ code, all the others prohibit the 
discrimination of minorities and, in the case of the American codes (SPJ and 
NPPA), “stereotyping”. The formulations vary and are being updated to 
respond to an increasing sensitivity with respect to new minorities, the most 
comprehensive including race, colour, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
disability and mental illness (IPSO). Two of the most assertive codes in this 
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regard (FAPE and IPSO) recommend that no mention is made of information 
relating to these categories, except when this information is relevant to the 
news. In the case of the two American codes, the SPJ code warns of the risk 
of imposing one’s own cultural values upon the other, while the NPPA code 
recalls the need for journalists to recognise their own prejudices and to make 
sure this is not reflected in their work. Despite the implications of this in 
photojournalism (see, for example, Dente Ross & Lester, 2011 or Moore, 
2010), none of the general codes relates this norm with the image. 
 
2.3.4. Conclusions 
 
Our comparative study demonstrates that general codes of ethics 
prevailing in the countries analysed are still formulated for written journalism, 
dedicating little attention to questions specifically related to photography. 
 
With respect to the fostering of the truth and news credibility, most of 
the codes limit themselves to prohibiting post-process manipulation of 
photographs, leaving to one side questions related to staging and 
photographic opportunities, which only the codes specific to photojournalism 
consider. Even so, very little is said of image editing tools or the boundaries 
between legitimate editing and manipulation. As we shall see further on, 
these types of rules usually figure in the style books and internal guidelines of 
the media outlets themselves, although their application is not without its 
complications.  
 
The fact that none of the codes analysed makes mention of other forms 
of manipulation related to the intervention of the photographer (framing, 
composition, light, etc) is also significant. In this respect, the codes of ethics 
confirm a trend that we have already identified when we analysed the history 
of photojournalistic ethics: the protection of the credibility of press 
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photographs still focuses on the camera and its near automatic capacity to 
reproduce reality.  
 
However, the codes still do not include rules regulating coordination 
between text and image and do not require published photographs to be 
accompanied by basic information that helps readers understand what they 
see. It is also significant that the codes do not refer to the increasing use of 
visual material obtained by non-professionals, citizen journalists or 
witnesses. 
 
With respect to the protection of human dignity, significant differences 
can be observed between codes of the various countries, with the British 
IPSO code specifying in greater detail the conditions in which photographs 
can or cannot be taken. It is also the only code to extend the right to privacy 
beyond the private space by considering the possibility that even in the public 
space people’s privacy should be respected. Another significant point is the 
almost complete absence of references to the use of images of violent 
content. The only exception is the ANIGP-TV code, which considers the 
publication of photos showing pain and suffering if the aim is to “raise the 
public’s awareness and safeguard human life”. 
 
The following two sections of this second chapter are dedicated to 
challenging some basic assumptions upon which the credibility of news 
photos has been grounded. It is our contention that the old paradigm of the 
dark room, which mirrors a narrow understanding of objectivity, is no longer 
suitable for promoting trust in news photos. Recent discussions on the 
integrity of certain award-winning World Press Photos reveal how difficult it 
has become to establish a consensual criterion on the legitimate and 
illegitimate use of digital-imaging technologies. 
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2.4. Forensic analysis and media ethics24 
 
 
The controversy surrounding the integrity of Paul Hansen’s award-
winning World Press Photo of the Year 2012 is a good example of how 
developments in digital technology are moving the debate on ethics and 
news images into a new and highly sophisticated technical level only 
accessible to skilled professionals and forensic experts. 
 
The dramatic photograph, dubbed Gaza Burial, depicts a crowded 
funeral procession in the streets of Gaza after an Israeli air strike killed 
Suhaib and his brother Muhammad, 2 and 3 years old, respectively, and their 
father, Fouad Hijazi, on 19 November 2012.  
 
Like many other professional photographs, this one has been digitally 
enhanced, according its author “to recreate what the eye sees and get a 
larger dynamic range”, raising concerns regarding the extent to which the 
editing process has preserved the authenticity and integrity of what was 
depicted. Although traditional techniques such as cropping, burning and 
dodging are considered morally legitimate, as they are analogous to those 
employed in the old darkroom, new digital editing tools are blurring the 
boundaries that define what is fair and unfair, thus creating a sense of 
uncertainty.  
 
At the core of the ethical debate surrounding Hansen’s photo is the 
question of knowing whether the image he produced and edited was the 
result of the combination of different images, in which case it should be 
considered composite, a technique that does not meet the ethical standards 
of photojournalism. Although the codes of ethics analysed are not very 
explicit with respect to the boundaries between legitimate editing and 
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manipulation, the practices accepted by the industry and newspapers and 
news agencies’ internal guidelines usually prohibit the cloning or sustracción 
of pixels and, consequently, the creation of an image from two separate 
images (Campbell, 2014).  
 
For Neal Krawetz, author of The Hacker Factor Blog and computer 
forensic expert, this was exactly what happened with Hansen’s photo. 
According to him, the Gaza Burial image was produced using a technique 
known as “high dynamic range” (HDR), which allows the combining into one 
single image the lightest and darkest areas of multiple images or versions of 
an image, allowing photographs to resemble a scene as our eyes would have 
seen it.  
 
An HDR image, Krawetz contends, may be produced basically through 
two different techniques: (1) by combining a series of different images; or (2) 
by combining a “series of variants” of the same image with the help of 
programs such as Photoshop (Krawetz, 2013). Some cameras, even 
smartphone cameras, equipped with HDR produce these images 
automatically. Should HDR images be considered composite, even when 
they result from a combination of a “series of variants” of the same RAW 
image? It seems quite obvious that the answer to this question depends on 
what we understand by “variants” of an image. If we favour the argument that 
considers a digital image’s mathematical nature (digital images convert light 
into binary codes), then we are forced to admit that each “variant” of an 
image has its own particular digital (numerical) configuration, which marks its 
difference to all other images. In this regard, and strictly speaking, every 
“variation” in an image creates a different one. 
 
The controversy generated by Paul Hansen’s photo led the organizers 
of the World Press Photo to hire the services of Hany Farid and Eduard de 
Kam, whose forensic analysis determined that the image was not composite. 
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After having compared the RAW file with the JPEG image provided by 
Hansen, the two experts concluded that “(...) the published photo was 
retouched with respect to both global and local colour and tone. Beyond this, 
however, we find no evidence of significant photo manipulation or 
compositing” (World Press Photo 2013).  
 
This public statement seems to corroborate Paul Hansen’s version of 
the facts. In an interview given to the news website news.com.au, Hansen 
declared: 
 
In the post-process toning and balancing of the uneven light in the 
alleyway, I developed the raw file with different density to use the natural light 
instead of dodging and burning [...] To put it simply, it’s the same file – 
developed over itself – the same thing you did with negatives when you 
scanned them.  
(Paul Hansen cited by Sharwood, 2013). 
 
The lack of consensus among the various forensic experts regarding 
this case is not surprising. In fact, given that in the digital age photographs 
result from processing data recorded in cameras’ sensors, post-processing 
procedures should no longer necessarily be considered synonymous with 
manipulation. In fact, all digital images require processing in order to become 
viewable images. Before that they are just an approximate “amount” of data. 
This process of transforming data into an image may take place automatically 
inside the camera, with the help of built-in software, or outside the camera, 
with the help of digital image computer software.  
 
What is at stake with this case is no longer the question of knowing 
whether Hansen’s picture has been post-processed or not, but whether the 
post-processing editing has significantly changed the data as first recorded in 
the RAW file. The problem here is to determine accurately what “significantly” 
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refers to and to provide a rationale for the criterion used to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate proceedings. Should this criterion have a 
technical nature that would allow manipulation to be measured? What sort of 
rationale should justify that technical criterion? Should it be purely 
conventional, or should it be rooted in a more fundamental grounding? If 
arbitrariness is not sufficiently convincing, then the alternative seems to be to 
challenge the representational power of photography itself. In fact, and 
regardless of the technical rationale, some important moral questions remain 
unanswered: did the digital editing affect the integrity and authenticity of what 
was depicted? Did it deceive the public? If so, why? Was it because it 
misrepresents what actually happened? Was it because we were told, after a 
complex metadata forensic analysis had been carried out, that the image had 
been digitally enhanced? Given that the general public has had access to 
different versions of this image, how can the experts’ analysis affect the 
public’s own judgment? Finally, and most fundamentally: should credibility in 
news photos be dependent on a technical and forensic analysis? 
 
John Long, chairman of the NPPA's Ethics & Standards Committee, 
seems to refuse to discuss the use of HDR photography in purely technical 
terms. According to him, public trust in news photos is based on conventions 
and on a “general understanding of what makes an honest photograph” 
(Long, 2012). And although recognizing there is something “inevitable” and 
“greatly to be desired” in the use of HDR images and other new techniques, 
Long believes its time is yet to come: 
 
In this day and age, the public has a perception of what makes an 
honest photograph. True, this is in many ways just convention. But there is a 
general understanding of what makes an honest photograph and HDR and 
other new techniques are not part of this perception, at least not yet.  
(Long, 2012)  
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In another interesting remark, Long underlines the fact that some HDR 
images result from “multiple ‘moments’ that are combined”, which is 
something that contrasts with the traditional concept of photography as a 
realistic representation of a single, if not decisive, moment. For Long, HDR 
images belong to the “world of art” (Long, 2012). 
 
The argument set out by Long is interesting for two reasons: firstly, 
because it broaches the historical dimension of trust. By contending that 
public trust in news photos is based on conventions, which may evolve over 
time, Long recognizes that trust has a dynamic nature. Because trust is a 
relationship, it can be strengthened and weakened over time.  It is therefore 
important to question how to improve and where to ground trust in news 
photos. The historical development of digital photography suggests that it is 
becoming increasingly harder to base trust on photographs themselves, for 
their indexical dimension is being constantly threatened. The alternative 
seems to be to base trust on the relationship between people. In this case, 
news photgraphs would be trustworthy because readers trust those who 
share those pictures with them. But Long’s argument is also interesting 
because it suggests that photojournalism should be defined in opposition to 
the world of art. When considered together, these two statements suggest 
that for Long, improving trust in news photos is incompatible with challenging 
the relationship between journalistic and artistic photography. 
 
It is worth noting that the controversy surrounding Paul Hansen’s photo 
revolves precisely around these two issues: first, as we have seen, it is not 
clear whether the editing process used in this case is fair and whether or not 
it affects the integrity of the representation and, second, because the 
assertion regarding its informative value does not go against its artist quality. 
Rather, the opposite. The World Press Photo of the Year was also selected 
for its beauty. In this regard, Fred Ritchin warns of the danger that, in the 
highly competitive world of a media already saturated with images, aesthetics 
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is becoming as important, if not more so, to editors than content (2013b).  
Whether from the pressures of technological advancement, or from the 
pressure of an increasingly competitive media market, what is certain is that 
the foundations of photojournalism’s social identity and legitimacy appear to 
be threatened.  
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2.5. Digital era, analogue conventions 
 
 
John Long notes that the credibility attributed to photography lays in 
part in historical conventions and is therefore temporally “defined”. To 
understand how this image of credibility surrounding press photography 
came to be, we need to go back to the origins of photography itself and, more 
specifically, to the increase in its use in the press at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  
 
In contrast with illustrations, which they replaced, photographic images 
were not only able to reproduce an accurate portrayal of something, but were 
also the result of the direct action of this something, their footprint. 
Photography, William Henry Fox Talbot declared in the presentation of its 
invention at the Royal Society in 1839, “record(s) images permanently on 
special treated paper without any aid whatever from the artist’s pencil” 
(Mitchell 1994: 3). As famously expressed by Roland Barthes, photography 
testifies that something “was there”, that what has been photographed was 
really in front of the camera (Barthes, 1981). This testimonial role was 
extremely useful in legitimizing the social role of photography and, moreover, 
in helping to restore press credibility, which had been severely tarnished 
following the rapid increase in sensationalist newspapers during the industrial 
era of the first decades of the twentieth century.  
 
As we have seen in previous sections, these reasons, together with the 
understandable enthusiasm generated by this innovative contraption, explain 
the overrating of photography’s objective dimension and the consequent 
playing down of the active role played by the photographer him/herself. It is 
as if personal decisions that each photographer needs to weigh up before 
pressing the button were insignificant and did not influence photography’s 
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meaning. Since its early days, professional ethics has revolved around 
promoting the image of photography as a neutral, almost transparent, 
medium.  
 
According to Dona Schwartz, the translation of the ideal of objectivity 
into photojournalistic parlance is carried out through the adoption of the 
visual code of naturalism, which the author defines as a “communicative 
strategy which seeks to obscure the articulatory apparatus utilized in the 
production of a message, diminishing the perceived presence of an author 
and the significance of intent or point of view” (1992: 97).  
 
Her analysis of the most important photojournalism textbooks published 
in the United States of America reveals the different instructions relating to 
framing, composition, lighting and colour or tonal value recommended to 
generate objective images of reality:  
 
Conventions of framing, composition, lightning, and color or tonal value 
guide the translation of newsworthy subjects into the two-dimensional 
photographic image. But the representational devices employed by 
photojournalists are designed to be transparent (...) In their careful crafting of 
images, photojournalists ascribe to a formal code of naturalism, preserving the 
objective aura cast around the photographic image.  
(Schwartz 1992: 96)  
 
The attempt to create photographic images that mirror reality requires 
carrying out a series of technical procedures whose aim is to eclipse the 
materiality of the medium itself. The purpose is to allow reality to express 
itself as it is. Photography would then be a “window” open to the world.  
 
Paradoxically, news photos are also meant to generate an emotive 
response on behalf of readers. As we have just seen, since its early days 
photographs have been used by newspapers to increase engagement with 
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readers and expand circulation. In this sense, and in order to grab readers’ 
attention, news photos need to be increasingly spectacular, which means 
that besides depicting their subjects faithfully photographs also need to be 
formally captivating. The creation of Magnum Photos in 1947 and the 
institution of international contests of photojournalism such as the Pictures of 
the Year International in 1944 or the World Press Photo in 1955, are both 
indicators and accelerators of this tendency (Schwartz, 1990; Sousa, 2011) 
 
Meanwhile, it should also be mentioned that this is not the only use to 
which photography is put. Much like journalists who have strived to defend 
the concept of photography as an objective mirror that reflects reality, in the 
realm of the arts many have dedicated themselves to exploring its expressive 
potential and to combating the idea that it is the photographed object that 
determines the form and meaning of the photographic image (Schwartz 
1990; Fontcuberta 2009).  
 
As we have seen, and regardless of all the different uses to which 
photography has been put, the journalistic industry has always favoured its 
documentary and referential functions, basing public trust on the indexical 
dimension of photography. But with the advent of digital photography, the 
trust engendered in the photographic representation of reality has been 
seriously shaken. William J. Mitchell, back as far as 1992, declared that the 
digital era is the “Post-Photographic Era” and, clarifying what he meant, does 
not shy away from comparing digital photography with painting: “Although a 
digital image may look just like a photograph when it is published in a 
newspaper, it actually differs as profoundly from a traditional photograph as 
does a photograph from a painting” (1994: 4). The potential for open 
manipulation, storing, transmission and copying of the digital image, which is 
made up of discrete units (pixels), is increasing exponentially.  
 
Despite the enormous impact that the digital revolution has had on 
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journalism and photojournalism in particular, the truth is that, twenty years on 
from the invention of Photoshop, the most important ethical codes and 
editorial guidelines still operate within the paradigm of analogue photography. 
The “darkroom” is still the standard reference for establishing which 
procedures are legitimate for image production (Lavoie 2010b; Schwartz 
2003). However, despite the current inadequacy of the analogue model of 
legitimacy, no suitable alternative has been proposed.  
 
In her interesting study on the replies provided by the industry and 
professional journalists’ associations in answer to the challenges presented 
by the digital era, Dona Schwartz identifies three distinct strategies: 
 
1. “Publish only photographs that depict the subject as the ‘camera 
sees it’”; 
 
2. “Publish only photographs that depict the subject as someone 
present at the scene would have seen it”; 
 
3. “Authorize photographers to take decisions regarding image 
production consistent with the prevailing norms governing journalistic 
representations across communicative modes” (2003: 45-46). 
 
Immediately apparent is the disparity between these answers. Taken 
together, they reveal the situation of impasse in which photojournalism finds 
itself and what Vincent Lavoie declared in 2010: “photojournalism is a 
fundamentally unstable category which is being constantly reconfigured by 
different narratives” (2010b: 18). 
 
The first two strategies create more problems than solutions. Regarding 
the first, it should be noted that it is virtually unfeasible. Given that what the 
camera “sees” depends on the algorithm created by each manufacturer to 
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process the data recorded by camera’s electronic sensors and convert it into 
viewable images, this solution would only make sense if all photographers 
were to use the same cameras. Otherwise, it would be impossible to prevent 
the depiction of events from being diverse. In some extreme situations, for 
instance the lack of light, pictures taken with different cameras vary widely. 
Moreover, this first strategy is based on the premise that the problem that 
needs solving is the diversity in the modes of representing reality, a problem 
which technological advances have only aggravated. Those who support this 
strategy insist, therefore, on finding formulas that ensure that photography 
can provide an objective representation of reality. Furthermore, the concept 
of public trust resulting from this strategy depends on constant vigilance, 
which aims to guarantee that the rules of play are not violated. In short, it 
offers a technical answer to a question that is ethical, even ontological, in 
nature. 
 
The second strategy, though less restrictive, appears equally naïve and 
unfeasible. As Schwartz states, this option seems to disregard the fact that 
human perception is influenced by so many diverse factors that it would be 
impossible to detect, for each situation, what would be the common or 
average perception. People’s perception is mediated by an infinite amount of 
historical, cultural, social and biographic factors and could not be reduced to 
a kind of mechanical operation performed by our senses. Furthermore, as 
with the first strategy, this one has been thought up to solve the problem of 
the disparity in the modes of representation of reality. In this regard, these 
first two strategies both support the thesis postulated by Nelly Schnaith, for 
whom the main problem regarding photographic realism is, first and 
foremost, its hegemonic aspirations (2011).  
 
The third strategy differs radically from the first two, firstly because, by 
making photojournalists responsible for their work, the debate surrounding 
public trust is brought back to an ethical-moral terrain. It pertains, states 
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Schwartz, to establishing a “social contract” between the media and its 
public, which requires, above all, transparency in the processes of 
newsmaking and accountability. Providing more contextual information 
regarding photographs and the production process will help the public to 
become gradually familiar with photographic language, to trust the media and 
to be better informed. Secondly, and fundamentally, this third strategy 
liberates photojournalism from the hegemonic constraints of photographic 
realism. As Schnaith argues, the realistic representation is certainly 
legitimate and even important but has no right to impose itself as the only 
form of visual access to reality (Schnaith, 2011).  
 
Good news photographs are those that allow us to perceive the 
unperceived, something that helps reveal hidden facets of phenomena. The 
realist canon does not have, in this respect, any special privilege. In short, 
grounding photojournalism’s credibility in a paradigm other than that of 
analogue photography and reconsidering photography’s relationship with art 
may well be the two most significant questions to be addressed by 
contemporary photojournalism. 
 
To sum up this chapter, it could be said that the idea of grounding 
photography’s credibility in its referential and objectivist functions raises 
some issues: first, it contributes to reducing the understanding of 
manipulation to its digital post-processing dimension, obscuring the fact that 
many other important problems related to photojournalism ethics lay 
elsewhere. Some of those other important questions will be addressed in the 
next chapter. This restrictive understanding of manipulation is also 
problematic because it creates the illusion that the difference between 
legitimate and illegitimate photographs should be established in technical 
terms. Public trust in news photos could then be based on constant 
surveillance meant to guarantee that post-processing procedures do not 
transgress accepted technical standards, most of which are inspired by the 
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old paradigm of the darkroom. In this regard, besides preventing the general 
public from participating in debates on ethics and photography, which have 
become restricted to highly qualified forensic experts, this understanding of 
manipulation contributes to spreading a feeling of suspicion regarding 
photography. Given that manipulation has become so sophisticated, only 
computer experts are actually capable of spotting it. In this context, all 
photographs should be considered fake until forensic experts demonstrate 
they are not.  
 
Furthermore, centring the discussion of manipulation on the technical 
level involves yet another risk: it conceals the debate on the foundation of the 
technical criterion itself. In fact, this technical criterion only makes sense 
within a framework of an understanding of press photography that should be 
centred on its referential and objective aspect. However, that press 
photography should be so is not the result of a technical criterion. And 
although this understanding of photography has been naturalised, hiding its 
origin, the analysis of the history of photojournalistic ethics has revealed that 
this concept of photography is the result of a set of historic vicissitudes and 
specific technological, commercial and professional factors that could, and in 
our opinion should, be questioned (see section 2.1. and 2.2.). 
 
Finally, making the social function of press photography depend on its 
capacity to realistically reproduce reality entails forgetting (or hiding) the fact 
that photographic realism and naturalism are also styles and that realistic 
photographs are the result of the application, by the photographer, of a set of 
specific techniques (Schwartz, 1999). In this regard, photographic realism is 
not a “non-style”. The aim of this set of techniques is, on the one hand, to 
hide the material dimension of the photographic signal, making it transparent 
and, on the other, to conceal the role the photographer plays in determinating 
what the photograph shows or hides. The review we have carried out of the 
history of photojournalism suggests that this concept of press photography 
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serves two fundamental purposes: firstly, to transpose onto the field of 
photography the pretense of objectivity that started to become popular in 
written journalism and secondly, to reinforce press photography’s 
professional statute as opposed to artistic photography. 
 
It is our belief that press photography should overcome this type of 
“mimetic illusionism” (Dubois, 2008: 52), based on the identification of the 
inconic and indexical functions of photography, in order to be able to 
uncouple its documental and testimonial power from the reductive view of 
visual representation. The revolution that digital photography represents to 
photojournalism and the infinite manipulation of potential sources of visual 
information require that trust in press photography be no longer based on an 
intended objectivity of photography itself but on the relationship between the 
various protagonists of the informative process, including the public. This 
does not mean that objectivity has lost its ethical or moral value. In fact, if 
referring to the method used to produce and share contents with the public, 
the concept of objectivity is still useful and up-to-date (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 
2001; Ward, 2004). 
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3. The visual representation of the other 
 
 
Our reflection on the photojournalistic representation of the other will 
initially base itself on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. As mentioned in 
the introduction, there are methodological options that cannot be fully justified 
from the outset of a study, but gradually as it begins to take form (Aranguren, 
1994: 12). In this regard, opting to frame an ethical reflection of the 
representation of the other on Levinas’ philosophy will have to be justified in 
some way by itself over the course of this rumination. Having forewarned the 
reader, we can, nevertheless, identify the reasons that, in our opinion, make 
this choice pertinent. We begin by summarising them according to their order 
of importance. Each one will then be expounded, in reverse order, in the 
following section. We start with the most general issues relating to the 
dialogue between Emmanuel Levinas and Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology. 
 
The first reason relates to the fact that, for Levinas, the ethical 
relationship with the other is characterised in particular by hospitality and 
welcoming the other. The face of the other is both plea and authority, misery 
and magnanimity. From his fragility and misery, the other commands me: 
“Thou shalt not kill”. His bare, exposed face challenges me and calls me into 
question. Not respecting his radical difference and otherness would be an act 
of violence. But the other is also authority. His face is a trace of the infinite, of 
this absolute otherness that is irreducible to the constituent and legislative 
activity of the ego. In this regard, respect for the other is neither shame nor 
commiseration. Nor is it a duty of reciprocity: I would respect you and your 
freedom so that my freedom and I could also be respected. The moral 
relationship in Levinas is asymmetric and free, expecting nothing in return. 
This approach will be particularly interesting in the context of the visual 
representation of pain, suffering and denunciation of injustice. 
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The second reason is related to the fact that Levinas rejects considering 
the question of the relationship with the other under the categories of 
knowledge, for this would mean reducing the transcendence and radical 
alterity of the other to the realm of immanence and totality. For Levinas, the 
representation of the other is an undertaking forever condemned to failure. 
To represent the other is to give them form, to define them and to impose 
limits upon them. This suspicion of the power of art and the image in general, 
which Crignon (2004) considers uncommon among 20th century 
philosophers, is an additional point of interest to us and in some way helps to 
point out the limits of the representational power of the image. 
 
Finally, Levinas’ work is also an excuse to make a brief reference to 
phenomenology, considered one of the most influential European schools of 
philosophy of the 20th century. In fact, it would not be possible to understand 
Levinas’ thought without making reference to the philosophical project of 
phenomenology’s founder, Edmund Husserl. In the following pages, we 
introduce some of the most important aspects of Husserlian phenomenology, 
focusing our attention on those questions that allow Levinas’ thought to be 
better understood.  
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3.1. Husserl and the question of intersubjectivity  
 
 
In order to enter Edmund Husserl’s philosophical project, we will refer 
to, in first place, the text that gathers the five lectures given by him between 
April 26 and May 2, 1907, in the University of Göttingen, which were 
published under the title The Idea of Phenomenology and which were 
dedicated to questions on the philosophy of knowledge (Husserl, 1950). 
 
In the synopsis he wrote to introduce the lectures, titled The train of 
thought in the lectures, Husserl starts by stating that what distinguishes 
philosophical thought from natural thought typical of the sciences and 
everyday knowledge is its concern for the possibility of knowledge itself. 
Sciences, oriented towards their objects, are, in this regard, naïve in that they 
presuppose without question the possibility that things allow themselves to 
be known, that the laws of logic that govern thought can be applied to objects 
and that, ultimately, they allow things themselves to be understood. 
Philosophy, on the other hand, cannot be indifferent to this question. What 
method should a science or form of knowledge that aims to question the very 
possibility of knowledge adopt? How can a science progress without the use 
of any previous knowledge, that is, without a presupposition? In other words, 
the radical question underlying Husserlian thought is to establish a science 
that is able to fully legitimise itself and that is able to dispense with any type 
of presuppositions. 
 
Referring explicitly to Descartes, Husserl states that the method of 
Cartesian doubt would be a good starting point. Even doubting everything, I 
am forced to recognise the existence of the mental process that puts 
everything in doubt. “The cogitationes are the first absolute data” (Husserl, 
1950: 2). In this regard, it is the ego cogito that constitutes the safe grounding 
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upon which the foundations of a science without presuppositions and thus 
capable of self-legitimisation can be laid.  
 
The need to circumscribe the field of the legitimacy of knowledge to the 
field of the cogito and its cogitations would lead Husserl to propose the 
epoché, according to which “everything transcendent (that which is not given 
to me immanently) is to be assigned the index zero, i.e., its existence, its 
validity is not to be assumed as such, except at most as the phenomenon of 
a claim to validity” (Husserl, 1950: 4). This means, still according to Husserl, 
suspending natural thinking and its naïve belief in the possibility of 
knowledge and to put the world into brackets, in other words, to “exclude all 
that is transcendently posited” (Husserl, 1950: 4). This does not mean, 
though, denying the existence of things. What Husserl intends is to focus on 
things as they appear to us and on the modes through which things are given 
to our consciousness, a process achieved through the phenomenological 
reduction. Phenomenology is, thus, the “activity of giving an account, giving a 
logos, of various phenomena, of the various ways in which things can 
appear" (Sokolowski, 2000: 13). One could now ask: what is the point of 
enquiring into the ways in which things appear to us? What is the relationship 
between those modes of appearance and things themselves? In order to 
answer these questions, it is important to introduce the Husserlian concept of 
consciousness and his doctrine of intentionality. 
 
For Husserl, our consciousness is always consciousness of something, 
which means that every act of consciousness is intended towards some kind 
of object, whether it be an object of perception, imagination, desire or 
thinking. And although it may not look like it at first glance, this is quite a 
revolutionary idea. For Sokolowski, the doctrine of intentionality challenges 
the traditional philosophical concepts of human consciousness and 
experience that have dominated our culture for the last three to four hundred 
years and which were shaped by Descartes, Hobbes and Locke (Sokolowski, 
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2000: 9). According to this traditional understanding, our consciousness is 
like a “bubble or an enclosed cabinet” (Ibidem), a closed box where our 
impressions of the outside world are stored with the help of concepts 
conceived as internal images of real things. These mental entities would 
function, therefore, as “bridges” between the world and ourselves. They 
would represent things inside our minds, raising the difficult question of 
knowing how we could guarantee the “match” between those mental entities 
and real things. Being so used to understanding our human consciousness 
as something “inside”, we become perplexed at the idea of ever reaching the 
“outside”.  
 
The phenomenological doctrine of intentionality shatters this traditional 
concept of consciousness and experience, claiming that there is an essential 
correlation between consciousness and the world, that is, between intentions 
and objects. For Husserl, the multiple modes through which things appear to 
us are part of their being. Things are as they appear and appearing is their 
mode of being. In this sense, when we think about a particular object, it is not 
an internal image of that object that shows up mysteriously in our mind, but 
the object itself, given in a particular intentional act. In this regard, there are 
no “mere appearances”. Things are as they appear. According to this new 
understanding of consciousness, “things that had been declared to be merely 
psychological are now found to be ontological, part of the being of things” 
(Sokolowski, 2000: 15).  
 
This new understanding of the relationship between our consciousness 
and things themselves restores our lost faith in the world and in the possibility 
of knowing it. As Sokolowski remarks, “the most important contribution 
phenomenology has made to culture and the intellectual life is to have 
validated the truth of prephilosophical life, experience, and thinking” 
(Sokolowski, 2000: 63). Phenomenology is, then, a contemplation of those 
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different sorts of intentionalities through which things are given to 
consciousness.  
 
But for phenomenology to become a “doctrine of essences”, a second 
form of reduction, called “eidetic abstraction”, is required (Husserl, 1950: 6). 
This new form of reduction is meant to help grasp the objective and universal 
meaning of things as they appear to the consciousness, “to grasp the 
meaning of the absolutely given, the absolute clarity of the given, which 
excludes every meaningful doubt, in a word, to grasp the absolutely ‘seeing’ 
evidence which gets hold of itself” (Husserl, 1950: 10).  
 
The eidetic abstraction aims to discard what is accidental and 
contingent within the modes of appearance of an object in order to seize its 
eidos, that is, its essence. The process involves imagining the multiple and 
diverse modes through which objects can be given to consciousness (a 
method known as the free imaginative variations) in order to see what 
remains invariable, that is, their eidos. This means bringing the multiple and 
diverse to a unity through a process Husserl calls the synthesis of identity. 
This process is also known as constitution. Through transcendental reduction 
and eidetic reduction, the ego aims to constitute the ideal meaning of things. 
The free imaginative variations method provides the means to seize what 
remains invariable within the diverse data given in contingent experiences. 
 
In order to keep faithful to the requirements imposed by the project of 
developing a philosophical thinking that could absolutely legitimate itself and 
not having to rely on any given presuppositions, Husserl ended up creating a 
method that is often accused of being solipsistic. According to Paul Ricoeur, 
this criticism must be considered very seriously, for it could jeopardise the 
whole phenomenological project. For Ricoeur, the big question Husserl had 
to explain was: “How should a philosophy whose principle and foundation is 
the ego of the ego cogito cogitatum specify the meaning of the other than me 
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and of everything that depends on this fundamental alterity” namely the 
constitution of a world that, by definition, is not only my world but a common 
world, an objective world (Ricoeur, 1986b: 197).  
 
We are, thus, faced with the paradox of having to reduce all being to the 
phenomena intended by the transcendental consciousness and, at the same 
time, consider the intersubjective constitution of the objective world, which is 
neither the world of the ego nor the alter ego, but a world formed 
intersubjectively. 
 
It is true that the thesis of the ideality of meaning, according to which 
there is an immanent universal meaning in each phenomenon that is 
attainable through eidetic reduction, makes communication between 
consciences possible, since all of them can refer to the same objectivity. In 
fact, what is being communicated is the ideal meaning and not a particular or 
possible mental image. Nevertheless, the possibility of the constitution of the 
objective world remains to be demonstrated. The enduring problem is 
knowing how to constitute a plurality of absolute consciences based on the 
method of phenomenology that obliges this constitution to be formed in the 
heart of a pure and absolute consciousness. This is the fundamental 
question to which Husserl dedicated the 5th Cartesian Meditation (Husserl, 
1960). According to Paul Ricoeur, Husserl’s intention is to transform the 
objection into an argument and to demonstrate how it is possible that “in this 
progression in the direction of the other, to the world of the others and to the 
others as the world, the privilege of the ego can be maintained, which is the 
only primary principle of transcendental phenomenology” (Ricoeur, 1986b: 
198)  
 
Faced with this difficulty, Husserlian phenomenology will have to 
confront two apparently opposing requirements. On the one hand, in order to 
remain faithful to its principles, Husserl has to guarantee that the constitution 
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of the meaning of the alter ego is formed in and by me. On the other, in order 
to describe the originality and specificity of the experience of the other who is 
distinct from me, the author of the Cartesian Meditations is forced to discover 
within the realm of the self the reasons that allow the “transgression” of the 
meaning of the ego to the alter ego. That the other is also a body that I can 
perceive as I perceive other things does not make him/her a thing. The other, 
like me, is a constituent subject. A subject called to participate 
intersubjectively in the constitution of our objective world, that is, our common 
world. It is this need for the other to appear in my consciousness not only as 
an empirical reality among others but as another consciousness involved 
necessarily in the constitution of the unity and cohesion of the world that 
raises the greatest problems.  
 
We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and 
implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the 
realm of our transcendental ego; we must discover in what intentionalities, 
syntheses, motivations, the sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me… 
(Husserl, 1960: § 42) 
 
Husserl himself recognises, in his Formal logic and transcendental logic 
(§96), the difficulty of this question. In order to specify the meaning of the 
alter ego, the German philosopher resorts to a new form of epoché that 
makes it possible to demarcate within the transcendental realm of the 
consciousness that which concerns the particular form of transcendence 
which is the other. This “peculiar kind of ephoché” is the prime requirement 
for what Husserl call the "reduction to my transeendental sphere of peculiar 
ownness" (Husserl, 1960:§ 44). Through this latter form of reduction, the ego 
abstracts all that is different from him in order to exclusively consider what is 
his. For Ricoeur, this abstraction of all the constitutive operations that involve 
the other results from a logical requirement to affiliate meaning within the 
interior of the ego’s reduced sphere (Ricoeur, 1986b: 202). This does not 
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mean that the experience that I have of myself chronologically precedes the 
experience I have of the other. Admitting it would entail the possibility of 
recovering any “savage experience preserved in the heart of my experience 
of culture” (Ricoeur, 1986b: 203). The aim is to determine the previous 
grounding to all the work of the proceeding constitution, purifying all that is 
not me. This process of abstraction aims to specify the essential structure of 
the transcendental ego that founds the intentional acts that intends the other. 
As a result of this reduction, the world is reduced to the horizon of my own 
body (Leib), this “isolated totality” that I am without distance, a specific 
psychophysical reality whose nature allows me to feel a member of a group 
of things that go beyond my monadic being. Here, the category of the own 
body assumes a decisive role. It is through an “analogical apperception” with 
the body of the other that I “transfer” the meaning of my ego to the meaning 
of the alter ego. The other, like me, is also a being that thinks, feels, loves 
and suffers. The other is not a thing among other things. However, the fact 
that it is impossible for me to live the experience of the other —otherwise 
they would be an extension of myself—, and that I can only describe their 
experiences based on an analogy that I establish with my own experiences, 
represents a limit to any attempt to constitute the other with the same clarity 
with which I can constitute other objects. Could it be any other way? 
Considered from within the Husserlian phenomenological framework it does 
not seem so. In this regard, as Levinas would say, the other is not a 
phenomenon.  The other does not appear as other things appear. The being 
of the other resists any attempt at definition. 
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3.2. Levinas and the absolute alterity of the other 
 
 
Following this brief reference to the thought of Edmund Husserl, we are 
now in a position to be able to enter into the works of Levinas. Far from 
wishing to go into his complete works in detail, our intention is to only 
highlight two aspects of his thought that could instruct and inspire our own 
reflection on the moral dimension of the photo-journalistic representation of 
the other. The first relates to the question of the representation itself, whilst 
the second relates to dialectic relationship between humility and height and 
the category of hospitality. 
 
To enter into Levinas’ moral philosophy, a good starting point would be 
the first sentence of the preface to Totality and Infinity:  
 
Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know 
whether we are not duped by morality.  
(Levinas, 1979, 21) 
 
There are many reasons to be suspicious of ethics and moral 
philosophy. “War and violence” rather than “peace and love” seems to be the 
norm that governs human behaviour.  
 
Born in 1906, in Kaunas, in today’s Lithuania, into the heart of a Jewish 
middle-class family, Emmanuel Levinas was forced to emigrate along with his 
family to Karkhov, in today’s Ukraine, in 1914 to flee the First World War. 
Between 1928 and 1929 he moved to Freiburg to study with Edmund 
Husserl, meeting on that occasion Martin Heidegger for whom he initially held 
a deep admiration. However, this admiration was to severely wain over time, 
mainly due to the increasing involvement of Heidegger with Nazism. The fact 
that he accepted the post of Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933 in 
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the same month that Husserl was banned from using the university’s library 
due to racial laws, would have been particularly disappointing (Hand, 2009: 
15). After obtaining French nationality, Levinas enlisted in the army in 1939, 
but was then captured and held as a prisoner of war in a labour camp in 
Fallingsbotel (Germany) in 1940. Many from his family were killed by the 
Nazis. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the many horrors experienced 
throughout the 20th century that engulfed the world in darkness, it was 
Auschwitz that, for Levinas, represented the paradigmatic model of the most 
gratuitous and incomprehensible human suffering. For the occasion of the 
publication in English of “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” (1990), 
originally published in the progressive Catholic journal Esprit in 1934, Levinas 
stated: 
 
The article stems from the conviction that the source of the bloody 
barbarism of National Socialism lies not in some contingent anomaly within 
human reasoning, nor in some accidental ideological misunderstanding. This 
article expresses the conviction that this source stems from the essential 
possibility of elemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against 
which Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself. 
(Levinas, 1990: 62, cited by Hand, 2009: 28) 
 
For Levinas, neither our theories nor our institutions have been able to 
realise goodness. According to Morgan (2015), it is clear that for Levinas all 
the diabolic horror, extreme violence and gratuitous human suffering exposes 
the limits of our practical and theoretical reason to understand, explain and 
control evil. It is the end of theodicy. In face of this scandal and absolute lack 
of understanding, the only possible response is opposition and “senseless 
kindness”. Our responsibility towards the other human being is prior to any 
sort of philosophical examination. What Levinas is suggesting is the need for 
an “ethics without ethical system” (Levinas, cited by Morgan, 2011: 25). 
Before anything else, the encounter with the other forces me to share, to be 
generous and to respect his absolute alterity. And this is a crucial point. For 
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Levinas, our Western philosophy has not been able to ensure itself 
sufficiently against the possibility of elemental Evil because of its tendency to 
reduce the other to the same: “Western philosophy has most often been an 
ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and 
neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being” (Levinas, 1969: 43).  
 
In a study published in the Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et 
Théologiques, in 1987, titled “Une introduction a la lecture de Totalité et 
Infini”, Adriaan Peperzak states that what is fundamentally under question in 
Levinas’ work is the idea itself of “autonomy or legislation of the Same” 
inscribed in the root of Western philosophy, which aspires to integrate all 
things under the immanence of total knowledge and to the “reduction of all 
alterity to the reflexive identity of a higher consciousness” (Peperzak, 1987: 
196). 
 
In En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (1949), Levinas 
undertook an interpretation of the history of philosophy based on the Platonic 
concept and the Cartesian ego cogito. Starting from the definition of 
philosophy as a dialogue of the soul with itself (Sophist, 263 and 264 a) and 
considering the revealing of the truth as a process of remembering (Phaedo, 
73 and subsequent chapters), Plato launched the basis of a philosophy of the 
“Same” that would culminate in the so-called metaphysics of subjectivity, 
according to which all philosophical activity is built and is based on the 
activity of the ego. Nevertheless, Levinas still finds in Plato and Descartes 
the principles of another thought capable of resisting the narcissistic 
philosophy that places the self at the centre of all reality. It is the Platonic 
notion of Good, to which the dialectic ascension of philosophy aspires — 
defined in Phaedrus as a dialogue of the soul with the gods (Phaedrus, 273e 
– 274a)—, and, especially, the Cartesian idea of the Infinite, that hint at 
another form of conceiving the alterity and transcendence of the other and 
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that would force the thought to break with the notions of autonomy and 
immanence that everything reduces to the same.  
 
According to Stéphane Mosès, what inspired Levinas in the third 
Metaphysical Meditation was not so much the “logical form and causal 
argumentation” that sustain the proof of the existence of God, but Descartes’ 
“speculative gesture” that opens “a way out of itself of thought through the 
idea of the Infinite” (Mosès, 1993: 80). For Levinas, the idea of the infinite in 
myself is not constituted in the realm of thought, in any intentional relation of 
the consciousness, arising instead as the result of the “irruption in the heart 
of subjectivity itself of a transcendence that, at the same time, completely 
overflows it”25 (Mosès, 1993: 80). Being “beyond” all possible understanding, 
the Infinite is neither the unlimited nor the encompassing, nor the universal —
otherwise it would be further reduced to the realm of totality and the 
system—, but the absolute alterity. The possibility for thought to think of the 
absolute other represents an exception and the recognition of a “vulnerability 
typical of a thought open to the idea of the Infinite, an inherent disposition of 
thought to be injured in its own sufficiency”26 (Mosès, 1993: 80). It is the 
recognition of this insufficiency that introduces heteronomy in a 
consciousness now incapable of a pure presence of itself. My 
consciousness, far from being the ultimate possession of itself, finds itself 
forever possessed by the alterity of the world and of the other who finds 
themselves in front of me. The break with Husserl’s phenomenology occurs 
here. While for Husserl alterity was relative to what my consciousness is 
aware of, for Levinas it is the opposite: my consciousness does not have an 
awareness of itself other than from the fundamental alterity that constitutes it.  
 
Though paradoxical as it may seem, subjectivity, states Levinas in the 
preface to Totality and Infinity, contains more than it is actually capable of 
containing, which is the reason why “(...) intentionality, where thought 
remains an adequation with the object, does not define consciousness at its 
 157 
fundamental level”, for “all knowing qua intentionality already presupposes 
the idea of infinity, which is preeminently non-adequation” (Levinas, 1969: 
27).  
 
The question that arises now is that of knowing what type of experience 
is the experience of the Infinite. The first problem that needs to be overcome 
in order to characterise it is conceptual. Being absolute alterity, the infinite is 
what, by definition, resists all conceptualization. In this regard, the experience 
of the infinite cannot be given in any act of contemplation. It is not the result 
of an experience of knowledge. This means that the experience of the infinite 
cannot be given in an intentional act, since this is characterised precisely for 
being an adequation with the intended object, and the infinite is, by definition, 
inadequation.  
 
We have seen the effort undertaken by Husserl in the 5th Cartesian 
Meditation to provide an accurate account of the intentional acts in which the 
other person is given. The recourse to the “analogical apperception” has 
exposed the difficulties involved in constituting the meaning of the other 
within transcendental consciousness. Others’ internal experiences cannot 
become the object of a clear and apodictic seeing. Their otherness resists 
the powers of the self. The other is non-adequation and absolute alterity. And 
this is the crucial point. For Levinas it is here, in the encounter with the other, 
that the experience of the Infinite is made possible. But precisely because the 
other is absolute alterity, their mode of being is radically different from that of 
all other phenomena. The other is not even a phenomenon, otherwise their 
alterity would be reduced to the realm of immanence. As we shall see further 
on, the mode of being of the other is not appearance, but calling and 
demanding. Now this may seem paradoxical: how is it possible to experience 
the Infinite in the encounter with the other if they are not a phenomenon, if 
their mode of being is not appearing? How does the infinite difference of the 
other show up, break through, spring up? For Levinas, the answer is the 
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face. It is the naked face of the other that expresses their absolute and 
radical otherness. The face of the other is the epiphany of the infinite. 
 
In an interview held with postgraduate students in Paris in 1986, 
Levinas addressed the question of the paradoxical status of the face in these 
terms: “I am not at all sure that the face is a phenomenon. A phenomenon is 
what appears. Appearance is not the mode of being of the face. The face is, 
from the start, the demand of which I was just speaking. It is the frailty of the 
one who needs you, who is counting on you” (Wright, Hughes, & Ainley, 
2002: 171). In this sense, the experience of the infinite becomes an ethical 
experience. But before elaborating on the ethical dimension of the face-to-
face encounter, and to explore some of the enriching insights that it can 
introduce into the debate on the visual representation of the other, let us first 
focus on the absence of phenomenality of the face.  
 
It has been said that considering the face as a pure phenomenon would 
compromise the radical alterity of the other by reducing it to the realm of the 
same. The alterity of the other resists all forms of categorization and 
generalization. It is infinite difference. In this regard, the physical traits of 
one’s face can only point out relative differences, not to any sort of infinite 
and radical difference. Even recognizing their ability to refer to our interior 
states of mind, the fact that those traits are perceivable makes it impossible 
for them “to stand for” something that, by definition, is unperceivable. Strictly 
speaking, the alterity of the other is not visible and, consequently, could not 
be represented. In Levinas’ words, “(...) one can say that the face is not 
‘seen’. It is what cannot become a content, which your thought would 
embrace; it is the uncontainable, it leads you beyond” (Levinas, Éthique et 
Infini quoted by Crignon, 2004: 103). And for us, this is one of the reasons 
why the philosophy of Levinas can be so productive when it comes to 
thinking about ethics and photography. As Philippe Crignon points out in an 
interesting article dedicated to Levinas and the Image, the fact that Levinas 
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was one of the few contemporary philosophers who did not share the general 
enthusiasm for arts and of having been a “fierce and unwavering iconoclast 
leads us to suspect that he perceived, perhaps better than others, something 
considerable at stake in the image” (Crignon, 2004: 101). It is true that 
Levinas’ reflections on the arts are mainly focused on paintings and not 
specifically on photography, but as Crignon underlines, they could also be 
applied to other techniques of image production, including photography and 
video (Crignon, 2004: 100). In fact, what is fundamentally at stake for Levinas 
is the possibility of representing the absolute alterity of the other, for 
representing implies shaping, giving a form, imposing limits. In this sense, the 
representation is a form of knowledge that brings the alterity of the other into 
the realm of the same or, to use Levinas’ terms, into the realm of totality. 
According to Crignon, the alterity of the other “can never be perceived since 
to see is already to have —if only to have before one’s eyes— and therefore 
to possess and to grasp, to dominate and keep (...) The alterity of the Other 
cannot therefore stem from any sort of visibility” (Crignon, 2004; 102). 
 
The face of other is thus unfigurable and should not be reduced to its 
anatomical traits. Moreover, although being that which cannot be seen, the 
face is nevertheless that which sees. This means that the visual 
representation of the face reverses the direction of the gaze: the other 
becomes the object of spectatorship, if not of voyeurism. In this sense, 
Crignon concludes, the representation of the face implies a double violence: 
1) the reduction of the vivid expression of the face to the “somatic place of its 
epiphany”, and 2) the exhibition of the blinded face to the gaze of others. For 
Crignon,  
 
In fact, we should not exclude the possibility that the representation of 
the face, and, in its wake, perhaps all figuration, participates in a certain 
violence or an impulsive wounding [griffure].  
(Crignon, 2004; 104) 
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As we shall see further on, criticism of the violence associated with the 
visual representation of the other is also present in the work of other authors 
who have written extensively on photography. As Chouliaraki points out, 
some of these critics echo the main denunciations of the critical theory, 
according to which the commodification of media products and of cultural 
goods in general jeopardizes their intrinsic value, transforming them into tools 
at the service of economic and political interests (Chouliaraki, 2013). 
Questions related to the intrusion into people’s privacy, the publication of 
graphic content photos, or the exhibition in museums and art galleries of 
pictures of people suffering are often addressed within the framework 
developed by the authors of the Frankfurt School. But as we have just seen, 
the focus of Levinas’ criticism lays elsewhere. For the author of Totality and 
Infinite, the visual representation of the other is intrinsically violent, for it 
reduces the alterity of the other to the realm of the same. In this regard, no 
visual representation of the other neither the more realist and naturalistic, 
nor the more expressionist, surrealist or abstract is ever capable of 
grasping their absolute alterity. This point is worth underlining, for it 
reinforces the thesis that we sustain in chapter 2 by which, besides historical 
motives, there are actually no major reasons not to encourage more creative 
uses of photography in journalism. Realistic and naturalistic techniques 
should not be given any sort of privilege when it comes to grasping the 
alterity of the other.  
 
As we have tried to show, the movement towards the 
professionalization of photojournalism fostered the opposition between 
journalistic and artistic uses of photography. In order to be recognized as 
professional photojournalists, reporters using cameras felt the need to abide 
by the same ethical standards that governed traditional journalism and to 
commit themselves to truth and objectivity (Lavoie, 2010b). For various 
reasons, including an initial enthusiasm surrounding the ability of 
photography to provide an objective image of reality free from all sorts of bias 
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introduced by human manipulation, press photographers have favoured a set 
of techniques meant to produce realistic and naturalistic representations of 
reality (Schwartz, 1992, 1999). One of the interesting things about this trend 
is that these techniques have been naturalized. It is as if they did not proceed 
from a prior set of decisions that could eventually be different (Schnaith, 
2011). Their aesthetic dimension has been put in brackets. This is an 
important point, for it makes it clear that there is something artificial and 
conventional in the opposition between journalistic and artistic uses of 
photography. As we shall see later on, arguments claiming that objective and 
realistic photographs have no aesthetic dimension are fallacious.  
 
Levinas’ views on representation are also interesting, for they oppose a 
widespread understanding of art according to which works of art would have 
a privileged access to the ultimate secrets of reality. According to 
Wyschogrod, “The view which Levinas rejects is the fashionable but 
erroneous dogma which assumes that the function of art is to ‘express’, to 
convey the ineffable, to bypass the vulgar perceptions of everyday life in 
order to rescue language from banality” (Wyschogrod, 1974: 71). What 
Levinas refuses to accept is an understanding of art that identifies it with 
“metaphysical intuition” (Ibidem). This means that, for Levinas, no legitimate 
direct link should be established between the aesthetic and the 
epistemological value of a work of art. As Wyschogrod remarks, for Levinas, 
art is intrinsically unable to teach and should not be expected to become the 
tool of ethical imperatives. The work of art must, therefore, be submitted to 
criticism, to a hermeneutical enquiry aimed at restoring its historical and 
cultural nexus.  
 
If we now apply this remark to means of visual representation other 
than paintings, as Crignon does, we could argue that photographs on their 
own could not fulfil any ethical and political functions, for they could easily 
lead to misunderstandings. Pictures need words to explain the temporal 
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sequence of events, of which they represent a frozen moment. Contextual 
information must be provided in order to diminish the possibilities of 
misjudgements. That is the reason why Hicks insisted that “the basic unit of 
photojournalism is one picture with words” (Hicks, 1973: 5). 
 
At the beginning of this section we stated that we believe there are two 
main reasons why the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is so productive 
when it comes to enquiring into the ethical dimension implied in the visual 
representation of the other. We have just outlined his theory of 
representation. It is now time to conclude this section by highlighting the 
moral dimension of the face-to-face encounter. 
 
Being an expression of the absolute alterity of the other, the face resists 
all attempts of reification or appropriation. For Levinas, the infinite difference 
expressed in the face of the other is “unencompassable” and “transcendent”  
(Levinas, cited in Wright, Hughes, & Ainley, 2002: 170). In this sense, the 
face is not a phenomenon whose meaning could be constituted by the 
transcendental activity of my consciousness. In other words, appearing is not 
the face’s mode of being. For Levinas, the face is foremost a call: “The face 
is, from the start, the demand of which I was just speaking. It is the frailty of 
the one who needs you, who is counting on you” (Levinas, cited in Wright, 
Hughes, & Ainley, 2002: 171). Through their naked face the other is made 
present to me in their vulnerability and destitution. As Crignon remarks, a 
naked face is an unprotected and defenceless face, a face exposed to 
violence (Crignon, 2004: 104). But for Levinas, the face is not only plea: it is 
also commandment: “thou shalt not kill”. In the mentioned interview with his 
postgraduate students in Paris in 1986, Levinas recognized the paradoxical 
dimension of the face: “There are these two strange things in the face: its 
extreme frailty —the fact of being without means and, on the other hand, 
there is authority. It is as if God spoke through the face” (Levinas, cited in 
Wright, Hughes, & Ainley, 2002: 169). The face of the other burdens me with 
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responsibility and singles me out for an appeal and a demand: “Hence to be I 
signifies not being able to escape responsibility” (Levinas, “Transcendence 
and Height”, in Basic Philosophical Writings, 17, cited by Morgan, 2011: 66).  
 
The radical alterity of the other implies that there is no symmetry or 
reciprocity in the ethical relation we establish with one another. Within this 
ethical “report”, the ego cancels itself before the other for disinterested 
generosity. Reciprocity would mean paying back, doing to the other what 
they had previously done to me, a commerce that characterizes economic 
exchanges, but not an ethical commitment. According to Georges Hansel, in 
Totality and Infinity Levinas reverses the traditional concept of morality as 
understood as an effort performed by the self in the “quest for perfection”. 
“The ethical impulse no longer comes from me: it comes from the revelation 
of the other, namely the other man” (Hansel, 2009: 64). This inversion of the 
traditional understanding of ethics is another very interesting reason to 
explore the philosophy of Levinas. In fact, and regardless of the difficulties 
implied in developing a whole moral theory around the idea of the infinite, as 
pointed out by Jacques Derrida (1999), by placing the absolute alterity of the 
other at the origin of morality and by considering the face-to-face encounter 
as a “moral summons”, Levinas somehow refuses to ground moral obligation 
in any sort of previous rational grounding. Our responsibility towards the 
other is prior to any sort of philosophical enquiry. For Levinas, my liberty is 
only meaningful in the acceptance of the infinite responsibility for the other; to 
reject it would be, ultimately, to reject myself. This seems to be the existential 
meaning of the epigraph that accompanies the last of the three texts in 
Humanisme de l’autre homme, which Levinas takes from the Babylonian 
Talmud: “If I do not answer for myself, who will answer for me? But if I 
answer only for myself, am I still myself?” (Babylonian Talmud, Treatise 
Aboth, 6a, cited in Levinas, 1987: 95). Facing the other obliges me to share, 
to be generous and to welcome the other. For Levinas, ethics is foremost 
hospitality. And true hospitality begins, Levinas tells us, when we are 
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overwhelmed by a recognition of the infinite and asymmetrical responsibility 
before the face of the other. We are not called simply to treat the other as we 
would want to be treated ourselves, but rather, Levinas contends, to “tak[e] 
up a position in being such that the Other counts more than myself”  (Rosen, 
2011: 365). 
 
To sum up this point, for Levinas, welcoming the other and their 
absolute alterity is a moral summons. And neither our institutions nor our 
theoretical and practical reasons will ever be capable of promoting goodness 
if they stay enclosed within themselves and refuse to embrace that which, by 
definition, will always remain beyond their reach.  
 
The next section of this study is dedicated to discussing the importance 
for news media to welcome the other and to provide the means for them to 
be seen, heard and understood. None of the most important political and 
social missions of the press could be properly accomplished if the media 
refused to assume its responsibilities towards the ones that, having less 
means to reverse their situation, are victims of injustice. 
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3.3. Proper distance and the suffering of others  
 
 
As we previously said, the purpose of this third chapter is to enquire into 
the ethical dimension implied in the visual representation of the other. Of 
particular concern are those situations involving violence, suffering and 
distress, which require special care and sensitivity.  
 
As we saw in chapter 1, respect for human dignity is one of the most 
important ethical principles governing the practice of 
journalism/photojournalism. Most international codes of ethics include norms 
and rules proscribing the unjustified intrusion into people’s privacy, only 
admitting exceptions when an overriding public interest is at stake. But given 
the difficulty of defining this concept and putting it into practice, it should not 
be surprising that abuses are being committed precisely in the name of public 
interest. It is our contention that the concept of public interest is being unfairly 
invoked both to disclose unnecessary and intrusive content and also to 
withhold important visual information. 
 
As we saw in chapter 2, the exhibition of unjustified and intrusive visual 
content has been at the top of the agenda of journalism’s ethical debates 
since the invention of small portable cameras in the late 1930s. For a long 
time the yellow and tabloid press have incorporated into their editorial 
strategies the publication of candid pictures of famous people caught in 
bizarre and awkward situations. But there are circumstances where the 
publication of pictures that intrude into people’s privacy without their 
authorization may be justified. And there are even other occasions where 
people themselves in one way or another express their will to have their 
stories and pictures printed. The focus of our attention will be on these sorts 
of situations where there are reasonable reasons to publish potentially 
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intrusive content. The purpose is to go through the arguments supporting 
those decisions and to discuss how the other should be represented, 
especially the other who is suffering. 
 
Inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Hannah Arendt, 
Roger Silverstone suggests that the discussion surrounding the 
representation of the other should be considered in terms of distance 
(Silverstone, 2003; 2007). Not a physical or social distance, but a moral 
distance the author defines as  
 
(....) the more or less precise degree of proximity required in our 
mediated interrelationships if we are to create and sustain a sense of the other 
sufficient not just for reciprocity but for a duty of care, obligation and 
responsibility, as well as understanding.  
(Silverstone, 2007: 47) 
  
Echoing the Aristotelian concept of mesotes (which means “mean” or 
“intermediate point”), Silverstone argues that the proper distance should be 
found between two extremes, one that implies excess and the other 
deficiency. According to this principle, misrepresentations can be produced 
when the media is “too close”. Paradigmatic examples of this moral 
excessive proximity are the use of embedded journalists, the unjustified 
intrusion into people’s private lives and the use of exotic images in global 
advertising. Other kinds of misrepresentation result from the media being “too 
far”. That is often what happens when Western media depicts Muslims, 
Iraqis, Palestinians or the converse, when Arabic media represents Jews or 
Americans (Silverstone, 2003).  
 
Invoking the etymology of the word “proper” (from the Latin proprius, 
which means “one’s own”, “particular” and “peculiar”), and highlighting the 
different meanings the word has in English (“sense of belonging”, “conformity 
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with a rule”, “adaptation to some purpose or requirement”), Silverstone goes 
on to argue that proper distance cannot be set in advance with the help of a 
fixed criterion, but, on the contrary, must take into consideration the 
singularity of the situation and that of those people involved in the story 
(Silverstone, 2003: 475). Grounding his own media ethical theory in the moral 
philosophy of Levinas, Silverstone contends that our relationship with the 
other, either with our neighbour or with a stranger, should be based on a 
“duty of care, obligation and responsibility, as well as understanding”. 
Acknowledging that there is always something that remains beyond reach 
when we try to understand the other and that their infinite difference makes 
them unique and irreplaceable, the author contends that no journalistic 
account could ever substitute theirs. For that reason, welcoming the other 
implies creating the necessary conditions for them to be seen, heard and 
understood. Preventing the other from accessing the public sphere is not only 
an exercise of discrimination, which is offensive towards their dignity, but is 
also an exercise of censorship, which, as highlighted by the media’s classical 
liberal theory, constitutes an obstacle to the emergence of the truth (Merrill, 
1970; Cornu, 1994; Silverstone, 2007).  
 
Ethical debates in journalism should not ignore that, as important as 
challenging how events are being covered, it is to question why some of 
them remain constantly disregarded. What is shown is no more important 
than what remains hidden and invisible. The suffering of the other, and 
especially of the distant other, is too often portrayed through a different kind 
of lens than the one that is used to portray the neighbour. Not all are equally 
welcome. In this sense, it could be said that media ethics is also about 
geography. The analysis of the representation of immigration in four Spanish 
daily newspapers included in the last section of this chapter provides some 
empirical evidence of this tendency (see section 3.5).  
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The use of this double standard is also noticeable, for instance, when 
we look at the representation of death in the news. Hanusch (2010) has 
recently shown that, besides publishing fewer and fewer pictures of dead 
bodies, Western newspapers are more likely to publish them if those bodies 
belong to distant others. Although acknowledging that there are still many 
questions related to the depiction of death in the news that remain 
unanswered, Hanusch contends, following Herman and Chomsky (1988), 
that government restrictions and self-censorship play an important role in the 
understanding of the political economy of images of death (Hanusch, 2010: 
63). These findings, which are in line with previous studies on media 
production (McQuail, 2010), point to what Silverstone calls a distortion in our 
communication system that contributes to “polluting” our mediated public 
sphere, which the author calls “mediapolis” (Silverstone, 2007). 
 
Silverstone’s ambition is to charge the media with the responsibility of 
contributing to the generation of an ethical civil society that extends beyond 
states and that encompasses an idea of global citizenship. In this regard, the 
respect for the dignity of people to whom journalists and the media are 
obliged should not be limited to the realm of political citizenship. In this 
context, the question of the representation of the other becomes absolutely 
crucial. Given that the media has become “environmental” and “increasingly 
intertwined with the everyday” (Silverstone, 2007: 5), our perception and 
understanding of the world around us has also become more and more 
dependent on the images and words used to represent it. As Silverstone 
points out, although not being a space of judgment and decision making in 
itself, “(...) the mediated space of appearance nevertheless provides the 
setting where such judgements and decisions are presented and 
represented, debated, and sometimes, to all intents and purposes, made” 
(Silverstone, 2007: 30).  
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Following Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the historical realizations of the 
Greek polis, Silverstone contends that what is fundamentally at stake when 
we think about the mediapolis as a space of appearance is “(...) the nature of 
power that is enabled by such appearance” (Silverstone, 2007: 32). The 
problem for Silverstone arises when freedom of expression is restricted or 
even denied and when appearances are intentionally transformed by their 
representations, all of which contributes to corrupting power and generating 
tyranny and violence. This is why it became so important to challenge the 
procedures governing access to the media and to be critical with regard to 
the images through which the media represents the world. The creation of a 
pluralistic, diverse and moral mediapolis depends also on our capacity as 
users to require from them a commitment to the highest ethical standards.  
 
If we now try to apply the concept of “proper distance” to the 
controversial question of the depiction of suffering, the first thing to do is to 
identify the two extreme positions between which the proper distance should 
be set. One of these extremes should imply excess and other, deficiency.  
 
On the side of the excess should be placed all those depictions of 
suffering that exploit and take advantage of the vulnerability of the other. 
According to Silverstone, this happens when “the media trade in otherness, 
in the spectacular and the visible, and, in so doing, inevitably refuse the 
possibility of connection and identification” (Silverstone, 2007: 47). The “trade 
in identity” that occurs when depictions elide the difference between the other 
and the same are equally exploitive. Both attitudes are disrespectful and end 
up offending the dignity of the other. It is as if they did not belong to our 
unique humanness.  
 
On the side of the deficiencies we could place the invisibility or absence 
of depiction. This happens when stories are considered not sufficiently 
interesting or appealing by the media, when the characteristics of a particular 
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event are not in line with the news values prevailing in the industry. This is 
particularly problematic in those situations where people’s suffering is the 
consequence of injustice and violence. Bearing in mind that in our mediated 
polis, visibility is closely connected with power and influence —by not 
providing publicity to stories of suffering and injustice, the media are, at the 
same time, diminishing the probabilities for those situations to be reversed. 
 
Having conceptually established these two extremes of the improper 
depiction of the suffering of people, it is important to underline that no proper 
distance can be decided in abstract or in advance. In this sense, the decisive 
thing when it comes to determining the proper distance is the situation itself 
and the needs and requirements of those affected by it.  
 
Given that depicting people suffering from a proper distance requires 
promoting “a duty of care, obligation and responsibility, as well as 
understanding” (Silverstone, 2007: 47), some questions immediately arise: 
what should be told and what should be shown regarding the suffering of 
others? What is or should be the function of images of suffering? Do they 
help understanding? Do they foster political and civic action? What sort of 
link do they establish with us, an emotional and affective one or a rational 
one? And most important of all: in those cases when the depiction of 
suffering is justified, how should publicity and protection of people’s dignity 
be balanced? None of these questions has a clear and simple answer. A 
brief overview of the literature available on the image and photography 
makes it clear that there are multiple and often conflicting understandings of 
their nature and epistemological value. 
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3.4. The aestheticization of suffering 
 
 
Susan Sontag, for instance, is quite sceptical with regard to the use of 
photographs of people suffering. In her influential book Regarding the pain of 
others, Sontag declares: “Harrowing photographs do not inevitably lose their 
power to shock. But they are not much help if the task is to understand. 
Narratives can make us understand. Photographs do something else: they 
haunt us” (Sontag, 2003: 89). According to her, “Perhaps too much value is 
assigned to memory, not enough to thinking” (Sontag, 2003: 105).  
 
The problem with remembering through photographs, the author 
contends, is that it may eclipse other forms of understanding: “To remember 
is, more and more, not to recall a story but to be able to call up a picture” 
(Sontag, 2003: 89). Pictures of concentration camps taken in 1945, for 
instance, would be much of what people associate with Nazism and with the 
horrors of the Second World War. A memory made of images and frames 
would be a memory with little or no consciousness of the temporal dimension 
of the events, a memory deprived of contextual and historical references.  
 
Addressing this same issue and referring himself to Sontag, Neil 
Postman remarks that photographs are never taken out of context, for 
photographs do not require one. In fact, taking images out of context in order 
to show them under a new perspective is actually the point of photography. 
The problem with this dismembering of reality and atomization of the world is 
that it conceals any sense of beginning, middle and end. And in “a world of 
discontinuities, contradiction is useless as a test of truth or merit, because 
contradiction does not exist” (Postman, 2005: 110).  
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Besides that, pictures create the illusion that the suffering of distant 
others could be somehow experienced by those who look at them. By 
blurring the distinction between reality and fiction, photographs generate a 
false sense of proximity. The widespread use of expressions such as 
“unreal”, “surreal” or “like a movie” to refer to real events, though surprising or 
unexpected as they might be, is symptomatic of the increasing hybridization 
of reality and fiction. This confusion is particularly dangerous, for it erodes 
our “sense of reality”. Looking at photographs of real events as if they were 
not real will end up sapping “our capacity to respond to our experiences with 
emotional freshness and ethical pertinence” (Sontag, 2003: 108-109).  
 
For Sontag, since the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), which is 
considered the first war to be covered in a modern sense, with pictures of the 
battlefront being rapidly sent to newspapers and magazine newsrooms, 
images of suffering have been used to feed an insatiable industry of 
entertainment: 
 
Whatever the moral claims made on behalf of photography, its main 
effect is to convert the world into a department store of museum-without-walls 
in which every subject is depreciated into an article of consumption, promoted 
into an item for aesthetic appreciation.  
(Sontag, 1990: 110) 
 
This “aestheticizing tendency of photography”, the author argues, ends 
up neutralizing the distress it aims to convey. Photographs that are too 
artistic displace people’s attention from what is actually shown to the means 
of its representation. And although strongly criticizing news media for taking 
advantage of this commodification of human suffering, Sontag also 
recognizes that this aestheticization is somehow inherent to photography: 
“Even those photographs which speak so laceratingly of a specific historical 
moment also give us vicarious possession of their subjects under the aspect 
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of a kind of eternity: the beautiful” (Sontag, 1990: 109). In On Photography, 
Sontag proposed an ecology of images as an antidote for this frenetic and 
voracious attempt to photograph everything in search of some kind of hidden 
truth or beauty under the surface of things. In this sense, the author remarks, 
photography was responsible for de-Platonizing our understanding of reality, 
reversing the ontological primacy of ideas over images: “Photographs do not 
simply render reality - realistically. It is reality which is scrutinized, and 
evaluated, for its fidelity to photographs” (Sontag, 1990: 87). 
 
Although acknowledging that the call for an “ecology of images” she 
makes in On Photography is impracticable, for no “Committee of Guardians” 
will ever be able to prevent news media from disclosing shocking and horrific 
images of people suffering (“If it bleeds, it leads”), Sontag insists on the idea 
that looking at pictures of people suffering will not make us understand or 
imagine what people have gone through. In order to illustrate the impossibility 
to communicate suffering, Sontag decided to conclude her book Regarding 
the pain of others by commenting on the large-scale realistic photomontage 
by the Canadian artist Jeff Wall titled “Dead Troops Talk (A Vision After an 
Ambush of a Red Army Patrol near Moqor, Afghanistan, Winter 1986)”, which 
shows Soviet soldiers talking to one another after being killed in combat 
during the Soviet-Afghan war in 1986. What struck Sontag’s attention in 
Wall’s “visionary photo-work”, which she believes could be a revised version 
of the final scene of Abel Gance’s film J'accuse (1919), is the fact that none 
of the dead-living soldiers is looking out of the picture to seek our gaze. It is 
as if they had nothing to tell us, for they realize we would not get it even if 
they tried. 
 
Sontag’s decision to use a work of art to illustrate the limits of 
representation and to make us think about the horrors of war is remarkable, 
for it works as a statement against what she identified as being “the most 
common exaggeration” affecting the dual powers of photography, which 
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consists of opposing its capacity to produce documents and to create works 
of visual art (Sontag, 2003: 76). Although some could consider this statement 
paradoxical, bearing in mind all the objections formulated by the author 
against the use of pictures of people suffering, there are good reasons to 
interpret it as the recognition of the subject’s complexity and the proposition 
of a more nuanced view than the one previously offered in On Photography. 
At the core of this exaggerated position that opposes beauty and truth, 
Sontag intuits a moral condemnation of photography itself: “It is felt that there 
is something morally wrong with the abstract of reality offered by 
photography” (2003: 118).  
 
In line with this nuanced position of Sontag, Mark Reinhardt also argues 
that, ultimately, the anxieties generated by the “aestheticization” of suffering 
“prove to be about the very nature of photographic representation itself” 
(Reinhardt, 2007b: 15). Although aware of the risks involved in 
“aestheticizing” suffering risks that influential thinkers such as Abigail 
Solomon-Godeau, Martha Rosler, Allan Sekula, Susan Sontag and also 
some of the early members of the Frankfurt School such as Theodor Adorno 
and Walter Benjamin have criticized for being “both artistically and politically 
reactionary, a way of mistreating the subject and inviting passive 
consumption, narcissistic appropriation, condescension, or even sadism on 
the part of viewers” (Reinhardt, 2007b: 14), Reinhardt contends that 
oversimplifying the relationship between photography and suffering may 
contribute to empowering the position of those who may take advantage of its 
withholding. 
 
In order to underline the political and social functions of photography, 
and thus to emphasize the importance of providing visual accounts of 
suffering, especially when linked to injustice, Reinhardt invites us to consider 
those “pictures that one cannot see - for, as a response to suffering, the 
refusal to picture may pose the most problems of all” (Idem, 15).  
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It could be argued that, as a general rule, withholding graphic pictures 
of suffering and death is a moral imperative, and that publishing them is only 
justified when there is an “overriding public interest” at stake and when 
seeing those pictures does change significantly people’s knowledge and 
attitudes regarding news events. But as we suggested before, there are good 
reasons to believe that abusive interpretations of the concept of “public 
interest” have been used to justify withholding important visual information. In 
this regard, the coverage of the “war on terror” operation, which began in the 
aftermath of 9/11, offers a well-documented case study27. 
 
Mentioning the study by Judith Butler’s Precarious life: the powers of 
mourning and violence (2004), Reinhardt remarks that pictures of casualties 
among Iraqi ordinary citizens were barely shown in American news media 
and the destruction caused by the airstrikes was predominantly depicted from 
the “imperial” distance of the aerial view. Having hidden violence and 
destruction, these editorial choices made it harder to contest the claims by 
the American administration regarding the war in Iraq. 
 
Bodies and faces of American soldiers were also absent from the 
reporting of the conflict. According to a comprehensive study by James 
Rainey for the Los Angeles Times, neither the Los Angeles Times nor The 
New York Times, The Washington Post, Time or Newsweek published a 
single picture of a dead American soldier between September 11, 2004 and 
February 28, 2005 (Rainey, 2005, cited by Reinhardt, 2007b: 18). Stories of 
American casualties were generally accompanied by photographs of 
memorial services and grieving families. Rainey’s study also notes that minor 
regional newspapers that published photographs of dead American soldiers 
had to face outrage from readers. And according to Barbie Zelizer, Sidney 
Schanberg faced the same negative reaction in 2005 when he wrote for the 
News Photographer, the magazine edited by the National Press 
Photographers Association, in a commentary titled “Not a pretty picture: why 
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don’t U.S. papers show graphic content”, arguing that by withholding graphic 
pictures American newspapers were undermining journalism’s obligation to 
tell the truth (Zelizer, 2010: 21). 
 
In About to die: how news images move the public, Barbie Zelizer 
showed that editorial decisions undertaken by American news media to 
suppress pictures of dead bodies were not necessarily motivated by ethical 
concerns, but by a complex set of instrumental reasons (Zelizer, 2010). 
Centring the analysis on three different events —the killing of Taliban soldiers 
by beating in 2001, the beheadings of journalists Daniel Pearl and Nick Berg 
in 2002 and 2004, and the hanging of Saddam Hussein in 2006—, Zelizer 
contends that the decision to publish pictures of their impending deaths 
instead of pictures of their dead bodies helped American newspapers to 
attain three different strategic goals: firstly, to protect themselves against 
accusations of immorally taking advantage of people’s death; secondly, to 
accommodate their report to different interpretations of death caused by war, 
maintaining a sort of equidistant position that intended to reinforce their 
authority and thirdly, because pictures of people-about-to-die depict unsettled 
events, which require from the public an active participation in order to 
complete the missing information, these pictures end up increasing people’s 
engagement with the news.  
 
The cases of the beheadings of Daniel Pearl and Nick Berg and the 
hanging of Saddam Hussein are remarkable, for they reveal that editorial 
decisions were undertaken considering the general state of mind regarding 
war and execution and also considering the need to maintain control and 
authority over the flow of information within a media environment where non-
journalists are increasingly active and influential. Having to compete with the 
Internet, where there are virtually no limits to the exhibition of graphic 
content, the traditional news media opted for pictures that could be 
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repeatedly shown without having to face accusations of betraying journalistic 
ethical codes. 
 
In the case of the killing of Taliban fighters by Northern Alliance forces, 
Zelizer’s findings are particularly relevant, for they challenge the reasons why 
the news media withheld important visual information about an event of 
undisputable public interest. Although available, photographs of the dead 
bodies of Taliban soldiers beaten to death in pubic in November 2001 were 
not shown in the U.S. news media, which instead opted to run pictures of 
their impending deaths. Again, it could be argued that this editorial decision 
protected people’s privacy and dignity. But going through the captions that 
accompanied those pictures, we are forced to concede that it was not a 
moral concern with those men that drove journalists not to publish 
photographs of their dead bodies. As Zelizer points out, most captions were 
ambivalent and none of them clearly identified those deaths as certain. 
 
Framing the Taliban deaths by beating as uncertain and, at best, only 
possible, instead played to its “as if” –to the photos’ role as subjunctive 
markers of a story more supportive of the U.S. aims. Attention was thus 
deflected from the fact of the Taliban deaths while heeding the larger message 
of the war’s continued prosecution.  
(Zelizer, 2010: 277) 
 
According to Zelizer, these editorial decisions challenge the traditional 
understanding of the social and political function of news images and of 
journalism itself. Rather than being used to provide evidence supporting 
news stories, these news images are meant to render events contingent and 
just probable, making it much harder to hold those in power to account. In 
this sense, when considered together, these observations on the coverage of 
the “war on terror” by the U.S. news media show that the refusal to 
photograph is not necessarily the right option when it comes to dealing with 
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death and suffering. This does not mean, though, accepting all sorts of visual 
approaches to suffering, of course. But between the absence of images, on 
the one hand, and the trade in suffering caused by the use of exploitative 
images, on the other, it must be possible to find a middle point, that is, a 
proper distance.  
 
For Reinhardt, this alternative understanding of the relationship 
between photography and suffering requires challenging the assumption 
according to which regardless of the efforts and good intentions of 
photographers themselves, there is something intrinsically aesthetic in 
photography that ultimately contributes to the denigration of subjects, the 
commodification of their suffering and the exploitation of their dignity. It is this 
assumption, the author contends, that is on the basis of the criticism directed 
at the work of important contemporary photographers such as Sebastião 
Salgado and James Nachtwey, who are accused of producing images of 
suffering that are too aesthetical (Reinhardt, 2007b). 
 
Regarding this issue, Ariella Azoulay takes a more radical approach: for 
her, we should get rid of the long-established opposition between the 
aesthetical and the political (Azoulay, 2010a). According to this theory, 
popularized by Walter Benjamin and which has had an enormous influence in 
contemporary debates on photography, all those who condemn the horrors of 
the modern world should inexorably “resist the aestheticization of the political 
that is identified with fascism and choose the politicization of art identified 
with Marxism” (Azoulay, 2010a: 245). 
 
For Azoulay, one of the problems with this theory is that it has 
naturalized this opposition, paralyzed the debate surrounding photography 
and confined it to the circle of professional spectators (art critics, curators, 
scholars, etc.) who are to judge whether a particular picture is too aesthetical 
or too political, with the paradoxical consequence that these “political 
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judgements of taste” end up ignoring the photographed individuals, 
subordinating them to a professional gaze that is meant to see “above and 
beyond” them (Azoulay, 2010a: 246).  
 
In a clearly ironic tone, Azoulay states that these experts are 
remarkable not only for their ability to identify what pictures are too-aesthetic, 
but also for their “hurry to announce publicly that those images are not worth 
looking at, and even to encourage others to adopt their judgement and ignore 
them, exile them from their field of vision” (Azoulay, 2010a: 246). Among 
those experts Azoulay includes the “postmodern theorists” Roland Barthes, 
Susan Sontag and Jean Baudrillard, all criticized for “proceeding to unburden 
themselves of the responsibility of holding onto the elementary gesture of 
looking at what is presented to one’s gaze” (Azoulay, 2008: 11). In this 
respect, Azoulay is not alone. The reaction against the postmodernist 
theorists who disdain the social and political function of documentary 
photography is shared by Susie Linfield, who, in her Cruel radiance: 
photography and political violence, declares:  “But it is Sontag, more than 
anyone else, who was responsible for establishing a tone of suspicion and 
distrust in photography criticism, and for teaching us that to be smart about 
photographs means to disparage them” (Linfield, 2010, XIV). 
 
For Azoulay, these judgments of taste that intend to classify images 
according to this mutually exclusive opposition are based on three false 
suppositions: according to the first, the aesthetic character is not intrinsic to 
photographs and some could even have no aesthetic dimension whatsoever, 
being completely devoid of stylistic components. According to this 
presupposition, photographs meant to raise awareness of injustice, political 
violence or suffering should avoid any aesthetical features. The problem is 
that even those photographs that intend to minimize all subjective 
intervention in order to be as objective as possible result from a set of 
techniques that, at the end of the day, form a style in itself. This is the first 
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reason to challenge the opposition between aesthetical and political 
photographs, for no political photograph could ever be devoid of stylistic 
components.  
 
According to the second, photographs are the product of photographers 
alone. In this sense, what is seen is somehow subjugated to the intention of 
the photographer. It is the photographer who, having decided how to frame, 
compose, focus, etc., determines how the photographed scene should be 
understood. If this were the case, photographers would have the power to 
deprive photographs of their political dimension by opting to depict them in an 
aesthetical fashion. This second presupposition is grounded in a naive 
understanding of the creation of meaning, according to which the sender of a 
message masters its meaning. Besides ignoring the influence of what Paul 
Watzlawick calls the relationship aspect of communication over the content of 
the message (Watzlawick, et al. 2011), this second supposition also seems 
to neglect the participation of the photographed people in the signification of 
the photograph. They are simply not taken into account.  
 
Finally, according to the third presupposition, the aesthetical and the 
political are attributes of photographs themselves. This supposition ignores 
the fact that the aesthetical is inherent to all photographs and that the political 
dimension of photographs does not depend on their aesthetic style but on 
people’s attitudes and actions regarding one another. 
 
To sum up, for Azoulay, besides being grounded in false 
presuppositions, the opposition between the aesthetical and the political 
undermines the potential of photography to raise awareness of suffering 
caused by injustice:  
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 (...) too often I heard too many people - myself included - sentencing an 
image and pronouncing it an utter aestheticization of the political - or, even 
more currently, the ‘aestheticization of the suffering of others’ - while the 
image at hand, I want to suggest, could easily serve as a rich source of 
knowledge about the world and people appearing in it, who by their presence 
address not only the spectator’s professional gaze.  
(Azoulay, 2010a: 246) 
 
This does not mean, though, that Azoulay is not conscious of the 
problems caused by the visual exploitation of human suffering. Commenting 
on the famous essay by Roland Barthes titled “Photos-Choc”, first published 
in the French edition of his Mythologies, where Barthes explains why 
shocking photos generate insensitivity (Barthes, 1970), Azoulay remarks that, 
paradoxically, the popularization of this discourse on insensitivity 
“participates in the acceleration of the horror”. By declaring that the 
omnipresence of horrific photos makes them invisible and that people are no 
longer moved by them, critics displace the focus of their analysis from 
people’s suffering to the techniques employed to render it. In this sense, the 
author argues, critics end up mirroring the position of those who trade in 
suffering for entertainment purposes. Both discourses “place the photo’s 
reference - horror - in brackets and facilitate the passing of judgments that 
grade or classify it into irrelevant categories”  (Azoulay, 2008: 165). 
 
In his brief essay, Barthes argues that it is the over-constructing 
character of these photographs that prevents them from affecting those who 
look at them: “Reduced to the state of a pure language, photographs are 
unable to disturb us”28 (Barthes, 1970: 99). The only photographs that 
actually shock are those taken for news agencies, precisely because they 
deliver the subject “literally” and “naturally”, obliging the spectator to actively 
engage in the quest for their meaning. It is important to recall here that when 
Barthes wrote “Photo-Chocs” (1957), the dissemination of horrific 
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photographs in newspapers was still quite exceptional, which is certainly one 
of the reasons why they were so unsettling back then. 
In both cases, regardless of their ability to shock, it is the aesthetic 
character of these photographs, and not what they actually show, that 
determines the viewing experience. For Azoulay, Barthes ends up falling into 
an “essentialist trap”, for he considers this “something” disturbing that 
challenges our interpretation, which in Camera Lucida (1982) he called 
punctum, a characteristic of the photograph itself. At the end of the day, this 
theoretical framework to interpret photography engenders a “vicious aesthetic 
circle”, according to which a good photograph must be able to affect the 
spectator by its own means, that is, through its punctum, a punctum that, 
paradoxically, must be established by the spectator themselves (Azoulay, 
2008: 163). In this regard, the major problem of this approach is that it ends 
up reducing photography to the printed photograph and does not take into 
account the importance of reconstructing the photographic event, that is, the 
real encounter between the photographer, the camera and the photographed 
people. And reconstructing the photographic event implies going beyond 
what is shown in the photograph, which provides only partial evidence of 
what “was there”. Barthes is obviously aware of it. But since for him this “call” 
to extend the interpretation outward is subordinated to the stylistic 
components of the photograph itself, Barthes ends up exonerating the 
spectator from their duty towards those photographed.  
 
Like Sontag, Azoulay also believes that looking at pictures of horror and 
suffering is not morally wrong if one is capable of doing something about it. 
But while for Sontag the vast majority behave as voyeurs, not having the 
power or the will to “do something about it”, for Azoulay we are all called to 
assume our civic skills and within our local responsibility struggle and oblige 
others to struggle “against the injuries inflicted on those others, citizen and 
noncitizen alike” (Azoulay, 2008: 14). Photography, Azoulay claims, is a 
space of realization of the political. A space that can elude the intervention of 
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the ruling powers and that is not limited to the boundaries of nation-states or 
economic contracts. Its political function is based on an unwritten civil 
contract of photography, which Azoulay compares to the social contract of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and whose existence is attested to in every act of 
photography. Since its invention in the nineteen-century, photography has 
created new forms of encounter between people and generated new 
possibilities of political action and forms of managing its visibility. In this 
sense, photographs can function as political statements. It is our duty as 
members of the cross-border community established by photography to 
actualize this civil contract and, within our means, assume our responsibility 
towards our co-citizens who, through photography, address us, asking for 
help (Azoulay, 2008). 
 
Following Roger Silverstone, we have claimed that the discussion on 
the representation of the other could be enriched by being thought in terms of 
moral distance, considered a middle point between two extreme positions: 
too close or too far. Applying his theoretical framework to the case of the 
representation of human suffering, we have proposed illustrating the two 
antithetical poles with two paradigmatic figures: the exploitation of people’s 
suffering and the refusal to photograph. Although acknowledging that the 
evaluation of the proper distance cannot be done in abstract, that is, 
independently of the real-life situations, the theoretical discussion on the 
relationship between photography and suffering should be able to take a step 
further in order to justify the recourse to these antithetical positions and to 
challenge some established assumptions that could freeze the debate 
surrounding what should and should not be done. It is important to recall here 
that this enquiry is focused exclusively on those stories that need to be told, 
that is, those that are of public interest. Publishing pictures of grief and 
suffering that have no public and political expression against the will of those 
photographed must be considered exploitative and immoral. 
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The coverage of the war on terror by the U.S. news media provided 
enough arguments to support the thesis by which the refusal to photograph is 
not necessarily the right decision. When the public interest is at stake, this 
refusal can even be seen as immoral, for it denies what Azoulay calls the 
“right to see” (Azoulay, 2008: 144). Accepting being photographed is part of a 
civil contract of photography that is meant to protect all citizens against 
injustice and abuses of power. This right to see implies a duty towards the 
other, a duty to reconstruct the photographic event and to engage in civic 
action. Supporting this political dimension of photography obliges us to 
challenge the assumption popularized by Sontag and others according to 
which looking at photographs of people suffering is satisfying voyeuristic 
impulses. 
 
With regard to those pictures that need to be seen, debates tend to 
focus on the aestheticization of suffering. Following Benjamin, and also 
Sontag and Barthes, many argue that photographs beautify suffering and, as 
a consequence, naturalize it and transform it into an object of aesthetic 
contemplation. The problem with this kind of approach, besides being based 
on the false premise by which it is the photographer who, through a set of 
techniques, determines the meaning of photographs, is that it ends up 
exonerating the spectator from their responsibility towards the other. The 
political transcendence of photography could not be reduced to any stylistic 
option. This discussion implies photojournalism directly, as conventions 
regarding news photos have favoured an objective and realistic depiction of 
reality. In Barthes’ words, news photos should look “natural” and “literal” if 
they want to engage us and force us to ask questions about what is shown. 
Arguments presented in this section indicate that neither the truth-value of 
photographs nor their political and social functions rely on their aesthetic 
character.  
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Moreover, this aesthetic discourse tends to reduce photography to the 
printed photograph, neglecting that the photo only partially accounts for the 
photographic event. As a consequence, “photography is presented as a 
dispenser of photos that requires nothing more than sorting, grading, 
presenting, rejecting, or framing” (Azoulay, 2008: 153). The necessary 
reconstruction of the photographic event and the participation of the 
photographed people in the process are too often relegated to second level.  
 
The next section of this third chapter is dedicated to the representation 
of immigration in the Spanish press. Within the theoretical framework 
elaborated throughout this chapter, which is grounded in the ethics of 
hospitality developed by Levinas and applied to journalism by Silverstone, 
the empirical analysis evaluates the distance over which four Spanish daily 
newspapers (El País, El Mundo, La Razón, ABC) depicted immigrants 
between June 1 2013 and June 31 2014. 
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3.5. The distant other: representation of immigrants in four 
Spanish daily newspapers29 
 
 
Within journalism ethics, the issue of the representation of the other, of 
the foreigner, of the member of a minority group, is highly relevant. In fact, 
the execution of the press’s most important socio-political roles, the most 
prominent of which include the promotion of public space for pluralistic 
debate and the defence of social integration (McQuail, 2010; Cornu, 1994; 
Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001; Silverstone, 2007), depends on the moral 
commitment the media and journalists are willing to assume with members of 
their community and not just with those belonging to the main or most 
powerful groups. 
 
Within the context of the representation of the other, reference to 
immigrants has acquired certain topicality in recent years, given the 
increasing migrant pressure on southern Europe’s borders, especially in Italy, 
but also in Spain, as a consequence of war and political instability affecting 
many countries in North Africa, South Sahara and the Middle East. The 
intensity of these migrant influxes has led various authors to argue that the 
creation of ethical media spaces should be capable of recognising the same 
rights of those to whom countries confer citizenship as those they do not 
(Silverstone, 2007; Azoulay, 2008). Their ambition is to charge the media 
with the responsibility of contributing to the generation of an ethical civil 
society that extends beyond states and that encompasses an idea of global 
citizenship. In this regard, the respect for the dignity of people to whom 
journalists and the media are obliged should not be limited to the realm of 
political citizenship.  
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As we shall see next, self-regulation related to immigration is sensitive 
to this question and therefore includes rules that prohibit the use of 
expressions such as “undocumented” or “illegal immigrants”. Unfortunately, 
the fact that these recommendations exist does not guarantee that the 
treatment of immigrants is always the most correct. In fact, recent studies on 
the treatment of immigration by the Spanish media confirm that immigrants 
are usually represented stereotypically and in a depersonalised manner, 
being on the whole photographed in groups, interacting amongst themselves 
and having no contact with members of local communities (Batziou, 2011; 
Ardevol Abreu, 2008; Igartúa, Otero and Muñiz, 2006).  
 
The aim of this study is to assess the representation of immigration in 
the four main Spanish daily newspapers —El País, El Mundo, La Razón and 
ABC— in terms of “proper distance” (Silverstone, 2003; 2007). This novel 
analytical perspective involves not only analysing how the media actually 
frames immigrants, but also evaluating the opportunities they are given to 
communicate directly with newspapers’ readers. For this purpose a set of 
indicators has been established for the analysis of text and images that will 
help measuring the moral distance with which the four Spanish papers 
represent immigrants (see section 4 Methodology).  
 
The next section presents the current Media Accountability Systems 
(Bertrand: 2000) available in Spain most relevant to the media treatment of 
immigration. The general principles referred to in these documents are meant 
to help journalists and the media to determine the degree of proximity or 
distance suitable for each story. 
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3.5.1. Ethical principles applicable to the media treatment of 
immigration 
 
With regard to the media treatment of immigration, codes of ethics and 
other mechanisms of journalistic self-regulation provide instructions to avoid 
breaching the most basic ethical principles. The deontological code of the 
Federación de Asociaciones de Periodistas de España (FAPE) calls for 
discriminatory situations to be avoided: 
 
“7. Journalists will raise their professional standards with regard 
to the rights of the weakest and discriminated. Therefore, they should 
maintain a special sensitivity in those cases of information or opinions 
of potentially discriminatory content or that are liable to incite violence 
or humiliate human activities. 
 
a) They should, therefore, avoid alluding to, pejoratively or 
in a prejudiced manner, the race, colour, social origin or gender 
of a person or any illness or physical or mental disability that 
they may suffer from. 
 
b) They should also abstain from publishing such 
information, unless of direct relation to published information. 
 
c) Finally, they should generally avoid expressions or 
statements that could be offensive or detrimental to the 
personal condition of individuals and their physical and moral 
integrity.” (FAPE, 1993) 
 
The Declaración de principios de la profesión periodística of the Colegio 
de Periodistas de Cataluña (CPC) incorporates an innovative feature by also 
including diligence in opinions. Article 12 states that journalists should “act 
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with particular responsibility and rigour in those cases of information and 
opinions of content that could cause discrimination through reasons of sex, 
race, belief or social and cultural extraction or that incite the use of violence 
by avoiding expressions and statements that could be offensive or 
detrimental to the personal condition of individuals and their physical and 
moral integrity.” (CPC, 1992). The Manual de estilo sobre minorías étnicas, 
published by the Colegio de Periodistas de Cataluña, gives the following 
recommendations: 
 
1. There is no need to include the ethnic group, skin colour, 
country of origin, religion or culture if it is not strictly necessary for the 
overall understanding of the news item. 
 
2. Generalisations, Manichaeisms and simplifications of 
information should be avoided. Non-Europeans are as varied as native 
Europeans. 
 
3. Negative or sensationalist news should be actively refrained 
from. Conflicts and their dramatization should be avoided. The search 
for positive news should be encouraged. 
 
4. Impartiality in news sources. Institutional versions should be 
verified. Versions from ethnic minorities should be encouraged and 
special care should be exercised with information relating to countries 
of origin (Giró, 2002: 13-14). 
 
With respect to the internal guidelines of the print media, El País’s Style 
Book contains specific references relating to immigration. The section Ethical 
Principles, under the heading “obscene expressions”, states the following: 
“Words or phrases that are offensive for the community should never be 
used. For example, ‘le hizo una judiada’, ‘le engañó como a un chino’, ‘eso 
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es una gitanería’…” (El País, 2014: 36). El Mundo’s Newsroom Guidelines 
makes reference in article 2 to minorities: “El Mundo will be especially 
sensitive to the rights of minorities”. Nevertheless, it is in their Style Book (El 
Mundo, 1996: 111) where the theme is addressed in more detail with the 
inclusion of an interesting section on Racist or ethnic, social or religious 
supremacy expressions, which states:  
 
“Derogatory expressions about ethic groups, religions or 
determined groups are prohibited, and vigilance should be applied to 
those cases in which a mention is apparently not racist but turns out to 
be so within the context. For example, the mention of the detention of 
“gypsies” or “Moroccans” in incidents in which the origin of those 
detained is as irrelevant as if they were from Aragon, blond or Seventh 
Day Adventists. Naturally, derogatory expressions such as “le 
engañaron como a un chino”, “una merienda de negros” or “fue una 
judiada” should be avoided at all costs.” 
 
In their Style Book (2003: 21), Grupo Vocento, in the section 
Journalistic Principles, states: “Journalists shall not discriminate against any 
source through social, political, racial, religious or gender reasons etc.”. 
Furthermore, article 9 of Agencia EFE’s Newsroom Guidelines states: “The 
treatment of EFE news material will avoid any type of discrimination for 
reasons of religion, origin, social situation, culture, ethnicity, sex or any 
illness or disability”. And in article 15: “EFE will try to give voice to individuals 
and collectives affected by some form of social exclusion” (Agencia EFE, 
2006). 
 
In addition to the codes of ethics, stylebooks and newsroom guidelines, 
there are other interesting documents such as the recommendations of the 
Audiovisual Councils. The Consejo Audiovisual de Cataluña (CAC) is explicit, 
exhaustive and clear in its Recomendaciones sobre el tratamiento 
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informativo de la inmigración (CAC, 2002). Among other aspects, it stresses 
the need to verify information, to use a range of sources beyond those from 
the police or the judiciary, and to include those from the immigrants 
themselves. It emphasises that, in the interest of news quality, journalists 
should make an effort to understand the circumstances and reasons that lead 
immigrants to leave their countries of origin. This “helps the audience to think 
about and to contribute to the undoing of stereotypes”. It states that the 
relation between immigration and delinquency or marginalisation should be 
avoided, whilst fostering positive information that shows immigrants in 
everyday contexts of integration. It defends the right to the dignity of 
immigrants with respect to their image and privacy. Aware that all the effort 
and demands should come from the governing bodies of the media 
companies themselves, this document asks the media for its collaboration in 
public policies regarding the incorporation of the immigrant population, in 
addition to the establishment of a climate of social dialogue. Therefore, the 
information disseminated by the media should not be one-sided but complete 
and contextualised and should serve not only the native population but also, 
and perhaps more so, the integrated population. Non-discrimination depends 
on the good use and correct selection of the terms to employ in the 
construction of each phrase and the avoidance of a discourse lead by fear or 
the idea that immigration is a threat. The use of terms that could be 
derogatory or that could generate false alarm should be avoided.  
 
For its part, the Consejo Audiovisual de Andalucía (CAA), in its 
Recomendaciones sobre el tratamiento de la información en los medios 
audiovisuales asks for the depiction of immigration as illegal, when not done 
so in the case of delinquency, to be banished in order to “convey the idea 
that it concerns people who arrive in our country in need of help and in a 
situation of abandonment” (CAA, 2006.). The Council asks for the permanent 
specialisation and training of journalists with the aim of avoiding 
decontextualized, excessively simplified information with a terminology based 
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on stereotypes and discriminatory language. In this regard, expressions such 
as “illegal” or “undocumented” should not be employed. And reference should 
only be made to race, ethnicity, origin or nationality when necessary to the 
understanding of the information. Furthermore, the Council calls for the 
avoidance of exaggeration or generalisation and for an effort to be made to 
inform in order to understand and not judge. 
 
3.5.2. Hypothesis  
 
With the aim of analysing whether the news coverage of immigration by 
the four newspapers under study here respect the moral distance that 
Silverstone refers to as “proper distance” and whether it meets the ethical-
deontological principles to which journalists and the media are obliged, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1: Immigrants do not usually have the opportunity to communicate 
directly with the newspapers’ readers. 
 
H2: There are significant differences in the treatment of immigration by 
the four Spanish newspapers.  
 
3.5.3. Methodology 
 
This study centres its analysis on a sample of news items and reports 
on immigrants and immigration published in four Spanish national daily 
newspapers —El País, El Mundo, La Razón and ABC—, between June 1 
2013 and June 31 2014. Articles published in the International, Opinion and 
Sports sections were excluded with the aim of focusing the study exclusively 
on news about the situation of immigrants in Spain. To obtain the sample, six 
days of each month, corresponding to different days of the week, were 
randomly selected. 91 editions of each newspaper —364 in total— were 
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analysed. Of the 289 articles identified as relating to immigrants, 179 that 
were accompanied by one or more photographs were studied.30  
 
To confirm the proposed hypotheses, the study analysed text and 
images. With regard to the latter, the samples were coded into six main 
categories:  
 
1. Generic identification data: newspaper, date of publication, section, 
author/source of photographs. 
 
2. Placement of photographs: on the front page, on an inside page 
(odd, even), size of photographs, presence of legend (yes or no). 
 
3. Angles used in the photographs: straight on view, high-angle shot, 
low-angle shot, close-up, medium shot, medium-close shot, ¾ shot, general 
shot. 
 
4. Number of people photographed: large groups (more than 10 
people), small groups (less than 10 people), individuals. 
 
5. Origin of the people photographed. 
 
6. Social interaction and visual contact with the camera. 
 
With regard to the text, the analysis was divided into two 
complementary procedures: one dedicated to the body of the news article, 
with the aim of determining whether the immigrants are consulted as 
sources, and the other dedicated to the titles, with the aim of analysing in 
which contexts immigrants are usually represented.  
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The information obtained was analysed using a T-Test of proportions 
that allowed a comparison to be made of the data in a table, cell by cell, in 
categorical variables of independent samples (Wimmer, R. D. & Dominick, J. 
R., 2011). Using this test, the values in two cells of the same row can be 
compared with respect to the columns of the table. For each column, the test 
is carried out under the hypothesis that the population size of case A and that 
of case B are equal, versus the hypothesis that they are significantly different 
(whether by being much higher or much lower) at a confidence level of 95%. 
The statistically significant differences are represented in the tables in capital 
letters, placing the letter of the column with that considered to be of unequal 
proportion. 
 
3.5.4. Results 
3.5.4.1 General analysis of news items on immigrants 
 
Of the 289 news items about immigrants from the newspapers 
analysed, 30.4% appear in El Mundo, 26.6% in ABC, 22.5% in El País with, 
lastly, La Razón being the newspaper with the least numbers of news items 
on immigrants during the months in which the study was carried out, with 
20.4%. News items on immigrants appeared in general in the Spain (58.3%) 
and Madrid (27.1%) sections. El País and El Mundo mainly published news 
items on immigrants in the Spain section (71.9% and 72.7% respectively). 
The exception is La Razón, which significantly publishes them in the Madrid 
section (44.1%). 
 
3.5.4.2. Analysis of the news items on immigrants accompanied by 
photographs  
 
Of the 289 news items on immigrants identified, 61.9% were published 
with photographs.   
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3.5.4.2.1. Authorship 
 
With reference to the authorship of the photographs, 39.7% were 
credited to a photographer and 34.6% to an agency. To a lesser extent, 5.6% 
were archive photographs. 2.8% of the photographs were taken by the police 
and/or by the Guardia Civil and 1.7% by the protagonists themselves. 12.3% 
of the published images did not identify their author. The behaviour of this 
variable does not present any statistically significant differences with respect 
to the presence or not of immigrants in the photographs. 
 
Among the newspapers analysed, it can be observed that photographs 
with a credited author are more frequent in El País (55%) and El Mundo 
(50.9%). No significant differences were observed for the use of agency 
photographs. La Razón stands out for having published the greatest number 
of uncredited photographs (29.5%). 
 
 
Table 1: Authorship of photographs 
 Total El País (A) El Mundo (B) 
ABC 
 (C) La Razón (D) 
Total 179 40 53 42 44 
 % % % % % 
Author of 
photo      
Photographer 39.7 55CD 50.9D 31 20.5 
Agency 34.6 35 30.2 38.1 36.4 
Archive 5.6 2.5 3.8 11.9 4.5 
Guardia Civil/ 
Police 2.8 - 1.9 7.1 2.3 
Protagonists 1.7 - 3.8 - 2.3 
TV video 
frame 0.6 - 1.9 - - 
Other 2.8 - 3.8 2.4 4.5 
Uncredited 12.3 7.5 3.8 9.5 29.5ABC 
(Source: authors) 
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3.5.4.2.2. Placement 
 
Placement is an important indicator when determining the relative 
importance attributed to the various news items. This study confirms that 
reports on immigration and/or immigrants are not usually published on the 
front page. In fact, of the 179 articles analysed that were accompanied by 
photographs, only 4.5% appeared on the front page, a behaviour similar to all 
four newspapers, with no differences between photographs featuring 
immigrants or not.  
 
The other significant data relates to the presence of more news items 
published on even pages (61.5% even pages, 47.5% odd pages). This data 
was not affected by the headline or the appearance of immigrants in the 
photos. With regard to the size of the photographs, the newspapers normally 
publish 1/4 page (49.2%) or 1/2 page (30.7%) images. In comparative terms, 
El Mundo and La Razón publish the largest photos, at 1/4 page and 1/2 
page. El País tends to publish 1/4 page photos, while ABC publishes images 
of a smaller size. The presence or not of immigrants does not influence the 
size of the photographs.  
 
The large majority of the photos are usually accompanied by text 
(94.4%), a percentage that descends to 86.4% in the case of La Razón, with 
no statistically significant differences being observed with regard to the 
presence or not of immigrants in the photographs. 
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Table 2: Placement of photographs 
 Total El País (A) El Mundo (B) 
ABC 
 (C) La Razón (D) 
Total 179 40 53 42 44 
 % % % % % 
Photo on 
front page 
item 
     
Yes 4.5 5 7.5 4.8 - 
No 95.5 95 92.5 95.2 100 
Photo 
placement      
Even 61.5 60 56.6 57.1 72.7 
Odd 47.5 45 43.4 54.8 47.7 
Photo size      
1.5 2.8 - 1.9 9.5D - 
Whole 0.6 - - - 2.3 
Half 30.7 17.5 41.5AC 11.9 47.7AC 
Quarter 49.2 57.5C 54.7C 33.3 50 
Eighth 14 25BD 1.9 33.3BD - 
Less than an 
eighth 2.8 - - 11.9ABD - 
Photo with 
caption      
Yes 94.4 100D 98.1D 92.9 86.4 
No 5.6 - 1.9 7.1 13.6AB 
Source: authors 
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3.5.4.2.3. Shots 
 
With regard to shots, the long shot and/or full shot are those most 
employed by all four newspapers  (45.8%), followed by the medium-short 
shot  (27.4%), the ¾ shot (16.8%) and close-up (10.1%). This tendency is 
common to all four papers and independent of the origin of those appearing 
in the images. 
 
Table 3: Shots used  
 Total El País (A) 
El Mundo  
(B) 
ABC 
 (C) 
La Razón  
(D) 
Total 179 40 53 42 44 
 % % % % % 
Shots      
Close-up 10.1 10 7.5 9.5 13.6 
Medium-short 
shot 27.4 27.5 20.8 31 31.8 
¾ shot 16.8 17.5 24.5 14.3 9.1 
Long shot 45.8 45 47.2 45.2 45.5 
Source: authors 
 
 
3.5.4.3. Analysis of the representation of immigrants in 
photographs 
 
Of the 179 news items accompanied by photographs, 88.3% feature 
people, though not necessarily immigrants, with a higher presence of men 
(76%) than women (26.3%). In fact, immigrants are present in only 60.8% of 
the photographs, a tendency which is common to all four newspapers 
analysed. In those photographs that feature non-immigrants, the presence of 
politicians (Minister for Home Affairs, Secretary of State and their European 
counterparts), members of the police, Guardia Civil and other security forces 
is notable with Spanish citizens appearing to a lesser degree.  
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3.5.4.3.1. Size and origin 
 
68.2% of the photographs analysed show groups of people, with a 
preference for groups of less than 10 individuals (54.2%) which are mainly 
composed of Spanish citizens (36.5%) or sub-Saharan citizens (30.2%). With 
regard to the four newspapers analysed, La Razón stands out for the lower 
presence of groups of less than 10 people (36.4%). 
 
In groups composed of more than 10 individuals, sub-Saharan 
immigrants are again the protagonists (69%). In those images featuring just 
one person, 27.8% of them show a Spanish citizen, followed by a sub-
Saharan (19.4%) and a Latin American (16.7%). This data is significant given 
that the units of study are news items on immigration. 
 
In the photographs showing immigrants and members of the local 
community, the most frequent are those showing sub-Saharans (10.1%). 
Only 4.5% show Spanish citizens with Asians, North Africans or Latin 
Americans. 
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Table 4: Size of groups and origin of immigrants 
 Total El País (A) 
El Mundo 
(B) 
ABC 
 (C) 
La Razón 
(D) 
Total 179 40 53 42 44 
 % % % % % 
Size of 
group in 
photo 
     
Individual 20.1 25 20.8 16.7 18.2 
Total groups 68.2 70 71.7 73.8 56.8 
Small groups 
(less than 10) 54.2 57.5 62.3D 59.5D 36.4 
Large groups 
(more than 
10) 
14 12.5 9.4 14.3 20.5 
Nobody 11.7 5 7.5 9.5 25AB 
Origin of the 
protagonists      
Total Sub-
Saharans 28 28.6 25 36.8 21.6 
Total Asians 4.9 7.1 2.5 7.9 2.7 
Total Latin 
Americans 7 10.7 7.5 5.3 5.4 
Total North 
Africans 2.8 0 7.5 2.6 0 
Total Spanish 26.6 28.6 25 28.9 24.3 
Total 
European 7 7.1 7.5 2.6 10.8 
Source: authors   
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3.5.4.3.2. Interaction 
 
With regard to social interaction of the immigrants in the photographs, 
we observed that in 12.3% of cases, the immigrants appeared alone while in 
24.6% they were interacting with others. Other interactions involving 
immigrants include the following: with the police or Guardia Civil (7.3%), with 
Moroccan police (1.7%), with politicians (6.7%), with health workers (4.5%) 
and with members of the local community (3.9%). Comparing the behaviour 
of the four newspapers analysed, the only data of note is that ABC publishes 
more photographs of immigrants interacting amongst themselves, that is, not 
relating to members of other communities (38.1%). 
 
Among the different immigrant communities, the sub-Saharans and 
Latin Americans are those that appear most frequently accompanied by the 
police and/or Guardia Civil, health workers or politicians. Regardless, these 
types of images, taken together, make up no more than 20% of the sample.  
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Table 5: Social interaction 
 Total El País (A) 
El Mundo 
(B) 
ABC 
 (C) 
La Razón 
(D) 
Total 179 40 53 42 44 
 % % % % % 
Social 
interaction by 
the 
immigrants 
     
Individual 
immigrant 12.3 15 13.2 4.8 15.9 
Immigrants 
interacting 
among 
themselves 
24.6 17.5 20.8 38.1A 22.7 
With Spanish 
police or 
Guardia Civil 
7.3 10 5.7 4.8 9.1 
With Moroccan 
police 1.7 5 1.9 - - 
With politicians 6.7 2.5 11.3 4.8 6.8 
With health 
workers 4.5 7.5 3.8 4.8 2.3 
With 
civilians/locals 3.9 2.5 9.4D 2.4 - 
Source: authors 
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3.5.4.4. Sources of information and visual contact with the camera  
 
With respect to sources of information, immigrants usually do not have 
a voice in the news items in which they appear (65.4%). In fact, on analysing 
those news items accompanied by photographs featuring immigrants, only 
30.3% publish the immigrants’ version of events. In La Razón, this figure is 
only 18.2%, which is significantly lower than that for El País (45%) and ABC 
(40.5%). 
 
In those articles whose photographs feature sub-Saharans, these 
themselves are the source of information in 35% of the cases. This is similar 
for those featuring Latin Americans (30%). In contrast, we observed that 
when the images featured Spanish protagonists, this percentage rises to 
52.6% and to 50% for Europeans. Nevertheless, when immigrants do not 
appear in the images, in 41.4% of cases, the protagonists are the source of 
the news. In conclusion, in those photographs that do not feature immigrants, 
the percentage of reports in which the protagonists are the source is greater.  
 
With reference to visual contact with the camera, this study reveals that 
this occurs most frequently in photographs featuring immigrants (33%). The 
majority featured sub-Saharans (42.5%). In photographs not showing 
immigrants, visual contact was observed in only 5.7%. 
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Table 6: Sources of information/ Visual contact with the camera 
 Total El País  (A) 
El Mundo 
 (B) 
ABC 
 (C) 
La Razón 
(D) 
Total 179 40 53 42 44 
 % % % % % 
Protagonists 
as source of 
report 
     
Yes 34.6 45D 35.8 40.5D 18.2 
No 65.4 55 64.2 59.5 81.8AC 
Visual 
contact with 
the camera 
     
Yes 22.3 22.5 20.8 23.8 22.7 
No 65.4 70 79.2CD 57.1 52.3 
Not observed 2.8 2.5 - 9.5 - 
Does nor 
feature 
people 
9.5 5 - 9.5B 25AB 
Source: authors 
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3.5.4.5. Analysis of the headlines  
 
The analysis of the headlines consists of classifying the context in 
which the immigrants are represented as positive, negative and neutral. A 
positive context is understood as the association of immigrants with socially 
valued actions or situations. By contrast, a negative context is considered to 
be their association with actions or situations that are socially reproachable. 
Finally, a neutral context is that in which the immigrants are not associated 
with either positive or negative contexts. 
 
From this analysis, it can be concluded that, in general terms, 
immigrants are associated with neutral contexts in 58.6% of cases and with 
negative contexts in 40.8%. References to positive contexts do not reach 1%.  
In comparative terms, El Mundo and ABC share similar behaviours, 
contextualising immigrants neutrally in 58.5% and 57.2%, respectively, of 
cases. For its part, El País presents the least number of negative contexts 
(17.5%), in contrast to La Razón, which most shows immigrants in negative 
contexts (61.4%). La Razón is the only newspaper in which the negative 
references exceeded neutral ones. 
 
It should be noted that the headlines of news items reporting on 
immigration do not necessarily feature immigrants as their main subject, a 
circumstance that has contributed to an increase in the recording of neutral 
contexts, such as those referring to legislative changes, action taken by the 
Government etc. 
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Table 7: Headlines/Context of representation of immigrants 
 Total El País (A) 
El Mundo 
(B) 
ABC 
(C) 
La Razón 
(D) 
Total 179 40 53 42 44 
 % % % % % 
Positive 
context 0.6 - 1.9 - - 
Negative 
Context 40.8 17.5 39.6A 42.8A 61.4AB 
Neutral 
Context 58.6 82.5BCD 58.5 57.2 38.6 
 
Source: authors 
 
With the aim of analysing the information presented thus far in more 
depth, the frequency of the use of different words associated with negative 
contexts has been determined. Given the high number of identifiable words 
and the low frequency of their use, they or each of their inflected forms were 
grouped into three semantic categories: violence, death and crime. The 
following presents a breakdown for each category: 
 
1. The category of “violence” corresponds to the use of the following words: 
attack, stab, assault, knives, injuries, rubber bullets, fight, robbery, 
kidnapping, rape. 
2. The category of “death” includes: bodies, the dead, murders, death. 
3. The category of “crime” includes: the convicted, delinquents, dismantled, 
detain, deportation, drugs, cocaine, hashish, marihuana, illegal, trial, 
mafia, drug traffickers, prostitution, the undocumented. 
 
Of the 179 headlines analysed, 12.3% use words directly associated 
with violence and 13.4% with death. 24.6% of the headlines use words 
associated with both violence and death.  
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It should be pointed out that, in percentage terms, La Razón contains 
headlines that refer to death most, reaching 25%, a percentage significantly 
higher than ABC, where these references are limited to 4.8%. The 
relationship Spanish newspapers establish between immigration and crime is 
also notable. Of the 179 headlines analysed, 17.9% used words that 
associate immigrants with criminal activities. Again, La Razón is the 
newspaper that publishes most headlines containing words in this category 
(31.8%), a percentage that is significantly higher than those of El País (7.5%) 
and El Mundo (11.3%) but not statistically higher than that of ABC (21.4%). 
 
Table 8: Headlines: semantic analysis 
 Total El País (A) 
El Mundo 
(B) 
ABC 
(C) 
La Razón 
(D) 
Total 179 40 53 42 44 
 % % % % % 
Total 
violence 12.3 12.5 9.4 14.3 13.6 
Total death 13.4 10.0 13.2 4.8 25.0C 
Total 
violence/death 24.6 22.5 22.6 16.7 36.4 
Total crime 17.9 7.5 11.3 21.4 31.8 AB 
Source: authors 
 
 
3.5.4.6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the representation of immigrants 
by four national daily newspapers based on the concept of “proper distance” 
proposed by Silverstone (2007). 
The results obtained allow us to confirm that, in general, in news 
articles accompanied by photographs, immigrants are represented from a 
distance.  
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From the formal point of view, the most significant result is the near 
complete absence of references to immigration on the front pages of the 
newspapers analysed over the period of a year  (95.5%).  
 
With respect to the visual representation of immigrants, they are 
normally shown in long shots, usually in groups and interacting among 
themselves. Only 4% of the photographs feature immigrants interacting with 
members of the local community. In the other cases, immigrants are 
photographed with the police and/or Guardia Civil, politicians or health 
workers. In line with the visual representation, the verbal representation 
through the headlines employed maintains a neutral tone, with a negative 
tendency manifested through words associated with concepts such as 
delinquency, violence and death, especially in La Razón. For its part, El País 
is notable for being the newspaper that presents immigrants in a negative 
context the least through its headlines.    
 
With reference to the opportunity that immigrants have to express 
themselves, in the majority of cases (65.4%) they are not the source of the 
news of which they are protagonists, especially in La Razón. Immigrants are 
usually represented from afar, so far away that they cannot be heard. This 
situation most severely affects sub-Saharan immigrants. The majority of 
journalism codes of ethics recommend avoiding discriminating people, 
whether as a function of the colour of their skin, nationality, religion, sex, 
sexual orientation etc. Furthermore, among the various rules that endorse the 
fostering of a comprehensive and truthful account of reality, one of the most 
notable obliges journalists to listen to all those involved in an incident. In this 
regard, by impeding immigrants from exercising their right to participate in the 
public sphere, journalists simultaneously violate two fundamental ethical 
principles: the respect for human dignity and the commitment to truth (Cornu, 
1994).  
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The data gathered in this study also reveals that visual contact with the 
camera is significantly higher when the photographs feature immigrants (33% 
vs. 5.7%). This means that the distance with which they are represented may 
vary within the same news piece: they may be given the opportunity to seek 
our gaze, by looking out of the picture, but at the same time they are 
prevented from talking. 
 
While recognising that it may be impossible to completely understand 
the meaning of the gaze of the other, who stares at us from their infinite 
difference, this finding suggests the existence of a conflicting combination 
between a gaze that questions and a voice that cannot be heard. The other 
becomes a body, a “silent body” (Silverstone, 2007: 2). The conclusion of this 
split representation of the other reveals poor coordination among editors, 
journalists and photojournalists that a future study should be able to 
explain31. 
 
In summary, the results presented here confirm the first hypothesis 
proposed: that immigrants do not usually have the opportunity to 
communicate directly with newspapers’ readers. They also corroborate this 
study’s second hypothesis: that there are significant differences in the 
treatment of immigration by the four Spanish newspapers. 
 
Taken together, these findings reveal the need to revise some of the 
established practises in the newsrooms of Spanish newspapers in order to 
promote a fairer and more personalised representation of immigrants.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
To conclude our study on ethics and photojournalism, it is important to 
highlight some of the main conclusions drawn in each chapter and to outline 
the possible relationships between them. 
 
The stated aim of our study was to analyse some of the assumptions 
that formed the historical bases of the predominant concept of what a good 
press photograph should be and to question their capacity to respond to 
some of the fundamental challenges that, in the current media context, affect 
our trust in news media.  Given the enormous difficulty facing contemporary 
ethics to ontologically and metaphysically justify the goodness of specific 
moral precepts, its contribution to the debate in the field of applied ethics 
should be to stimulate a critical-hermeneutical examination of the 
fundamental suppositions upon which specific morals are based upon and to 
question its capacity to respond to the new challenges posed by the 
technological developments that have qualitatively transform man's power to 
act upon the environment (Ricoeur, 1991b).  
 
Aware of the limitations of our methodological choices, we decided to 
examine the ethos of photojournalism by analysing various documents that 
bring together the ethical reflection applied to the profession, which mainly 
consisted of codes of conduct, academic journals on journalism ethics and 
stylebooks. On a secondary level are other documents that Claude-Jean 
Bertrand includes in his Media Accountability System (Bertrand, 2000) and 
that could be the object of future research into the subject.  
 
We are also aware that the specific practice of photojournalism could 
reveal certain shared assumptions on what a press photograph should be, 
but time and space limitations have forced us to prioritise. This does not 
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mean that the definition of the fundamental attributes of a good press 
photograph can be deduced directly from practice. To believe this would be 
to fall into the type of naturalist fallacy by which goodness could be deduced 
from being. That many photographs published in the media and on the 
Internet exploit the pain of anonymous people, victims of circumstances, with 
no political import, does not make these photographs good. However, the 
analysis of photographs could help find ways of photographing, editing and 
exhibiting images not considered in the documents analysed, thus enriching 
our reflection. Most of the references to specific cases analysed in this study 
served, above all, another purpose: to point out the main limits inherent to the 
predominant concept of press photography. The exception to this rule is the 
empirical study of the representation of immigration in four Spanish national 
newspapers presented in the last section of chapter 3 (3.5), which we 
discuss further on. 
 
To characterise the ethos of photojournalism, we decided to start by 
analysing documents that refer generically to journalism, not only because 
they are the most common and numerous, but also above all because the 
ethical reflection of the press historically exercised a significant influence on 
photojournalism (Zelizer, 1995; Schwartz, 1999; Lavoie, 2010b).  
 
The analysis of these documents allowed us to identify three main 
ethical news principles: freedom, truth and the respect for human dignity 
(Cornu, 1994), around which are a set of diverse practical and instrumental 
rules (Höffe, 1995). While the fundamental ethical principles themselves 
compel us through their intrinsic value, those principles of a practical or 
instrumental value compel us from the outside, whether because they foster 
good for somebody (pragmatic), or whether they help in the realisation of 
other goods through their purely conventional configuration (instrumental). 
Since these three fundamental principles are applied to journalism in general 
and are aimed at fostering the realisation of the press mission, it makes 
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perfect sense that they should also be applied to photojournalism. The same 
is not evident in the case of the pragmatic or instrumental principles, which 
need to adapt themselves to photography. The legitimacy of this intuition was 
reinforced after the oldest and most influential code of ethics specific to 
photojournalism was subjected to a critical-hermeneutical examination (1.6.). 
As a result of these analyses, we have been able to propose the following 
generic definition of photojournalism: Photojournalism is the activity involved 
in providing people with information of public interest through a combination 
of words and pictures in a free, truthful and respectful way.  
 
Having established these three fundamental ethical principles guiding 
journalism and photojournalism, it was important to analyse their interaction 
with the various other practical and instrumental precepts and to evaluate 
their capacity to promote the realisation of the press mission in today’s world. 
Once again, decisions had to be taken with regard to this question. It would 
be impossible, within the limits of this present study, to evaluate one by one 
each of the rules specifying how the freedom of information should be 
protected, how truth should be fostered and how the dignity of people in the 
news should be protected. In this regard, we decided to focus on the 
relationships between truth and objectivity (chapter 2) and between the 
defence of human dignity and the representation of suffering (chapter 3). The 
defence and promotion of liberty, however, remained outside the scope of 
this study. This decision does not mean that we consider this question to be 
of less relevance than the others. In fact, almost the opposite could be said. 
To suggest that freedom in photojournalism fundamentally depends on the 
ethical behaviour of photographers would be to do a favour for those who 
strive to limit the right to information. The reflection on press freedom should 
be able to think beyond cases of bad practice. There is no need to limit the 
freedom of photographers committed to public service in order to punish the 
paparazzi. In short: it is our belief that the defence of the freedom to inform 
should be considered within the legal sphere.  
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Chapter 2 centres on the current relationship between truth, objectivity 
and photography. The aim was not to discuss directly the question of truth in 
photography or determine what makes it possible to say that a photograph is 
true. This would be equivalent to discussing the image in the domain of the 
word. What we ask ourselves is whether the application of the concept of 
objectivity to photojournalism would not necessarily contribute to limiting the 
possibilities of the representation of reality to a particular way of seeing, 
which would certainly be legitimate but incapable of clearly justifying its 
desire for exclusivity. Unable to legitimise itself within a theoretical plan, the 
alternative would be to demonstrate its practical utility. In other words, the 
adoption of the principle of objectivity to press photography could be justified 
through its capacity to generate trust and credibility, without which the 
realisation of the press mission is impossible. In order to be able to go into 
these questions in any depth, we decided to follow the same strategy used in 
chapter 1. This obliged us to analyse how historically the idea of objectivity 
imposed itself upon journalism in the United States of America, which is 
considered paradigmatic of the situation in other Western countries (Maras, 
2013), and then to examine how it was applied to photojournalism.  
 
The historical analysis allowed us to conclude two important things: 
firstly, that the progressive adoption of the idea of objectivity complied with a 
set of specific technological, professional, commercial and political factors 
and, secondly, that the understanding of the concept of objectivity evolved 
over time, sometimes in several directions, in order to adapt itself to broader 
horizons of intelligibility, which are related to less ingenuous epistemological 
concepts or to diverse understandings of what the fundamental mission of 
the press should be. This evolution basically took two directions: according to 
the first, the idea of objectivity, understood as a predicate of the subject (the 
journalist) or of the object (the news), would go on to refer to a type of 
procedure designed to make the process of news production more 
transparent. This means, for example, revealing the reasons behind various 
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editorial decisions, enabling access to background information, including 
images not used in paper editions, etc. The second evolution of the concept 
of objectivity simply rejects its moral value within journalism and declares it 
either a form of deceit and lack of honesty that aims to hide the inevitable 
bias of the journalistic account, or declares its adoption to be 
counterproductive, through fostering a disinterested and distant vision of the 
politics that discourages the participation of citizens in the res publica 
(Schudson, 1978; Maras, 2013).  
 
Having analysed the historical evolution of the concept of objectivity and 
identified the various factors that encouraged its adoption in journalism, we 
then needed to examine how the idea of objectivity also imposed itself upon 
photojournalism.  
 
The first interesting finding that resulted from the review of the different 
works dedicated to the history of photojournalism revealed that determining 
its origins is disputed: while for most historians photojournalism should be 
understood as the natural evolution of photography itself, for professionals 
and practitioners photojournalism represents a rupture from the previous 
uses assigned to photography, having been responsible for the introduction 
of a set of novel characteristics including speed, mass market appeal, 
reproducibility and promptness (Lavoie, 2010: 12). This last historical point is 
interesting and confirms an important thesis for our study, according to which 
the adoption of the principle of objectivity served historically to set press 
photography in opposition to artistic photography and to help bring the new 
professional ethos of the press photographer closer to the ethos of the 
journalist (Zelizer, 1995; Lavoie, 2010b). It is this association between press 
photography and credibility that still serves as an argument for John Long, 
chairman of the NPPA Ethics & Standards Committee, to respond to the use 
of HDR in photojournalism (Long, 2012). But what history shows is that this 
association is the product of a set of professional, technological and 
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commercial factors characteristic of an era and not the definitive expression 
of a privileged relationship between a particular way of photographing and 
reality. In fact, for publishers of the 1830s and 1840s, the artistic dimension 
of illustrations did not compromise their objectivity or factuality. This rupture 
consolidated from the 1870s onwards, when technology finally made it 
possible to mass print photographs directly in newspapers, which would lead 
publishers to do without the manual work of illustrators and wood-engravers 
(Schwartz, 1999). With the advent of photography, a new concept of the 
objective image was thus born, characterised for being the result of a 
mechanical process that is, with barely any human manipulation through 
which objects themselves became imprinted upon a special film. And it was 
this indexical aspect that was the target of all the rhetorical artillery used to 
foster credibility and authority of the press photograph, which had been 
affected by the increasing influence of the public relations services, the 
propagandistic uses during the First World War and the excesses committed 
by the yellow press.  
 
Trust in the photographic image was profoundly affected by the advent 
of computers and digitalization that invaded the world of photography at the 
end of the 1980s. But it is nonetheless ironic that it was technology, once the 
source of trust in photography, that now became a source of extreme 
suspicion. The level of sophistication of image editing software these days 
allows images to be created that resemble photographs without actually 
being so. In other words, that the objects represented have not at any 
moment been in front of the camera, a possibility that seriously compromises 
the attribution of the testimonial value to the photograph through what was 
once its fundamental predicate: its indexical aspect. Furthermore, digital 
photography is no longer, as analogue was, the result of the direct contact of 
light projected by objects onto a film, but rather the product of a computer 
algorithm that converts data recorded in digital sensors into an image. In 
other words, digital photography requires a post-processing stage after, 
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which can take place either within the camera itself or in a computer. In this 
precise regard, all digital photographs are the result of manipulation.  
 
The response of the industry to this authentic revolution was rather 
conservative. The review of the codes of ethics, stylebooks, internal 
guidelines and professional forums reveals that the defence of press 
photography’s credibility in the digital era focused on the protection of the 
integrity of photography against the increasingly subtle and imperceptible 
forms of manipulation.  
 
To protect the integrity of the photographic image, it was determined 
that the only legitimate post-production editing techniques would be those 
already accepted in the old darkroom: limited cropping, dodging and burning, 
minor toning and colour adjustments, conversion to grey-scale and the use of 
cloning tools to eliminate dust on camera sensors or scratches on scanned 
negatives/prints (Campbell, 2014). The problem with this solution is that 
these criteria are too imprecise, since it is difficult to determine at what point 
a minor toning and colour adjustment might affect the integrity of a 
photograph. Moreover, there is a lack of consistency within the set of rules. 
For example, darkening a photograph to make a particular element disappear 
from the scene is prohibited. Yet this same effect could be legitimate if 
achieved through framing or cropping. At the root of this lack of rigour and 
unity is the difficulty in precisely defining and justifying what should be 
understood by the integrity of a photographic image. In this regard, these 
criteria are designed to foster a value that was not determined beforehand. 
Furthermore, this lack of precision and unity raises an inevitable question: will 
this type of solution be ideal to strengthen the credibility and trust in 
photojournalism? The controversy generated by the World Press Photo 
suggests not. The case of the photograph taken by Paul Hansen, winner of 
the contest in 2013, illustrates the confusion generated by the lack of clear, 
precise criteria needed to determine the limits of post-production. Having 
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been accused of being the result of an illegitimate composition procedure 
(HDR), Hansen’s photograph was subjected to various forensic analyses, 
which compared the JPEG file sent for the competition with the RAW file 
generated by the camera in the precise moment it was taken. The experts, 
however, did not come to the same conclusions (2.4.).  And in this year’s 
competition (2015), 22% of the photographs that made it to the final round 
(20 out of 90) were disqualified for illegitimate post-processing after the same 
kind of analyses had been carried out. 
 
In short, grounding the credibility of photojournalism on a hypostatic 
concept of photographic integrity creates more problems than solutions: 
firstly, because it relegates to second division other potential ways of 
manipulation related to photographic opportunities, photographer’s decisions, 
framing, light and shade, composition, etc. Secondly, because it creates the 
illusion that trust in photography might depend on a technical analysis, thus 
hiding the fact that the criterion defining what should be considered legitimate 
is essentially conventional. Thirdly, because hypostasize the technical aspect 
makes it difficult for news' readers and users to participate in the debate on 
ethics and photojournalism. Finally, and because technology is developing at 
an exponential rate, this strategy forces us to constantly update the criteria of 
legitimacy, generating not only insecurity but also an atmosphere of general 
suspicion. The possibility of deceit will always be one step ahead of the tools 
developed to detect it. This last reason dismantles the arguments of those 
who believe this type of forensic analysis would be the best antidote to the 
dangers that arise through the increasing utilisation of user-generated 
content. 
 
In summary, from a practical point of view, insisting on defending a 
concept of objectivity as an essential attribute of the photograph no longer 
makes sense in the digital era. The revolution that computers and 
digitalization represents requires us to be capable of considering 
 219 
photography beyond the limits of the photograph and to be able to rebuild 
trust in photojournalism in the relationship between the media and readers.  
 
The third and last chapter of this study focused on the relationship 
between the protection of human dignity and the representation of the other, 
especially the other who is suffering. The professional codes of ethics are, in 
this respect, decisive in asserting that, as a general rule, the media should 
refrain from intruding into the pain and suffering of people. However, 
exceptions are allowed when the news in question is of undeniable public 
interest. In other words, when it is essential for people to be able to formulate 
well-grounded judgements on questions related to their everyday lives. It is 
evident that on many occasions the invasion of privacy occurs for strictly 
commercial purposes. People’s lives have become an extremely profitable 
business. However, equally condemnable is the exploitation of people’s 
privacy, as is failing to publish necessary information. In this regard, the 
distortion of the concept of public interest might equally serve to justify the 
intrusion in people’s private lives as it does to justify the need to withhold 
sensitive information.  
 
Regardless of reasserting the importance of denouncing the malicious 
interpretations of the concept of public interest, our attention focused on the 
question of how images should be used in those cases where a greater 
public interest can be proven. How should the duty to inform be balanced 
with the obligation to minimise the pain inflicted on those appearing in the 
news? How do we prevent the visual representation of people’s pain and 
suffering becoming a show? Would all photographic representation of 
suffering be destined to beautifying it and convert it into an object for 
aesthetic contemplation? This question is decisive, as the possibility of 
morally justifying the use of photography as a means of denouncing evil and 
injustice depends on its answer.  
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Influential contemporary thinkers of photography, such as Susan 
Sontag, are fairly sceptic with regards to the use of photography as a means 
of denouncing. In her influential book On Photography, Sontag proposed an 
ecology of images as a way of combating the spectacle the exhibition of 
horror had become. Under question is not only the exploitation of people’s 
suffering but also the loss of the sense of reality that leads to insensitivity and 
compassion fatigue. According to this argument, photography would possess 
an aestheticizing tendency, which the media makes use of, that ends up 
neutralising the anguish that photographs of suffering aim to convey. Its form 
destroys its content (Sontag, 1990). However, in Regarding the pain of others 
(2003), the radical nature of this argument is more nuanced. Sontag does not 
appear willing to accept the consequence that would result from asserting 
that photography necessarily aestheticizes suffering. Taken to its extreme, 
this argument would entail having to reject any form of politically motivated 
representation of suffering. The problem, as Mark Reinhardt asserts, is that 
“(...) as a response to suffering, the refusal to picture may pose the most 
problems of all” (Reinhardt, 2007b: 15). Among other possible examples, the 
coverage of the war on terror unleashed as a consequence of the 9/11 
attacks made it clear that the portrayal of death and violence obeys complex 
games of interests that have little to do with protecting the dignity of the 
victims (Reinhardt, 2007b; Zelizer, 2010).  
 
Alerted to the negative effects resulting from the management of the 
invisibility of suffering, it is important to question once again how it should be 
represented without offending the dignity of the victims. For Ariella Azoulay, 
the approach to this question would have to free itself from the opposition, 
popularized by Walter Benjamin, between aesthetics and politics (Azoulay, 
2010a). According Azoulay, this mutually exclusive opposition is based on 
three false assumptions: 1) that political photographs could be stripped of 
any aesthetic dimension. This assumption disregards the fact that 
photographic objectivity, to which journalistic photography aspires, is an 
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effect brought about by the application of a set of specific techniques that aim 
to hide not only the presence of the photographer but also the material 
aspect of the photograph; 2) that what photographs are would exclusively 
depend on the photographer’s intention and technique. This assumption, in 
addition to being based on an extremely naïve semiotic concept, disregards 
the fact that the people photographed also determine what photographs 
represent; 3) that the aesthetic and the political would be characteristic of the 
photographs themselves. This assumption disregards the fact that what 
transforms a photograph into a document of political meaning is not the 
photograph itself but the acts and decisions people adopt with respect to it 
 
Azoulay’s contribution to the debate on the representation of suffering 
possesses two great merits: firstly, it allows it to be rescued from the 
exclusive circle of experts who would compete to judge whether or not a 
photograph is legitimate. It is as if everybody had an opinion about the 
legitimacy of photographs except the people photographed, remarks Azoulay 
ironically. And this aspect for us is decisive: the representation of suffering of 
the other cannot deny them the right to participate in determining their way of 
appearing. Secondly, Azoulay’s approach broadens the understanding of 
photography beyond the limits of the photograph by considering it as 
fundamentally the result of an encounter, with a potentially political meaning, 
between the photographer, the camera and the person photographed, 
without any one of them being able to claim the power to determine the 
meaning of the encounter. This, however, does not mean that anything goes. 
Azoulay is aware of the spectacle the representation of death, pain and 
suffering has become. But to put the brakes on what she calls the 
“acceleration of horror”, the best strategy is not to consider the form of the 
photographs but to adopt a position on the violence and injustice suffered by 
those photographed (Azoulay, 2008). In short, it is not the aesthetic or artistic 
aspect of a photograph that mainly compromises the representation of the 
suffering of the other. In this regard, the argument that the moral primacy of 
 222 
press photography in representing pain and suffering is founded on its 
objectivity and realism is as fallacious as the argument that sustains that it is 
this objectivity and realism that explains the privileged relationship that press 
photography establishes with the truth.  
 
For Roger Silverstone, the moral representation of the other should 
respect a proper distance, defined as an intermediate point between two 
extreme positions, one that errs towards excess (too far or too close) and the 
other, deficiency (refusal to photograph). Echoing the Aristotelian concept of 
mesotes, the author asserts that the proper distance cannot be determined 
abstractly, through the application of any general criterion, but has to adjust 
itself to the specific case in point, paying attention to the context and taking 
care of the people photographed.  
 
The empirical study included in the last section of chapter 3 (3.5.) 
shows that, as a general rule, the principal Spanish newspapers do not 
respect the proper distance: they represent immigrants in a depersonalised 
way, mainly in groups, with no interaction with members of the local 
community and without being given the opportunity to explain their version of 
events. But this distance from which the media represents immigrants is not 
only condemnable for its negative discrimination of the immigrants 
themselves but also attacks one of the other main fundamental ethics of 
photojournalism: the search for truth. By denying immigrants any say, the 
media deprive us of indispensable perceptions and understandings of reality. 
And by favouring the publication of photographs in which immigrants appear 
far away, the media make it difficult for them to appeal to us with their gaze, 
to ask us for help or to reveal to us their pain, suffering and indignation. From 
afar, things do not appear as they really are. For this reason, for Silverstone, 
the media has the moral duty to foster a fairer, diverse and plural public 
space, which involves welcoming the active participation of people whose 
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access to the media is made more difficult by belonging to minority social 
groups.  
 
Finally, a word dedicated to Emmanuel Levinas, whose moral 
philosophy has exercised an important influence on our own reflection of the 
representation of the other. From his intuitions, we have mainly retained the 
idea that the alterity of the other is absolute and irreducible to sphere of 
constitution of the same. The naked face of the other is the epiphany of the 
infinite, of this absolute difference that separates him from me. In this regard, 
the other will always resist any attempt to be defined and represented.  This 
argument was important for our study, as it helped us contest the argument 
of the supposed privilege that press photography has when it comes to 
representing the reality of the other. However, this argument is also important 
for another reason: the fact that the other is absolute difference and that his 
alterity cannot be represented requires us to recognise that the other is also 
unique. Nobody can replace him. For Levinas, more than an object of 
knowledge, the other is the subject of a fundamental ethical relationship that 
makes knowledge itself possible. Without the other, there is no truth. Our 
fundamental moral duty is, therefore, to welcome and care for the other. 
Ethics is hospitality. 
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Notes 
 
                                            
1 Both the New York Times and the Washington Post recognized that their coverage of the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had been biased. See: The New York Times, 2004 
and Kurtz, 2004. 
2 “El êthos es el suelo firme, el fundamento de la práxis, la raíz de la que brotan todos los actos 
humanos” (Aranguren, 1994: 21). 
3 The verse of the Greek poet Pindar (518 BC - 438 BC) translates perfectly the idea: “Become 
such as you are, having learned it” (Pythian 2, line 72). It is worth mentioning that Pindar’s verse 
should not be understood through the lens of our modern psychology. As various academics have 
pointed out, the poet is not addressing our personal self, inviting us to discover through the labyrinths 
of our complex psychological life what could be called our authentic self. “Become who you are” should 
be understood, rather, as an invitation for each one of us to fully develop ourselves as rational beings. 
4 “Qui concerne soit les moeurs, soit les règles de conduite admises à une époque, dans une 
société déterminé” (Lalande, 1947: 636). 
5 “La science qui prend pour objet immédiat les jugements d'appréciation sur les actes qualifiés 
bons ou mauvais” (Lalande, 1947: 295). 
6 Although not recognized by some of the most classic English dictionaries (Oxford Dictionary, 
Cambridge Dictionary), the exceptions being Collin’s English Dictionary and Merriam-Webster, we 
believe that the use of the noun form “obligatoriness” does not pose any particular hermeneutical 
problems. 
7 It is worth mentioning that on his critical remarks on these different moral theories, André 
Léonard avoids referring directly to their authors. His purpose is not to go into any of these 
philosophical moral theories in depth, but to highlight their general structure and to point out the 
difficulties that they may face in order to convincingly ground the absoluteness of moral values and 
their obligatory character. That is the reason why he says that hedonism is really not that “Epicurean”, 
for Epicurus centred his ethics on temperance, or that Aristotle’s eudemonism should not be 
considered simplistic and reductive, given the fact that for the philosopher “the rule for moral good is all 
that contributes to the reasoned happiness of men” (See Léonard, 1997: 108-109). 
8 The expression “from duty” is the one used by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. See Kant 
(2011). 
9 “La moral kantiana es, en principio, como la moral sartriana, perfectamente “acósmica” (= 
cosmos, en griego). En ella, ninguna inspiración moral se busca en la naturaleza de las cosas o en los 
datos objetivos de nuestra condición humana” (Léonard, 1997: 165). 
10 As we shall see further on, formalism may be considered also from a positive perspective. 
This thesis is in line with that developed by Paul Ricoeur in Oneself as Another (Ricoeur, 1992). The 
main argument: a formalist approach to moral duty should not replace an ethics based on virtue and 
oriented toward ends, but rather be seen as a complementary approach to moral life. Its normative 
dimension and its appeal to universality are very important moments of moral life. 
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11 “Se trata de encontrar una instancia capaz de fundar conjuntamente el carácter 
transcendente de la obligación moral en cuanto me obliga, es decir, en cuanto que me liga realmente, 
y su carácter inmanente en cuanto que se impone a mí desde dentro, es decir, en conciencia” (André 
Léonard, 1997: 172). 
12 “De la figura de la conciencia moral, a saber, de la moral de la razón pura práctica, debemos 
retener, ante todo, como un hallazgo fundamental, el que la esencia del valor moral y, en 
consecuencia, la norma de la conciencia moral, han de buscarse en la conformidad de la acción 
humana con la razón” (Léonard, 1997: 172). 
13 "En la hipótesis en que la metafísica persigue la cuestión del ser hasta alcanzar la 
afirmación de Dios, la respuesta será que el dinamismo de las esencias procede de la inteligencia y de 
la voluntad creadoras" (Léonard, 1997: 222-223). 
14 “La amistad que busca el bien y la promoción del otro es el valor moral fundamental que se 
desprende de la apertura de la razón humana a la estructura de la libertad y al misterio del ser” 
(Léonard, 1997: 202). 
15 Among others, Boris Libois (1994) has pointed out the paradoxical situation of having people 
claiming, at the same time, more ethics in journalism while recognizing the limited room for manoeuvre 
that professional journalists have. Among the constraining factors identified, which would help explain 
bad practices, Libois lists the following: economical and technological determinism; the structural 
transformation of television; the complot, disinformation and manipulation and, finally, the increasing 
pressure of public relations organizations. We will come back to this point throughout this first chapter. 
16 "Or, c'est toujours, me semble-t-il, à propos de convictions préalables que l'on pose la 
question de fondement" (Ricoeur, 1991: 279). 
17 “Ce sont les difficultés internes à notre rapport à des interdits structurants qui nous amènent 
à chercher pour l'obligation morale, telle qu'elle s'impose au plan social, un fondement plus radical que 
le simple 'tu dois'” (Ricoeur, 2001: 32). 
18 Otfried Höffe’s Political Justice [Politische Gerechtigkeit: Grundlegung einer kritischen 
Philosophie von Recht und Staat, Suhrkamp, 1987] was originally published in German in 1987. 
19 This is probably the main reason why in countries like Portugal and Spain, journalism codes 
of ethics were only established after the breakdown of the dictatorial regimes that ruled both countries 
from the 1930s until the mid-1970s. The first Portuguese journalism code of ethics was adopted in 
1976 by the Portuguese Journalists’ Union, and the Spanish one in 1991 by the Col.legi de Periodistes 
de Catalunya. For more information about the process involved in the creation of the Portuguese Code 
of Ethics, see (Pina, 2002) and for the situation in Spain see (Aznar, 1999). 
20 Independent Press Standards Organisation Editor’s Code of Practice, available online: 
https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/cop.html [Retrieved February, 19, 2015]. 
21 Point number 10 does not figure in the first edition of The Elements of Journalism, published 
in 2001, having been included in the revised and updated second edition published in 2007, although 
references to the rights and responsibilities of citizens can be found throughout the first edition of the 
book. 
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22 “La déontologie du photojournalisme est donc plutôt une ontologie, puisque c’est de 
l’essence même de cette pratique qu’il est encore question” (Lavoie, 2010b: §18). 
23 For more information on the pioneering role of The Illustrated London News see, for 
instance, Sousa, 2011: 32-33. 
24 Section 2.5 and 2.5 resume and extend our paper published in 2013 in the Journal of 
Applied Journalism and Media Studies (2), 2, with the title "Gaza Burial, World Press Photo 2013: 
Between ethics and forensics". See Santos Silva, 2013. 
25 «C’est que, pour Levinas, l’idée de l’infini en moi, ou encore, l’irruption au sein même de la 
subjectivité d’une transcendance qui, en même temps, la déborde absolument ne relève en aucun cas 
du savoir, défini comme l’assimilation d’un objet par un sujet » (Mosès, 1993: 80). 
26 «Il y a au contraire une vulnérabilité propre de la pensée exposée à l’idée de l’infini, une 
disposition en quelque sorte intrinsèque de la pensée à être blessée dans sa suffisance à soi» (Mosès, 
1993: 80). 
27 Among other studies focusing on the coverage of the Iraq invasion by the American news 
media see, for instance: Butler, 2004; Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingstone, 2007; Zelizer, 2010. 
28 "(...) réduite à l'état de pur langage, la photographie ne nous désorganise pas" (Barthes, 
1970: 99). 
29 The study presented in this section was carried out within the context of a broader research 
project devoted to the representation of immigration in the Spanish press in collaboration with 
colleagues from the Abat Oliba CEU University, Dr Ana Beriain Bañares, and from the Complutense 
University of Madrid, Dr Elena Real Rodríguez and Dr Maria del Mar López Talavera, to whom we are 
grateful for having given permission for this study to be included in our doctoral dissertation. 
30  The selection of the sample in this study was inspired by the research carried out by Igartua, 
J. J., Otero, J. A., & Muñiz, C. (2006), “Imágenes de la inmigración a través de la fotografía de prensa. 
Un análisis de contenido”. Comunicación y Sociedad, XIX (1), 103-128. 
31 References to this question in American journalism can be find, for instance, in Zelizer, 2010. 
"The photographer does not make the final decision about which image to display but transmits the 
image to editors, who make the selection "without the photographer's permission or agreement". And 
citing Jenni Goldamn, Zelizer adds: "if there is a crisis in world photojournalism today, it is a crisis of 
editing and publishing, not of photography" (Zelizer, 2010: 61). 
